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NOTICE

The Publishers wish to apologize for the present somewhat cramped appearance of the pages of the Classical Quarterly. This is temporary only, and is due to the fact that when a change of style for the New Series was finally agreed upon, a certain amount of material had already been set up in type in the old style. To avoid having to reset this, it was decided to keep these pages for 1951, but to reduce the margins so that they could be inserted in the new cover. The 1952 and subsequent issues will have their type suited to the new size, and it is hoped that the change in appearance will be generally welcomed.

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A NEW GNOMOLOGIUM: WITH SOME REMARKS ON GNOMIC ANTHOLOGIES, II

We will now consider the most obvious parallels to our text in the papyri.

(1) and (2) Berl. Kl. Texte V. 20 A and B (P 9772, 9773). Both second century B.C. Both deal with the subject of women and marriage. In both the citations are arranged to present opposite views on the subject. In A citations 1–6 (and perhaps 7–9) denounce women and marriage, while 10–13 defend them; in B 1–4 defend women,[1] while the subject of the remaining excerpts is indicated by the heading ψόγος γυναικῶν. Compare Stob. *Flor.* §§ 67–74, where several chapters are devoted to what was treated here in one subdivided chapter.

(3) The so-called *Disticha Argentinensia* (2nd century A.D.; see *Archiv f. Pap.* ii (1903), pp. 185 ff.), a much later collection on the same subject.

(4) P. Petrie III, 1. 1 (3rd century B.C.). A fragment containing two short extracts, one from Epicharmus and the other from Euripides. (For their interesting textual history see *Livre d'Écolier*, p. xxvi.) The common subject, as *ed. pr.* remarks, is 'some advice or reflection on the miseries of life and their remedies'. Cf. Stob. § 98 (περὶ βίου κτλ.).

(5) P. Ross.-Georg. I. 9 (2nd century B.C.). Two excerpts from Euripides, the first from the *Danaë*, the second from the *Orestes*. The common topic appears (as *ed. pr.* suggests) to be the question 'What is the greatest good in life?' Cf. Stob. § 103, π. εὐδαιμονίας.

(6) The fragment published by Kalbfleisch, 'Griechische Komödienbruchstücke aus einer Anthologie', *Raccolta Lumbroso*, pp. 29 ff. (*c.* 100 B.C.). The first extract deals with the subject of poverty; the second, quoted (apparently) from the *Νομοθέτης*, a known play of Menander, is too fragmentary for the subject to be determined. Cf. Stob. §§ 91–7 (on πλοῦτος and πενία). (The topic of the first fragment reminds one of the question 'Num paupertas impedimento sit hominibus ad philosophandum'.)

(7) P. Hibeh 7 (*c.* 250–210 B.C.) contains selections in iambic and lyric metres; it is badly damaged and sense can be made out only in the identifiable portions—one consisting of thirteen lines from the *Electra* of Euripides and the other the well-known line of Euripides or Menander *φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρήσθ' ὁμιλίαι κακαί.* I suppose (although as in the previous case this cannot be shown) that this was an anthology arranged under subject-headings; if this assumption is true, it seems that we have here remains of at least *two* chapters, the first περὶ εὐγενείας (cf. Stob. §§ 86–90), or (less probably) περὶ πλούτου καὶ πενίας (id. §§ 91–7), the second π. φίλων (cf. chapters xxxii–xli in Photius' summary of Stobaeus).

These scanty fragments, as far as their mutilated state permits us to judge, seem to be the nearest parallels to our text in the papyri. My supposition that each was but a part of a fairly large compilation covering a large number of subjects rests on the slenderest of internal evidence (that provided by P. Hibeh I. 7); but I think that the probability of this will become strengthened the more we inquire into their affinities and history. Their precise purpose (which we shall presently investigate) and the size and arrangement of the excerpts would strictly entitle them to be placed in a class by themselves; I would, however, extend this class to embrace any collection of excerpts, of whatever magnitude and however arranged, which has been made with an eye to the ethical or didactic value of their content; for instance the 'Menandrean' *Monosticha* (cf. P. Iand. V. 77); the short collection of χρεῖαι and γνῶμαι in P. Bouriant; and the Byzantine *Gnomologia*.[1] This in spite of the fact that some of them at least are mere collections of copy-book sentences suitable for use in the lower stages of education (cf. *C.Q.*. xliv (1950), p. 136).

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[1] And are not, as Knox says, 'a general discussion' of the subject; cf. *ed. pr.*, note.

For the moment, however, we shall confine our attention to the narrower class to which our text belongs.

It has already been noted[2] that these fragmentary anthologies, to which ours bears the closest relationship, contain a great number of passages which are also to be found in Stobaeus and Orion. To these we must now add both of the prose γνῶμαι in our anthology: Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 8. 17; *Flor.* 112. 14. The identity can hardly be accidental: it strongly suggests some continuous tradition analogous to that found in the *Stephanos*-anthology, of whose history—a history of progressive absorption and accretion—we have more complete evidence. The fact that our anthology includes *prose* γνῶμαι,[3] and that these come *after* the verse pieces,[4] brings the resemblance of these early *gnomologia* to the later ones closer than ever. The other details of the resemblance are equally striking. First, the predominantly ethical nature of the quotations and their arrangement under *subjects*. (Most of these subjects are to be found together in the third book of Stobaeus' *Florilegium*.) Second, the subdivision of the topic, in (1), (2), and (3) at any rate, into opposite or contradictory points of view. This *antilogical* tendency (cf. Hense, art. cit., p. 2559) has been well expressed by Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 59: 'Anthologi enim ut Stobaeus argumentorum oppositione delectantur'. (The subject of τύχη is one which admits of more than two points of view; we should therefore not expect antilogical arrangement in our papyrus.)

If these resemblances to Stobaeus' anthology are significant, as I think they are, we already see in the *gnomologium* a literary form which has preserved its distinguishing features from the early Ptolemaic period (at least) till the Byzantine age. We can also conjecture by comparison with the scope of Stobaeus' compilation something about the probable proportions of the kind of anthology from which this odd sheet has been recovered. I think that each will have embraced quite a large number of subjects; the description of the *favi* in Seneca, *Ep.* 83, and the miscellaneous content of the ethical extracts in Ostr. Berl. P 12310, 12311 (see below, p. 12), the products of a schoolboy's *varia lectio*, seem to me to make this very probable. Nevertheless the scale on which these subjects were treated cannot have been comparable with that which we find in Stobaeus. To take, for instance, the subject treated in our example, which was perhaps covered in all its aspects in four columns: we find chapters on different aspects of the same topic and related topics scattered (in no very definite order) under separate headings in various parts of Stobaeus' work: thus in the Photian summary we see:

> Bk. I. 1. περὶ τύχης ἢ ταὐτομάτου.* 8. καί, ὅτι ἀλόγιστος ἡ φορὰ τῆς τύχης.* II. (8. περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν.) (29. περὶ τοῦ βούλεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀναβάλλεσθαι.) 30. ὅτι τὸ δυστυχῆσαι πολλάκις ἐπωφελὲς γίνεται, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἄφροσι. III. (3. περὶ φρονήσεως).* IV. (105. ὅτι ἀβέβαιος τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐπραξία.) 106. περὶ τῶν παρ' ἀξίαν εὐτυχούντων.* 107. περὶ τῶν παρ' ἀξίαν δυστυχούντων.* 108. ὅτι δεῖ γενναίως φέρειν τὰ προσπίπτοντα.* 109. ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εὐτυχίας προφαίνειν, τὰς δὲ ἀτυχίας κρύπτειν. 112. ὅτι οὐ χρὴ ἐπιχαίρειν τοῖς ἀτυχοῦσιν.* 113. ὅτι οἱ ἀτυχοῦντες χρῄζουσι τῶν συμπασχόντων. Of these topics some come directly under the subject of τύχη; others (in brackets) are related topics; I have indicated those which are touched upon in our text with an asterisk.

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[1] The *Comparatio Menandri et Philistionis* appears to be a special and perhaps intermediate case.

[2] For a summary of examples see *Livre d'Écolier*, pp. xxiv ff.

[3] A fact which weakens Knox's arguments (op. cit.) pp. 12 ff., about the reasons for the decay of Greek poetry and prose respectively.

[4] See Hense, s.v. 'Johannes (Stobaeus)', P.-W. ix.

(For the history of the subject-headings in Stobaeus see Hense, art. cit., coll. 2552 ff. and the literature quoted by him there.)

We see that the smaller scale of our anthology necessarily brought different aspects of one broad subject under a single head where in Stobaeus they have been assigned separate chapters. But the basic arrangement was, I believe, the same; and so is the general purpose. Compare the words of the Photian summary: *Σεπτιμίῳ ἰδίῳ υἱῷ . . . συλλεξάμενος ἐπὶ τῷ ῥυθμίσαι καὶ βελτιῶσαι τῷ παιδὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἀμαυροτέραν ἔχουσαν . . . .* The whole tendency of this kind of compilation is educational; I hope to show that it was meant to serve this end from the first. To do this, however, it will be necessary to investigate its origins and early history.

I consider one of the most important documents for the anthological or selective method in literary education to be Plutarch's essay *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat*, mentioned above in connexion with the simile of the bee—a work whose bearing on the history of anthologies has already attracted notice.[1] Its particular interest lies in the fact that it gives reason and justification for what seems in Plutarch's time to have been a prevalent feature of a certain stage of Greek education. Especial stress is laid on the value of *ἀντιλογίαι*, the presentation of opposite points of view on a given subject: in § 4 (p. 20 C; cf. ibid. 21 A–22 B) Plutarch, discussing poetic education, stresses the value to the student of the presentation to him of opposite or contradictory views well expressed, and with their respective cases put as ingeniously as possible; this, he says, sharpens the critical faculty. It is this *antilogical* arrangement of the subject-matter, in Stobaeus and the Berlin *gnomologia* A and B, which I think gives the vital clue to the origin of the *gnomologium* as an instrument of education. Even without any express contemporary reference to systematically compiled anthologies we should, I think, be justified in suspecting a connexion with the *sophistic movement* and its preoccupation with *δύο λόγοι*; in respect of the latter we are reminded particularly of Protagoras. See Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6. 65; Diog. Laert. 9. 51; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Ἄβδηρα*; Arist. *Rhet.* 2. 24, § 11; Cic. *Brut.* § 30; Tzetzes, *Chil.* 11, *Hist.* 384; cf. Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, p. 130. In the anthologies, as in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, the arguments on either side of a question contend before the critical eye of the young student, who awards the honours. For a supporter of the method, like Plutarch, it is natural to take an optimistic view of the pupil's capacity for judgement. For Aristophanes, a conservative and a pessimist, there are indeed two sides to every question—a right one and a wrong one; and he is convinced that whenever the wrong one is put with enough novelty and audacity the young at least can be relied upon to choose it. And in Aristophanes we find not only general denunciation of the new system which discovered 'two arguments' in every point at issue, but evidence for the use or misuse of *γνῶμαι* from the poets to serve this end. One of his chief objections to the abominable Euripides is the fact that he affords a wealth of *γνῶμαι*[2] to the defender of morally indefensible arguments. It may be instructive to refer to the passages in the *Clouds* where the word *γνώμη* or a derivative is used, in the relevant sense: 320 f., 894 ff., 952, 1036 ff., 1314. In some of these places the *γνῶμαι* are the invention of the proficient speaker himself; in others they may be original or quoted. That Aristophanes does recognize quotation from the poets as a feature of sophistic practice is evident; his own use of the weapon, either by literal quotation or in parody, is mischievous and effective. For instance, when the tables are turned upon Strepsiades and he reproaches his son for beating him, the all too well trained young sophist unctuously replies with a *γνώμη* parodied from Euripides: *κλάουσι παῖδες, πατέρα δ' οὐ κλάειν δοκεῖς;* In *Frogs* 1471 Euripides' own *γνώμη* is turned against him by Dionysus, who airily disposes of a promise with *ἡ γλῶττ' ὀμώμοκ'* . . . .

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[1] See ibid. 2577.

[2] Quintilian calls Euripides '*sententiis densus*' (*Inst.* 10. 1. 65). Even if my attribution to him of col. I, l. 3 is incorrect, our anthology will no doubt have contained some *γνῶμαι* of Euripides, with whom *τύχη* was such a favourite topic; see G. Busch, *Untersuchungen zum Wesen der Τύχη in den Tragödien des Euripides*, diss. Heidelb. 1937; W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, tr. Highet, ii, p. 351.

The importance attached by the greatest of the early sophists to the study of poetry is expressed by him as strongly as possible in *Protagoras* 338 E: *ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι.* Socrates takes up his challenge and in a learned and ingenious interpretation of the two apparently contradictory *γνῶμαι* of Simonides proposed by Protagoras for discussion shows himself the sophist's match; he then expresses his disapproval of the practice of dragging the poets into philosophical discussion—a practice to which we must conclude Protagoras to have been especially prone (347 B ff.). When Plato makes Protagoras take two apparently contradictory *γνῶμαι* of Simonides as his text in this way, I think he does so with a double purpose. First, he shows us what Protagoras looks for in a poet: contrary arguments well expressed. Secondly, he represents with what triumph the sophist discovers such contrary arguments in a poet so respected for wholesome teaching by the supporters of traditional education as Simonides. Protagoras does indeed give poetry a high place of importance in his scheme of education, but with an ulterior motive. It is not difficult to see what he and his followers thought poetry was good for; it must serve the ends of argument and furnish its material.[1]

If we examine the remains of some of the other sophists, too, we find certain features which suggest a connexion with the anthologies, both in their arrangement and their material. When Cicero (*Brutus* 12. 47), speaking of Gorgias, says '. . . Cum singularum rerum laudes et vituperationes conscripsisset—quod iudicaret hoc oratoris esse maxime proprium, rem augere posse laudando, vituperandoque rursus adfligere', we think again of the *ἔπαινος–ψόγος* antilogies which we saw in Stobaeus and some of the earlier *gnomologia*. The evidence for the extent and manner of the sophists' use of earlier writers, too, is interesting. The sophists were not only, as W. Jaeger says (*Paideia*, vol. ii, p. 293), 'the first to give methodical instruction in the works of the great poets, from whom they usually chose the texts of their own discourses'; they were so thoroughly steeped in poetry that it influenced their style and diction, so that with them the distinction between poetry and prose seems to break down, and we are not surprised to find among them writers who were equally at home in either medium of expression. See Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, pp. 52 ff., 73 ff. Of the extent to which they made use of verbal quotation in their compositions the scanty remains which the sophists have left us do not enable us to judge with certainty; it seems to have varied with the character of the piece. We do not find it in a short *παίγνιον* which is intended as a model of extempore composition, and we should not expect it in view of the remarks of Alcidamas, *Περὶ Σοφιστῶν*, where he extols the superior skill of those who can make a sparkling extempore speech, comparing their ability favourably with one who is only able to compose elaborate pieces at leisure, *καὶ παραθέμενον τὰ τῶν προγεγονότων σοφιστῶν συγγράμματα πολλαχόθεν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐνθυμήματα συναγεῖραι*: see von Arnim, *Dion von Prusa*, p. 14. But in a treatise on an ethical or literary subject we should expect it; and the facts which have come to light within recent years about another work of Alcidamas, the *Περὶ Ὁμήρου*, show that this same writer—who was, we should remember, the pupil and close follower of Gorgias—makes the fullest possible use of quotation in a work of literary criticism. For the latest accounts of this work and its relation to the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* see J. G. Winter, *Tr. & Proc. Am. Phil.*

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[1] For the kind of use to which the Sophists put poetry, see Fr. Cramer, *Geschichte d. Erziehung u. d. Unterrichts im Altertum* (1832), ii, p. 182; for the treatment of passages of the poets by sophists and others see ibid., p. 256. See also H. Gomperz, op. cit., pp. 127 ff.; cf. ibid., p. 188; Büttner, *Basileios des Grossen Mahnworte an die Jugend*, Diss. Munich, 1908, pp. 10 f.

Soc. lvi (1925); Gallavotti, *Riv. di Fil.* N.S. vii (1929), pp. 31 ff.; T. W. Allen, *C.Q.* xxiv. 40, and other literature quoted by G. S. Kirk, *C.Q.* xliv (1950), pp. 149 ff. The piece apparently came from a collection whose title is given in Stobaeus and the *Certamen* as the *Μουσεῖον*. The exact significance of the title has perhaps still to be determined, but a connexion with education seems implied by its use elsewhere, Though the purpose of the work, as Allen has shown, is one of literary criticism, and the citations in it have not been selected as *sententiae* in support of ethical arguments, one can imagine cases in which a literary *ἀγών* might be compiled on the latter principle; compare the late *Comparatio Menandri et Philistionis.*[1]

Free use of quotation was a characteristic of Hippias of Elis, who acknowledges his debt to earlier writers in a well-known passage cited by Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 6. 15. 1, to illustrate the shameless plagiarism practised by the ancients. The mention of *γνωμολογία* as a characteristic of the *Περὶ Ὁμονοίας* of Antiphon the Sophist (Philostr. *Vit. Soph.* 1. 15. 4) is probably no more than the attribution to him of a sententious style; which is attested by the fragments. As one of the subjects which Polus professed to teach (Plato, *Phaedr.* 267) it perhaps means the same.

Up to now we have observed:

(1) a similarity between the sophistic antilogy and the antilogical arrangement of gnomic anthologies;

(2) a tendency on the part of the sophists to lavish use of quotation;

(3) their interest in poetic *γνῶμαι*, particularly as an aid to teaching, which would in itself be a motive for the invention of a means of making this part of their work easier.

But we still require clear contemporary evidence for the use of *gnomologia*.

This we unquestionably have in Plato, *Laws* 7. 810 D ff. (cf. 802 A ff.; 809 B ff.); a passage whose relevance to the question has already been recognized (see, for example, Burnet, *Greek Philosophy; Thales to Plato*, p. 310; Jaeger, *Paideia*, iii, p. 255; Marrou, *Hist. de l'éducation*, p. 255). It is too long for quotation, but deserves careful study. Here we have two rival schemes in literary education; one that by which pupils are required to 'learn poets whole'; the other, that by which selections are made for them to read and learn. The former system requires no explanation. It is the conservative tradition whose shortcomings have already been enlarged upon in the *Republic*; the learning of whole works of poets of respected antiquity and supposed wholesomeness—narrative epics interset with speeches, such as the Homeric poems, mythological poems such as the *Theogony* and *Shield* of Hesiod, the poems of Simonides, and didactic and moral works such as the *Works and Days* and the elegies of Theognis. In these the 'gnomic' element (for which see Horna, art. cit. 76 ff.) was very prominent. But the presentation of *γνῶμαι* haphazard, as they occurred in their authors, together with so much material of doubtful value, could not pass unchallenged for long. In the *Republic* the challenge is voiced at length, and by the time the *Laws* was written the alternative system was already in being, whose rivalry with the old system, or lack of system, is described by Plato in terms which leave us in no doubt as to the radical importance of the controversy. This is the system of education by select passages; the selection being made from an ethical point of view. There need be no doubt whether Plato intended the selections to be compiled into written anthologies; *μὴ μεθιέναι τρόπῳ μηδενί, γράφεσθαι δέ* says so plainly.

For the passage *ἂν ἄρα που . . . γράφεσθαι* I propose the following interpretation: the pieces which are 'on no account to be let go, but to be written down' are divided into (*a*) poetry, (*b*) prose; the latter are subdivided into (i) written prose, (ii) pieces

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[1] The views of scholars who postulate a pre-sophistic origin for the *ἀγών* in the work of Alcidamas are mentioned in Kirk's article, loc. cit.

'spoken, like this, without being written down'. οὕτως will mean 'as I (the speaker) am doing now'—since he is represented in the dialogue as delivering his advice orally, and not writing it down. ψιλῶς cannot mean 'in prose' here. Elsewhere in Plato where ψιλός is followed by ἄνευ the two words are closely combined and ψιλός simply helps to express the lack of whatever is governed by ἄνευ; e.g. *Symp.* 215 C; *Laws* 9. 880. The references here will therefore be to (*a*) moral excerpts of unspecified length, in verse; (*b*) (i) similar excerpts written in prose; (ii) prose teachings left unwritten by their authors—including, I think, *apophthegmata*. (We have a special word of appreciation for Spartan *apophthegmata* in *Protagoras* 342 f.)

But who are the men whom Plato describes as 'perhaps not fewer (than the adherents of the old system), or, even if they are fewer, certainly not worse'? The name which immediately occurs to me as a contemporary champion of selective reading is that of Isocrates. His remarks (*Ad Nicoclem* 44) about the educative value of selected γνῶμαι from the poets are well known and often quoted. If we compare *Ad Demonicum*, §§ 51 f., mentioned previously (*C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 132), (assuming this speech to be the work of Isocrates), the combined evidence of the two passages shows him as a decided supporter of the selective method.

I do not think, however, that Isocrates and his circle alone are referred to by Plato in the *Laws* passage; first, because Plato makes it clear that advocates of the new system are already as numerous, or almost as numerous, as its conservative opponents. In spite of the evidence which we have for the extent of Isocrates' following (e.g. Cicero, *Brutus* § 32 '. . . Isocrates, cuius domus cunctae Graeciae quasi ludus quidam patuit atque officina dicendi') it seems doubtful whether his influence alone could have been so widespread as to warrant Plato's statement.

Secondly, I think that the comparison of the selective reader with the bee in *Ad Demonicum*, where, as we have noted, we have the earliest extant example of the simile, is not original. Plutarch and later writers who use the simile[1] make apt and picturesque use of a quotation from Simonides. Now if Isocrates did in fact invent the simile we must, I think, conclude that a source of Plutarch borrowed the idea from the *Ad Demonicum* and added the quotation. This I do not believe. I suspect that the Simonides quotation (which seems to be echoed in Plato, *Ion* 534 B, though here, as perhaps originally in Simonides, it is the *poet*, and not the judicious reader of the poets, who is likened to the bee) was first used in this connexion by some writer who was followed independently by Isocrates(?) and the source of Plutarch; Isocrates, who does not quote the poets verbatim, omitted it, while Plutarch's source followed his original in making use of it. I conjecture the inventor of the simile to have been one of the earlier sophists. Possibly the occasion of the original use of the simile was a discussion of Simonides; in which case Protagoras, or Simonides' compatriot Prodicus, might be suggested as the source (for the possibility that they were particularly concerned with the interpretation of this poet, see Plato, *Protagoras* 316 D, 340 A, 341 A).

Or possibly the writer, in a speech or preface, openly avowed his debt (as Hippias does, p. 5 above) to the poets for *flosculi* (in the sense of *sententiae*, cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 33 quoted below, pp. 10–11)—λόγοι and δόγματα—and perhaps (in view of the imitation of poetic λέξις which we know to have been a feature of sophistic style) for the flowers of language (*flores*, *flosculi* in the other sense—cf. Cic. *Orator*, § 65, and Sandys's notes in his edition of that work, on §§ 20 and 39) as well, and recommended the method to his hearers.

[1] For inquiries into the source of Plutarch, *Quomodo adolescens* etc., the relation between Plutarch and St. Basil, and the sources of the latter see Schlemm, *De Fontibus Plutarchi commentationibus de audiendis poetis et de Fortuna*, Diss. Göttingen, 1893; G. Büttner, op. cit., pp. 21 ff., 67 ff.; Seidel, *Vestigia diatribae, qualia reperiuntur in aliquot Plutarchi scriptis moralibus*, Diss. Breslau, 1906; Stelzenberger, *Die Beziehung frühchristl. Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa*, p. 468.

Or again, comparing the scholion on Hermogenes mentioned *C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 133, we might conjecture the source to have contained a defence of the *πολυμαθία* with which the name of sophist was always associated (e.g. by Maximus of Tyre *Διαλεξ*. 33. 8 . . . *τὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος τὸ πολυμαθὲς τοῦτο καὶ πολύλογον καὶ πολλῶν μεστὸν μαθημάτων*) and in which Hippias glories so openly. 'Die Sophisten sind die Aufklärer ihrer Zeit, die Encyclopädisten Griechenlands' (Zeller, *Gesch. Gr. Phil.*, p. 1150). Plato's condemnation (in the passage of the *Laws* which we have mentioned: cf. *Phaedr.* 275 A 7) of the polymathy involved in the conservative system gains point when we consider that polymathy was a favourite accusation against the new sophistic education, even as the sophists' readiness to produce contrary arguments (*τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν*) certainly was; this, too, Plato turns against the sophists' conservative critics.[1]

We have only to consider the wide range of scientific as well as ethical subjects covered by Stobaeus (see the *Eclogues*) to realize how admirably an anthology of this type, containing a wealth of *μαρτύρια* on scientific subjects (compare Chrysippus' voluminous citations, below, pp. 9 f.), would have served this side of sophistic education as well. We shall see (below, pp. 12 ff.) that there is much which suggests a connexion between anthologies and the *θέσις*. Rhetorical definition divided the latter into 'practical' and 'theoretical'; it was usually agreed that the former category was the domain of the rhetor, while the latter was the concern of the philosopher. The fact that most of the papyrus anthologies deal with questions of practical ethics, rather than with scientific subjects, is significant of their end.

That Isocrates(?) is borrowing his simile from a sophistic source, at any rate, I think highly probable. Perhaps when Cratinus (fr. 2, Kock) speaks of the *σοφιστῶν σμῆνος* he has the simile in mind.

Thirdly, it is evident that others with a worthier title to the name of philosopher than Isocrates were interested in *γνῶμαι* and their elucidation. If we could believe Xenophon, Plato's adoption of gnomological methods would seem not to have been made on his own responsibility. In the *Memorabilia* we find Socrates himself, on whom the offences of the sophists were laid by his enemies, accused of misusing quotations from the poets for evil ends: 1. 2. 56 ff. How Socrates did in fact, according to Xenophon, use *γνῶμαι* we are told, ibid. 6. 14. In ibid. 4. 2, 1 ff. we have further information about the attitude of the Xenophontic Socrates to *γνωμολογία*; the young Euthydemus has been reading with a view to excelling *τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν*. Socrates praises his motives and admires his aims, but expresses doubt whether the ambitious young man can ever achieve the latter by himself. The implication of the passage which follows seems clear: a young student cannot hope to undertake the task of selecting and appraising all the maxims of the 'poets and sophists' *without a teacher's aid*; the vast extent of Greek literature should convince him that this is impossible. Euthydemus professes the frequently expressed aim (cf. Joel, *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates*, pp. 503 ff.) to become eminent 'in speech and action'. Those who, like Aristophanes, dislike and ridicule the practice of *γνωμολογία* would doubtless have us think that *τὸ λέγειν* alone is the aim of the eager *γνωμοδιώκτης*,[2] and that the proficiency which he will thus acquire will be put to the worst of uses.

Whether this picture of Socrates as a literary educator is a true one, and whether other philosophic elements have intruded, is a matter of dispute (see, for example, Joel, op. cit., pp. 526 ff. and literature quoted by him). It does not agree very well with the opinions put into Socrates' mouth in the *Protagoras* (see p. 4 above); we might rather compare Diogenes Laertius' account of the Cynic Diogenes as teacher of the sons of Xeniades (6, § 31): *κατεῖχον δὲ οἱ παῖδες πολλὰ ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ Διογένους, πᾶσάν τ' ἔφοδον σύντομον πρὸς τὸ εὐμνημόνευτον ἐπήσκει.* What was the precise method employed by Diogenes we are not told; I suspect that the selective scheme of reading entered into it, and that they learned choice *γνῶμαι* and the maxims of Diogenes himself. See von Fritz, P.–W., *Suppl.* vi. 88. Here, as in the last instance from Xenophon, we are reminded that the teaching of literature to the young was now, by reason of its greatly increased extent and variety, no longer a simple matter, but one requiring the services of learned men with special methods; this want the sophists professed to fill. That one of the methods employed was that of judicious *selection* from the mass of material at hand, and its *compilation* into a convenient form, seems to me highly likely.

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[1] We see a sneer at Sophistic polymathy in the pretentious variety of scientific and philological subjects learned by Socrates' pupils in the *Clouds* (e.g. ll. 191 ff.).

[2] The expression is from Cratinus, fr. 307 (Kock).

Plato does not discuss the nature of the strong objections made to the new system; but they will surely have been directed against the dismemberment of the poets and their misuse for the immoral ends of argument. Plato would certainly not have approved of Protagoras' use of poetry any more than he approved of his use of argument, to which poetry was merely an instrument or an embellishment; but he considered the essential features of the sophistic method of dealing with the poets right—the use of critical selection and the subordination of poetry to argument and doctrine; and to the stock objection of the traditionalists he has a ready answer: what of the works which they are so anxious to have read in their entirety by the young? Apart from the gross immoralities and useless information (cf. polymathy; see above, p. 7) contained in them, the 'classical' poets such as Homer (to say nothing of the dramatists) are full of speeches, passages *ἐν ἤθει*, in which contrary arguments are put forth with bewildering persuasiveness; is this any better than the brazen professions of the sophists and their *δύο λόγοι*? Whatever may be right, the old system is wrong; the sophists are certainly 'no worse' than the *πολλάκις μύριοι*. Plato describes what his own system would be—a book such as the *Laws*, containing his own philosophical doctrines, and a written collection of excerpts from poets and prose writers, and probably *ἀποφθέγματα*, as *μαρτύρια* to illustrate and support his arguments at every point. There is no difference between his *method* and the sophists'; the difference lies only in the use which he would make of it. Here, in fact, we have one more instance of the way in which Plato is prepared to appropriate the methods of the Sophists, on whose general policy he wages such relentless war, for the ends of his own system (cf., for example, M. Lechner, op. cit., pp. 47 ff.; Stenzel, *Platon der Erzieher*, pp. 52–3). It is interesting to find in Lucian, *Piscator* 1 ff. (see *C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 132) Plato made to take part in, and win, a contest of words with Lucian in which *γνῶμαι*, correctly quoted or in parody, play the most important role.

So far, then, we have come to the following conclusions:

That the gnomic anthology was already in being when Plato wrote the *Laws*, and that its use by certain contemporary educators, including Isocrates, was approved by him in principle.

That this system of literary education was not the invention of Isocrates, but was probably a legacy from the sophists, whose educational aims and methods it was admirably fitted to serve.

That other philosophers beside Plato gave the discussion of *γνῶμαι* from earlier writers an important place in education; in Xenophon, as we have seen, Socrates is represented as so doing, the practice being made one of the charges against him.

This brings us to the vexed question of the true picture of Socrates: a question with which this article cannot deal. From this point on I do not propose to make a detailed examination of the opinions of the representatives of the various philosophical schools about the literary preparation proper to the intending philosopher, or the literary researches suitable to be undertaken by philosophy itself; neither do I propose to examine the remains of the philosophers for any but the most express evidence for the use of the anthological method. I think, however, that if the suggestions which have been made are correct, and *gnomologia* were by now already in existence, we may assume that they were approved or used by those philosophers who set a high value upon literary education and inquiry and were tolerant of, or actively interested in, *rhetoric* (see below, pp. 12 ff., and Horna, art. cit. 79) from Antisthenes onwards (see von Arnim, *Dion von Prusa*, pp. 34 ff., on Antisthenes; and for the history of the relation between philosophy on the one hand, and rhetoric and literature on the other, in the following pages of von Arnim's summary). In fact it is difficult to see how (for instance) the writers of diatribes[1] would have fared without such assistance as a *gnomologium*, compiled beforehand either by themselves or by others, could afford. And as for Chrysippus (cf. below, p. 10; on whom, in connexion with the history of the *gnomologium*, we have the exhaustive researches of Elter, *De gnom. gr. historia atque origine*, Bonn, 1893), it seems inconceivable that he did not compile the results of his voluminous reading before incorporating them in his works, as Seneca seems to recommend (see *C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 133). But detailed inquiry on these matters must be left to others. Their relevance to the present investigation is limited by the fact that most of our papyrus *gnomologia* seem to be school texts and do not deal with the kind of subjects treated in the Chrysippus fragments; and few, if any, of the children who used them are likely to have got as far as the study of philosophy at all, or even if they did, it will not have been their next step. From now on, then, as far as the philosophers are concerned only direct allusions to written anthologies or the anthological method will be discussed.

Such allusion I think we have in the next two witnesses, which would be particularly valuable as evidence if a connexion could be proved to exist between them.

The first is the philosophical fragment P. Oxy. 414, discussed by Luria in 'Ein Gegner Homers', *Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie*, 1924, and *C.Q.* xxii (1928), pp. 176 ff. The subject of the text, which is badly mutilated, is the question whether the poets are a profitable study for the philosopher (or intending philosopher). (Luria's assumption that Homer is specially meant seems to me not to be proved.) The unknown author states briefly the case for the use of poetry in education, only to demolish it. The most interesting point, for us, is that in col. II, where the case put forward by the advocates of the use of poetry in education is apparently continued, the subjects which poetry can teach are set out in an antithetical style which reminds us of the antilogical arrangements of the *κεφάλαια* in Stobaeus: . . . *περὶ τῶν | κ]αλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, | περὶ τῶν δικαίω[ν] | κα[ὶ ἀ]δίκων, περ[ὶ] | τῶν θείων, περ[ὶ τῶν] | ἐν Ἅιδου, κτλ.* This suggests to me that the supporters of poetic education envisage the teaching of poetry by selections arranged under subject-headings as far as possible *antilogically*, as in Stobaeus. Luria concludes from considerations of style and vocabulary that the work is to be dated early.

Similar opinions are expressed at much greater length in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Grammaticos* 13 (§§ 270 ff.), which, with the passages of Galen mentioned below, is quoted extensively by Elter, op. cit. I; cf. Horna, art. cit. 81. This chapter throws important light on the purpose and methods of those who consider *ποιητικὴ γνωμολογία* a suitable preparation for and accessory to philosophy; and if we could suppose that its arguments may have a common ultimate source with the Oxyrhynchus fragment, the possibility that the latter is discussing anthologies would be strengthened, although the connexion must remain pure conjecture. Here too the case for poetic and 'grammatical' education as a preparation for and aid to philosophy is stated, only to be denied; and again we find (280) the same objection to the calling in of poets as witnesses in support of philosophic theses which we have already met in the *Protagoras* and the Oxyrhynchus fragment.

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[1] For the use of citations in the diatribe see, for example, Wendland, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der gr. Phil.*, pp. 3 ff.; Seidel, op. cit.; Büttner, op. cit., pp. 61 ff.; Stelzenberger, op. cit., pp. 439 ff.

The same objection constantly recurs in Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, particularly in Books II, §§ 213 ff.; 220 ff.; III, 300 ff., where Chrysippus is singled out for special censure for his method of treating scientific questions. His treatises were full of quotations from the poets, from whom *γνῶμαι* were drawn to illustrate every point; not only is his use of them so copious as to be wearisome, according to his critic, but this excess of poetic testimony is not proper to the spirit of true philosophic inquiry; it is rather the trick of the rhetorician, who talks to win; moreover, his witnesses often spoil his case, since he has not the wit to quote just so much as would support it, and suppress the rest. The passage which is of most importance for us is §§ 314 ff. Here we read that Chrysippus' works were so loaded with excerpts that they looked like the work of a schoolmaster 'who wants to arrange as many lines as possible under one notion' (*γραμμάτων διδασκάλου βουλομένου στίχους ὅ τι πλείστους ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ διανόημα τάξαι*);[1] by *διανόημα* I understand a subject-heading, *κεφάλαιον*. From the specimens of Chrysippus' work which Galen quotes, with their *μαρτύρια*, we get a clear picture of what the schoolmaster's book was like. If we disregard the thin connecting thread of the philosopher's own argument, which often amounts to little more than an 'exegesis or epitome' of the accompanying mass of citations (§ 326), we are left with a compilation of literary excerpts arranged according to subjects; in fact a *gnomologium*. The important point is that Chrysippus' own words establish that such books were in use in Greek schoolrooms at the time when he wrote. (To make Chrysippus himself responsible for the invention of the *gnomologium*, to which he half-humorously compares his own work, would be to miss the point altogether—though, as we have seen, he probably compiled his own. Elter, who has examined the relation of Chrysippus to the anthologies with great thoroughness and insight, appears to me to attribute to him too much influence on their history. See especially Part I of his work, pp. 21, 68.)

We notice that in the last three instances the writer is concerned exclusively with *poetry* and the part which it is to play in education. With regard to the *system* on which it is to be taught, after Plato it seems to me that the point at issue is no longer the same; there is ample evidence that whole works of the poets continued to be taught to schoolboys, but for a certain stage in school education—the most advanced, as we shall see—the anthological method has won general acceptance. The question is now generally how much the testimonies of the poets are worth to a serious thinker and to what stage the study of them can profitably be pursued at all. As we have already seen, Socrates in the *Protagoras* (see p. 4) is made to express disapproval of the exaggerated importance attached by Protagoras to the testimony of the poets and the introduction of their *sententiae* into a serious philosophical discussion. The philosopher, he feels, should know when to put aside childish things. In the *Laws*, where we find the anthological method as an already established, though not yet predominant, practice which Plato himself would enlist in support of his own teaching, the study of poetry is expressly for the young and is intended only as a preparation for more serious studies. In the case of Plato these studies will of course be philosophical. Compare Plutarch, *Quomodo adolescens* 36 D, where the teaching of poetry on the selective method is only a preliminary to the higher study of philosophy.

Further important light is thrown on the *gnomologium* and its purpose by Seneca, *Epp.* 33 and 83. The latter has already been mentioned (see *C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 133). It is to be compared with *Ep.* 33, where Seneca is replying to his correspondent's request for *aliquas voces nostrorum procerum*. He does not refuse, but warns Lucilius against making too free use of the *dicta* of others; this is not appropriate to a mature thinker, who should be capable of thinking for himself and expressing original ideas in original language, although such methods are suitable enough for the young, to whom we give *sententiae* and *chriae* to learn. The compilations made by Seneca both for himself and for his friend, and designed as an aid to literary composition, do not confine themselves to quotations from the poets; in fact the *flosculi* are perhaps all from prose authors (e.g. Cleanthes, Zeno). The text of the second century A.D. published by Vogliano, *Stud. di Fil. class.* N.S. xiii (1936), pp. 267 ff., seems to be a possible example of this kind of prose philosophical anthology which Seneca's words imply, compiled in this case from Epicurean authors. It contains six prose extracts, of which three were already known from Stobaeus and the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, and may have been arranged according to subject-matter; of the left-hand column, of which the bottom is lost, the subject-matter can be made out in one citation only, which deals with the topic of death; but the two citations in the right-hand column seem to have a common subject, ἐγκρατεία. (See, however, the editor's remarks and conjectures, pp. 279 ff.). An Epicurean anthology would be particularly interesting in view of the words of Lucretius, *De R.N.* 3. 10 ff.: '. . . tuisque ex, inclute, chartis, | floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant | omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta.'[1]

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[1] Cf. the rather similar expression *τὸ πίπτον ὑπὸ μίαν διάνοιαν*, Philodemus, *Rhet.* 2, col. xliii, Sudhaus.

The extracts which are according to Seneca given to schoolboys to learn also include prose *chriae* as well as *sententiae*. We may compare the short chrestomathy in P. Bouriant. Here, as there, and as in Quint. *Inst.* 1. 36 (see *C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 136), we are evidently dealing with elementary education.

The use of γνῶμαι and χρεῖαι at a more advanced stage—in the schools of the *grammatici*—is attested by Quintilian, *Inst.* 1. 9: 'sententiae quoque et chriae et aetiologiae[2] subiectis dictorum rationibus apud grammaticos scribantur, quia initium ex lectione ducunt.' This passage is discussed by Colson in his commentary (*Quintilian Book I*, Cambridge, 1924; cf. articles by the same author, *C.R.* xxxiii (1919); xxxv (1921)); see particularly the notes on *aetiologiae* and *subiectis dictorum rationibus*, where Colson's views on the exact nature of the prescribed exercises are given. Here, instead of learning improving passages by heart, or writing them from dictation as copy-book sentences, as the elementary schoolboy does, the more advanced student takes a *dictum* and (according to Colson) writes an explanation and full discussion of its subject-matter. Now we have here no express reference to compiled anthologies of γνῶμαι and χρεῖαι; but the fact (which Quintilian regards as so important) that this kind of exercise 'derives from reading' (cf. *lectio* in Seneca, *Ep.* 83, see *C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 133) implies the use by the student of the anthological method, and that he will compile the results of his reading in anthological form as Seneca seems to imply is only to be expected; this would be of obvious use in the exercise called *aetiologia* as explained by Colson; see his note, and *C.R.* xxv, p. 152 n. 2, on the use of μαρτύρια τῶν παλαιῶν.[3]

There seem to be indications that not only did schoolmasters compile anthologies of excerpts but that the pupils of the *grammaticus*, who are by now old enough to read and criticize literary works in their entirety,[4] also made such compilations as part of their preparation. Perhaps we see such a process at work in the literary excerpts, on various subjects and jotted down in no particular order, on Ostr. Berl. P 12310 and P 12311, published by Viereck, 'Die Ostraka des Berliner Museums', *Raccolta Lumbroso* (1925), pp. 253 ff., where see the editor's useful note. Compare also, perhaps, the ostraca, often re-edited and reinterpreted, in J. G. Milne, *J.H.S.* xxviii (1908), pp. 121 ff.; ibid. xliii (1923), pp. 40 ff.; Ziebarth, *Aus d. antiken Schule*, No. 39; Fraenkel, *Hermes*, lix (1924), pp. 382–8; Wüst in *Bursian*, 1926, p. 123; a passage (of Philemon?) copied apparently by two schoolboys (in preparing an anthology?).

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[1] And very useful; see Horna, art. cit. 80.

[2] Following Colson, who adopts and defends a MS. reading.

[3] One drawback to Colson's convincing explanation of the reading adopted by him is the fact that we have no examples of such an exercise in the papyri. Could *antilogiae* be read? This would well describe (for example) Berl. Kl. Texte V. 22 A and B. Or possibly even *anthologiae* is not out of the question. But if so, some other explanation of *subiectis dictorum rationibus* will be necessary.

[4] Cf. Lechner, op. cit., pp. 83–4.

Now the evidence of Quintilian for the use of the anthological method—if we have succeeded in finding such evidence—is interesting. The authors whom we have hitherto been quoting afford ample evidence for its use as a preparation for *philosophy* and (especially in the case of Seneca) as an aid to literary composition on philosophical subjects. Here, I think, we find the same method applied to the other great branch of prose composition to which the sophists—the inventors of the method, if we have been right—gave such impetus. When Quintilian describes the best method of education for boys at the grammar-school he has always in view their preparation for a future training in oratory and rhetoric. This would confirm the conclusions stated by Horna, on p. 79 of his important and suggestive article, on the use of anthologies in rhetorical education. The rivalry between philosophy and rhetoric was of long standing. The disputed territory to which both schools of thought laid claim (see von Arnim, op. cit., pp. 94 ff.) was just that to which a preliminary training in literature was most relevant. But at any rate, as to the best kind of literary preparation both sides were agreed; see Colson, op. cit., introduction.[1] We have Quintilian's own testimony to such agreement as far as poetic *sententiae* were concerned (5, § 39), where he remarks that not only do the orators quote freely, but the philosophers, who rate their precepts above all other teaching, do not hesitate to borrow the testimony of the poets. But, given that Quintilian requires the preliminary training at the hands of the *grammaticus* to take these lines, in what way will the teaching subsequently be applied?

In Book II. 1, §§ 8 ff. Quintilian has some interesting information for us about past practice and contemporary tendencies in the first stages of rhetorical training, and besides mentions differences between the practice of Greek and Latin rhetoricians respectively which must be borne in mind; an informative discussion of these points will be found in Colson's preface to his edition of Book I. The conscientious rhetor, he says, will not neglect what was formerly considered their most important, and for a time their only, duty: instruction in the writing of *narrationes* and *laudandi vituperandique opuscula* and of *theses* and *communes loci*. He goes on to say (§§ 12 f.) that the pupil should not be suddenly transferred from the schoolmaster to the rhetorician, but that the *grammaticus* should still have certain hours allotted to him—'which method is still in practice among the Greeks, but has been abandoned by us'. In the teaching of the above-mentioned intermediate exercises the rhetorician and the *grammaticus* ought to collaborate. We shall find it useful to compare the curriculum—one which follows a rather strict order—laid down by the Greek progymnasmatists.[2] Here we find, treated far more thoroughly than the schoolmaster could be expected to treat them, the exercises which according to Quintilian have in Latin practice, which he would modify, slipped down from the sphere of the rhetorician into that of the *grammaticus*, and some of which he would be content to resign to the latter. Immediately after the μῦθος (as in Quintilian) we have, most significantly, the γνώμη and χρεία (Theon, *Prog.* 5; Hermogenes 3 and 4; Aphthonius 3 and 4; Nicolaus Sophistes 3 and 4) which with the following exercises are evidently designed to lead up to the θέσις (Theon, 12; Hermog. 11; Aphth. 13; Nic. 13). Compare Sulpicius Victor, § 3 (Halm, *Rhetores Latini*, p. 314): 'itaque hypothesin sciemus quidem in controversiis et litibus esse, . . . thesin vero in καταϲκευαῖς et ἀναϲκευαῖς, itemque in his, quas Graeci χρείας vocant, cum disputatur, rectene quid dixerit Diogenes vel Socrates: item laudes et vituperationes videntur ad thesin pertinere.' We now see the point of the schoolmaster-anthologist's arrangement of his matter according to subjects; it is to ensure that his students, when they are presently required to write θέσεις on given subjects, will have the literary matter, γνῶμαι and χρεῖαι, conveniently arranged and at their fingers' ends. It is not surprising that the favourite κεφάλαια of the schoolmaster-anthologist tend to correspond to favourite themes of the rhetoricians. For instance, the stock example of a θέσις in the rhetorical manuals is the question εἰ γαμητέον (Quint. *Inst.* 3. 5. 8, 'an uxor ducenda', as an example of the *quaestio infinita*; Nic. Soph. op. cit. 13; Hermogenes 11; Aphthonius 13; Theon 12; Sulpicius Victor, loc. cit.). Every aspect of the subject of women and marriage is covered by the chapters of Stobaeus, and it forms the subject of two of our papyrus fragments of the Ptolemaic period (Berl. Kl. Texte V. 22 A and B) and of the much later *Disticha Argentinensia*; compare the two ostraca mentioned on p. 12 above, on the same well-worn theme.[1] A little work entitled Πόθος, by the Byzantine John Pediasimus, consists of a great number of epithets in praise and condemnation of women; I suspect that it drew upon anthologies of verse excerpts like these. The subject must owe much of its popularity as a rhetorical theme to its prominence in Stoic doctrine (cf. Grossgerge, *De Senecae et Theophrasti libris de matrimonio*, Diss. Königsberg, 1911; Stelzenberger, op. cit., pp. 408 ff., on the *Ehebuch* and the authorities quoted by him there), as the question εἰ πολιτευτέον so frequently mentioned with it certainly did; another factor which made it so suitable for treatment in the preliminary exercises of the rhetor was the wealth of γνῶμαι on the subject afforded by Euripides. This is also true of the subject of τύχη (see p. 3 above, note); cf. Norden, op. cit., pp. 276, 367, 647. The favourite subjects of Euripides are the favourites of the rhetorician and also of the anthologist.

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[1] 'The attitude assumed by the two schools of thought to the ordinary curriculum was practically the same, in spite of the difference of general outlook'. Cf. Horna, art. cit. 79 f.

[2] See Marrou, op. cit., pp. 238 ff.

Thus when, at an age when 'omnis in audiendo profectus est' (Quint. *Inst.* 1. 12. 12) the pupil of the *grammaticus* learns by heart (cf. ibid. 11. 2. 40) what has been said by others on a variety of subjects, he finds what he has to learn arranged according to these subjects. It is in this order that he will be required to remember them 'cum ad stilum secedet, cum generabit ipse aliquid atque componet' (1. 12. 12)—the next stage, when under the tuition of the rhetor he learns to say something on his own account on a given θέσις, making free use, from memory, of the passages he has learned[2] or if necessary looking them up in a *gnomologium*, where they will be found conveniently arranged for reference.

We thus see γραμματική as but a preparation for ῥητορική and the gnomic anthology as the link between the two.

Now the sophists were keenly interested in general questions of the kind treated in the species of exercise which finally emerges in the rhetorical text-books as the θέσις. For the previous history of the term and the treatment of exercises so called by Peripatetics and others see the summary, with references, in von Arnim, op. cit., pp. 81 ff.; for the final definition, Thiel, *Hermagoras*, pp. 27 ff.; von Arnim, op. cit., pp. 62 ff.; Radermacher in P.–W. s.v. 'Hermagoras', vol. viii, pp. 692 ff. We must evidently be cautious about accepting as strictly relevant evidence the statement of Diogenes Laertius 9. 53 where he names Protagoras as the man who πρῶτος κατέδειξε τὰς πρὸς τὰς θέσεις ἐπιχειρήσεις; but the treatment by the Sophists of *loci communes* (e.g. Cicero, *Brutus*, § 46 (Protagoras); Quint. *Inst.* 3. 12 (P. and Gorgias)) and ψόγοι and ἔπαινοι is amply attested. See von Arnim, op. cit., pp. 105 ff. We have seen how well the *gnomologium* is adapted to the purposes of this kind of exercise. I do not think that we shall be far wrong if we see in it one of the instruments by which the revolutionary Protagoras and his fellow sophists gave Greek education a rhetorical bias which was to last for centuries. In the *gnomologia* we find, on a smaller scale, something like the *silva rerum* which Crassus in *De Oratore* 3 insists that the perfect orator should have at his disposal; cf. *Orator*, §§ 118 ff. We have noted, however (p. 9 above), that the papyrus *gnomologia* contain matter which concerns practical ethics rather than deep philosophical and scientific problems. Only the mature orator can afford to widen and deepen his knowledge to include subjects like these.

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[1] References to it as a rhetorical topic are legion. In the introduction to a collection of Ἀποφθέγματα Ῥωμαϊκά attributed to Plutarch or Caecilius Calactinus the writer hints plainly at the use of ἀποφθέγματα in the discussion of 'general questions' such as εἰ πολιτευτέον, εἰ χρὴ γαμεῖν. Much the same points are made by Quint. *Inst.* 12. 29 ff., with express reference to rhetorical composition, but without mention of the specific topics. The same topics are mentioned by Quintilian 4, 25 ('ducendane uxor', 'petendine magistratus'); cf. Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 11. 113. 1; *Strom.* 2. 137. 2; Jerome, *Adv. Jov.* 1 (Migne, *P.L.* xxiii, p. 260 A f.); Eustath. *S. Philothei Laud.*, § 11.

[2] Cf. Theon, *Prog.*, p. 122, ll. 22 ff. Spengel.

The *gnomologium* is thus a product of the age of prose, and a symptom of the ascendancy of two prose literary forms in particular—the oration and the philosophical treatise—and is the vehicle by which the sentiments of great writers are conveyed to the student in the form which he will find most convenient when he attempts original composition. It is perhaps significant that in Stobaeus (and in our text) the poetic quotations precede the prose; poetry is for the beginner; indeed we sometimes find the use of verse recommended solely as an aid to the imperfectly trained memory (Plato, *Phaedrus* 276 C; Scymnus Chius 33 ff.; Lucian, *Anacharsis* 21); at best poetry serves to prepare and stimulate (Plut. *Quomodo adolescens* 36 D); really serious and significant things will be expressed in prose. Up to the time when the mind is ripe for such serious studies, however, education seems to have concerned itself mainly with poetry.[1] The fact that most of our school anthologies contain only poetic quotations is evidently no accident; poetry so preponderates that one sometimes finds school education spoken of as ποιητική (e.g. Nic. Soph. *Prog.* 3; cf. the passages of Sextus Empiricus and Galen quoted above, pp. 9 f.).[2]

We have seen, however, that school education was not exclusively occupied by poetry, but that the simplest and shortest kind of prose citation—the χρεία[3]—is prescribed, together with the γνώμη, even in the most elementary stages. Besides the χρεῖαι in P. Bouriant already mentioned we have a much earlier collection of short χρεῖαι in P. Hibeh I. 17, belonging perhaps to a comparatively ambitious compilation. This, the earliest extant prose anthology (*c.* 280–240 B.C.)—for so I think we must describe it, in spite of the difficulties mentioned by the editors in their foreword—bears the subject-heading ἀνηλωμάτων and contains χρεῖαι of Simonides on the subject of expenditure. Possibly the compilation confined itself to the sayings of this author (see, however, *New Chapters*, ii, p. 93). The editors of the Simonides sayings compare another one-author anthology from the first half of the first century B.C., published by A. Holder, 'Neues über Diogenes den Kyniker', *Festschr. f. Theodor Gomperz*, Vienna, 1902. The parallel is not quite exact, for these pieces are too long to be described strictly as χρεῖαι; perhaps ἀπομνημονεύματα (see Hermogenes, § 3, π. χρείας) or διηγήσεις (P.S.I. 85) would be a better designation. The purpose of this collection of anecdotes and sayings of Diogenes was perhaps much the same—to provide the student with material for use in composition. P. Reinach 85 (late 3rd century) has a fragment of a χρεία of Diogenes, apparently in answer to the question 'What is man?' and Aristotle is mentioned or quoted in the next lines.

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[1] Cf. Lechner, op. cit., p. 83.

[2] For a different account of the relegation of poetry to the preliminary (and inferior) place in education see Colson, op. cit., introduction, pp. xxix ff. This account makes the process a gradual one; but it seems already inherent in the scheme outlined in Plato's *Laws*.

[3] See von Wartensleben, *Begriff d. griech. Chreia*, Heidelberg, 1901; Horna, art. cit. 75 f., with the supplementary notes of von Fritz, ibid. 87 f.; Collart, *Les Papyrus Th. Reinach*, ii. 25 f.; Marrou, op. cit., pp. 241 f.

The use of χρεῖαι in school education is well attested. With prose γνῶμαι, however, this is not so. Until the discovery of our *gnomologium* no early collections of prose γνῶμαι were known; and in fact some of Knox's theories about the influence of the anthology attributed by him to Cercidas (see below, pp. 16 f.) on the subsequent history of Greek literature were built upon the assumption that prose excerpts such as occupy so much space in Stobaeus were not used until a much later date. Besides the Epicurean anthology mentioned above, p. 11, the parallels to the prose part of our anthology are quite late; one, published by Brinkmann in *Rh. Mus.* lxxi (1916), pp. 581–4 (2nd–3rd century A.D.) contains two prose extracts (from Isocr.(?) *Ad Demonicum* and Hermarchus) dealing with a common subject; the other, published by Reitzenstein in *Hermes*, xxxv (1900), pp. 608–11, contains only one citation (on marriage and procreation) of which the subject can be determined; of the next (from Favorinus) only the heading is preserved. Perhaps the rarity of prose γνῶμαι in the early anthologies is significant of the original purpose of the *gnomologium*. It is natural enough when writing a prose exercise to point one's argument with a quotation from a poet; much less so to insert a prose quotation, unless in the form of a χρεία. It is hard to agree with what Norden says (op. cit., pp. 89 ff.) about verbal citation in so far as *poetic* γνῶμαι are concerned. There seems to be little to bear out his statement that verse quotation in a prose work was considered φορτικόν; on the contrary, it was used freely by some of the greatest ancient masters of prose. The case of Chrysippus, as quoted by Norden, is hardly a fair one; Chrysippus carried citation to such excess that it can scarcely be said to have left him any style of his own. The use of verse citations is recommended and illustrated in a very early τέχνη in Doric dialect, P. Oxy. 410. In the Attic orators, of whom only Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Lycurgus cite the poets, the use of quotation seems to depend partly on individual taste, and partly on the nature of the speech; see Spengel, *Artium Scriptores*, p. 20; Horna, art. cit. 79. It was used by the best Latin orators as an adornment and to help the speaker's case; see Quint. *Inst.* 1. 8. 10 ff. With regard to *prose* quotations, however, Norden's remarks are very pertinent. Ancient taste evidently felt that, whereas the apt quotation of passages of verse in a prose work could be an embellishment and form part of the artistic whole, the insertion of even a short passage of prose from another pen and in a style not the writer's own jarred horribly. If the opinion of a prose writer was to be introduced his words must be paraphrased. (To the evidence quoted by Norden on this point we may add Seneca, *Ep.* 83; 'ut etiam si apparuerit, unde sumptum sit, aliud tamen esse quam unde sumptum sit appareat'.) Even in the case of the χρεία, which as we have seen was, exceptionally, classed with the poetic γνώμη as a favourite subject for instruction in schools, there are signs of special treatment. The student was made to vary his style of introducing such pieces as much as possible, and I think that this is the reason for an otherwise rather pointless grammatical exercise, the *declension* of χρεῖαι; for some examples see Ziebarth, *Aus d. antiken Schule*, pp. 16 f. For the conventions which governed the use of citation in prose composition throughout antiquity I think we have to thank the sophists, who reduced it to an art. Such a work as the *Περὶ Ὁμήρου* of Alcidamas consists of little more than an exercise in this art, the sophist's skill and critical powers being shown in the telling collocation of his material.

Now in the latest *gnomologia*[1] poetry no longer predominates. In fact in some of them, such as the *Gn. Vaticanum*, we find all, or nearly all, prose citations, γνῶμαι as well as χρεῖαι, the former being often anonymous. Another characteristic of the original *gnomologium* also tends to disappear—the arrangement of the citations under

[1] On late *gnomologia* see Stelzenberger, op. cit., pp. 473 ff.; Horna, art. cit. 81 ff.

subject-headings. The absence of this arrangement may sometimes (for instance in the case of the Menandrian *Monosticha*) be accounted for by supposing that the compilation belongs to the elementary school and that the *sententiae* are to be used as copy-book sentences; this impression seems to be strengthened when we find them arranged alphabetically (*Monosticha*; P. Iand. V. 77 (ed. C. Kalbfleisch); the γνῶμαι in P. Bouriant; the Graeco-Coptic *gnomologium* edited by V. Puntoni, *Gnomologii acrostici fragmentum graece una cum metaphrasi copto-sahidica*, Pisa, 1883; Evelyn-White, *Monastery of Epiphanius*, No. 615); but this cannot always be assumed to be the case; for instance, with the longer Byzantine *gnomologia*. These three tendencies—to increase in the number of prose γνῶμαι, to anonymity, and to the abandonment of the arrangement under subjects—seem to me to indicate that the original function of the *gnomologium*—the provision of a fund of quotations in support of θέσεις which the student will presently work up into prose exercises—has by now been lost sight of or deliberately dropped. Cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7. 3. 1, where he says of the *Stromateis* that they do not aim at τάξις and λέξις—the terms are, significantly, from rhetoric. When the sayings of the ancients are quoted solely for the improvement of the reader, it matters less how they are arranged. Though Stobaeus' great collection retains so many characteristics of the original form of the *gnomologium*, the fact that it includes such a great number of long prose passages is perhaps an indication that it is not primarily intended as an aid to composition: the words of the Photian summary would seem to show that this function was only incidental: . . . καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ τοῖς ῥητορεύειν καὶ γράφειν σπουδάζουσιν οὐκ ἄχρηστον τὸ βιβλίον.

Having tried to classify the principal kinds of anthology and to define, in particular, the scope, purpose, and history of the kind to which our example belongs, it remains for me to consider some other compilations which, while resembling our own in their main principles, present special features. Perhaps the most important of these is that for whose reconstruction we are indebted to A. D. Knox in *The First Greek Anthologist, with Notes on the Choliambic Fragments* (Cambridge, 1923). Knox sees in the Heidelberg choliambic fragments, together with P. Bodl. MS. Gr. class f 1(p)+P. Lond. 155, an ethical anthology of iambic writers, with a poetic preface by the anthologist, which he suggests is 'a general declamation against the decadence of the age as an introduction to a general anthology' (p. 3); the whole being the compilation of the Cynic philosopher and statesman Cercidas of Megalopolis. Cercidas' aim is to support the arguments of his philosophical doctrines by μαρτύρια from the poets; this being so, I do not suppose (as Knox apparently does, pp. 4, 10) that the familiar antilogical arrangement, so beloved of the sophist and the rhetor, will have found a place here. Cercidas, like Plato, has positive doctrines to defend and would not be interested in the other side of the question. The excerpts preserved, arranged as usual under a subject—greed (see Knox, p. 2)—are long and if, as I suppose, other subjects too were treated, the anthology must have been on an unusually ambitious scale.

With the title of Knox's book, if our conjectures about the origin and history of the *gnomologium* are correct, we cannot agree; certain improbabilities had already been pointed out by Guéraud and Jouguet, op. cit., pp. xxix ff. It seems that Knox postulates too great an influence for Cercidas' work (see pp. 12 ff.); this he would hardly have done had he realized that his anthology was not merely *used* as a school-book (as he himself concludes) but like all others of its kind was designed for that end. We have the evidence of Eustathius (B., p. 197, quoted by J. U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina*, p. 201) that Cercidas, a great power in his city, was actively interested in school education and went to the length of legislating about the school syllabus there.

Since, then, Cercidas is not the first Greek anthologist, but only the compiler of a school-book of a type by his time familiar to the Greek world, though on a bigger scale than most and designed to support a positive philosophic doctrine rather than to furnish material for rhetoric, we should not attribute to him too much influence on the course of Greek literature. One of the weaknesses of Knox's theory of this anthology as the parent of all ethical anthologies is (as Guéraud and Jouguet have pointed out, p. xxix) the difficulty of establishing such a connexion between it and the earliest examples from the papyri; another, and perhaps fatal, objection to Knox's theory is presented by our example, which includes prose passages, whereas the Cercidas anthology appears to have contained only certain kinds of verse.

Much of what Knox says about Cercidas, however, can apply to anthologies generally; the appearance of the *gnomologium* does indeed mark a decline in poetic creation, if only because (as we have seen) it owed its invention to the needs of prose literary forms which largely supplanted poetry (cf. Norden, op. cit., p. 78). Laziness, too, is encouraged; the *gnomologium* was an all too convenient short cut to literature; and an original, once a selection has been made from it, stands in the greater danger of being forgotten as a whole. But it might be argued that we are in danger of blaming the anthologist for the loss of much which would sooner or later have been forgotten in any case. For instance, the bulk of Middle and New Comedy seems to have fallen into oblivion through its own weaknesses; there was too much of it, and too little to choose between one play and another; in particular, the plots were too much alike, and in any age a play tends to live or die as a whole by its plot. For the preservation of what was best in these comedies—the neat, striking, and often beautiful expression of human sentiments—we have to thank the anthologist; and we might be tempted to think Knox's criticism—that in his selections the anthologist was guided by ethical rather than aesthetic considerations—rather unfair. If short passages, and not whole scenes of action[1] were to be selected, what other passages could one have chosen? On the whole, it is these same extracts, and not dreary gastronomic passages in Athenaeus, or odd glosses in grammarians, which have given posterity the most favourable impression of Middle and New Comedy. Nevertheless, though we need not suppose that the purpose of the average anthologist was deliberately obscurantist (as Plato's literary policy was), on the whole I think that Knox's strictures on the ancient anthologist are justified. We are forced to conclude that a method which on the admission of such a judicious defender as Plutarch expressly ignored what was of aesthetic value in its endless search for *sententiae*, and which became, as we have seen, such a generally accepted practice, can scarcely have failed to result in the neglect and subsequent loss of far more than it has preserved for us.

Another anthology of a special kind—since it professes to include γνῶμαι of one author only—with a poetic preface by the anthologist is the collection of *Epicharmea* or *Pseudepicharmea* attributed to Axiopistus (on the strength of a statement in Athenaeus 14. 648 D, who quotes Aristoxenus). We are fortunate in possessing a long passage from the preface in P. Hibeh I. 1 (between 280 and 240 B.C.); five lines coming apparently from the end of this preface were already known (= Kaibel fr. 254). P. Hibeh I. 2, of a similarly early date, has fragmentary lines (some of them *monosticha*) which are probably from the body of the same collection (see the first editors' foreword). Other examples of *Epicharmea* in papyri and ostraca are Berl. Kl. Texte V. 2, p. 124; Wilamowitz, *Sitzb. Berl.* 1918, p. 742. These fragments are republished by J. U. Powell, op. cit., pp. 219 ff.; and by D. L. Page in *Greek Literary Papyri*, i, pp. 438 ff.; Crönert, *Hermes*, xlvii, pp. 402 ff., has arranged the extant Epicharmean γνῶμαι under subject-headings, as the preface suggests. Here, at least, we have the express testimony of the anthologist himself about the purpose of his compilation (see P. Hibeh I. 1+fr. 254): it is to be an aid to the art of speaking. Most significant is his description of the work (ibid., ll. 12 f.): συντίθημι τὰν τέχναν | τάνδε (cf. Crönert, art. cit., p. 405). We should not take this description as applying to one part of the anthology only; it is clear that the purpose of the whole work is to provide the reader with a fund of concise, witty sayings which will make him *a ready speaker* on all occasions. For the use of Epicharmus in schools, cf. Theocritus, *Epigr.* 18. 9: *πολλὰ γὰρ ποττὰν ζόαν τοῖς παισὶν εἶπε χρήσιμα.*

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[1] As in the case of the Strasbourg papyrus mentioned *C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 134, n. 2.

Closely related to the ethical anthologies, though itself not an anthology, is the book of original *γνῶμαι* by Chares of Lampsacus (Gerhard, *Χάρητος Γνῶμαι*, *Sitzb. Heidelb. phil.-hist. Kl.*, 1912; J. U. Powell, op. cit., pp. 223 ff.).[1] This work is intended for use in schools (cf. *παῖ* in (*a*), l. 3) and its simplicity and unpretentious scale would make it suitable for a comparatively early stage of education. It can hardly have been intended as an aid to composition; we should perhaps regard it as the earliest example of the elementary school copy-book sentence collection, in spite of the fact that the *γνῶμαι* are arranged under subjects. The latter, as the *ed. pr.* observes, are in no noticeable logical order.

There remain several collections in the papyri which I cannot assign certainly to any class of anthology mentioned so far. P. Tebt. 1–2 (*c.* 100 B.C.) is a puzzling collection of pieces, prose as well as verse, in which it is impossible to discover any unity of subject; they contain little of ethical interest. The compilation is certainly not a *gnomologium.* I am at a loss to account for the multiplicity of copies in the same hand, which seems to rule out the possibility of regarding the collection as a writing exercise. There seems to be no reason to connect these texts with education. P. Freiburg I. 1 (2nd–1st century B.C.) contains (*a*) a piece of comic dialogue on the subject of slaves, (*b*) an epic simile, (*c*) a distich on Hesiod and Homer, (*d*) some lines of the *Iliad.* Of these extracts only the first has any ethical import. This papyrus is certainly from the schoolroom; for we find a fragment of a Homeric lexicon on the verso, and half-erased traces of what may have been an arithmetical exercise on the recto. It may be a schoolboy's notes, taken from his reading. P. Oxy. 864 (3rd century A.D.) contains hexameter and iambic lines in more than one hand. The passages are too fragmentary to yield continuous sense, but there seems to be no common subject. (Spelling exercises, from dictation?)

The very inferior quality of the text in most anthologies has often been commented on by editors; I have little to add to their remarks. In our text there are, however, one or two features which bear out this general opinion. In the verse pieces, which are all new, some evident errors, variants, and corrections give us no more than a vague impression of inaccuracy. But in the two prose quotations we notice two significant things. The first quotation is attributed indifferently to Theophrastus or Anaximenes.[2] Possibly the work from which it was taken was of disputed authorship; but one suspects that the compiler was either quoting from memory or had taken his citation from two other anthologies which attributed it diversely, and that he either had not access to the original or did not consider the question of its identity important enough to consult it. Another is the interpolation of *ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* in the Demosthenes *γνώμη*; this seems to have been deliberately inserted to give the piece a distinctively oratorical flavour.

The text of many of Stobaeus' extracts is notoriously bad (see Hense, art. cit., pp. 2584 ff.) and in many cases has been deliberately tampered with. Cases of false or doubtful attribution also are common and matters are complicated for the critic by the erroneous combination of originally unconnected lines; see Guéraud and Jouguet, op. cit., xxvi, on P. Petrie, I. i 3(*a*). How easily such false combinations might happen will be seen if we consider how inconspicuous are the paragraphi which divide the comic quotations in our text. For some remarkable variations in the text of an excerpt, see Guéraud and Jouguet, op. cit., pp. 35 ff. It is not surprising that passages long removed from their context, and collected into a fund of quotations from which the rhetorician's pupil was to draw in order to point his arguments, should early have become corrupted or falsely attributed; and if the invention of the *gnomologium* is as early as we suppose, some of the extraordinary variations from the accepted text, for example in quotations in the orators, might be accounted for if one supposed that they learned them from compilations like ours. Aeschines 3. 135 mentions *γνῶμαι* as part of the training of the young: *διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι παῖδας ὄντας ἡμᾶς τὰς τῶν ποιητῶν γνώμας ἐκμανθάνειν, ἵν' ἄνδρες ὄντες αὐταῖς χρώμεθα.* Aeschines naturally stresses the moral purpose of his early education. No doubt this kind of consideration was often a real one with the ancient schoolmaster-anthologist; but it is this aspect of the matter which seems to have been taken too much for granted by scholars who have not seen in the *gnomologium* a means to an end. With the Christian writers, however, the profession of edification for its own sake is evidently more sincere. It remains now only to say something about the significance of the passages from Clement, Basil, and Gregory mentioned in the first part of this article (*C.Q.* xliv (1950), p. 133).

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[1] See Gerhard's work for the occurrence of *γνῶμαι* from Chares in later anthologies and their mistaken attribution to comedy.

[2] In Stobaeus the *γνώμη* is assigned definitely to Anaximenes. (For his importance in the history of prose *γνῶμαι* see Wendland, *Anaximenes von Lampsakos*—a work which (pp. 100 f.) contains some interesting statements about *florilegia.*)

The attitude of the Christian writers to the old literature is a subject in itself and cannot be gone into here except in so far as it provides useful analogies for the period from which the anthology papyri come.[1] The recrudescence of the simile of the wise bee, however, is significant. Now for the second time in the history of Greek literature the thinking men of the Greek world found themselves faced with the problem of what to do with a literary heritage. Some, feeling that it had nothing but its meretricious beauty to recommend it, would have been prepared to sacrifice it altogether; others were anxious that its improving elements should remain at the disposal of the student, but (and here again history repeats itself) only as a preliminary to the study of better things. In their misgivings about it and in their final solution of the problem we see a repetition of the heart-searchings of Plato, and his final judgement in the *Laws*. We have reason to be thankful that the Church Fathers were finally content to leave the student to select what was best in pagan literature for himself, trusting to his conscience and judgement to avoid moral and spiritual dangers to which Plato, had he and those like-minded with him possessed their power and influence, would never have allowed the young to be exposed at all. Had the early Church pursued for the whole of pagan literature a policy as obscurantist as that laid down in the *Laws* for the treatment of the literature then extant, not only all that was according to Christian standards morally harmful, but all that did not furnish positive support to some point of Christian ethical doctrine would have been condemned to oblivion.

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[1] For a short account, see Norden, op. cit., pp. 673 ff.

THE METRICAL UNITS OF GREEK LYRIC VERSE. II

4

Dactylo-epitrite has established itself in a privileged position among choral lyric metres, since the greater volume of material and the greater regularity of its component units have encouraged a more careful study, and closely reasoned controversies have arisen and been resolved over its structure. Other kinds of Pindaric metre have for the most part been analysed in a hit-or-miss spirit, and arbitrary schemes have been produced of which rarely are two alike for the same poem, yet little attempt has been made to base any preference upon a theory. Few scholars nowadays are prepared to take – – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – – – – ⏑ – as – ⏒ ⏑ ⏑ | – ⏑ ⏑ – | – – ⏑ – major ionic+choriamb+iambic, since the notion that there was a free responsion which worked by groups of four syllables has been disproved by Maas; the fallacy of dividing (–) – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – (–) either – – ⏑ ⏑ | – ⏑ ⏑ – or – ⏑ ⏑ – | ⏑ ⏑ – – is generally recognized. And the iambo-trochaic series is so familiar that in (–) – ⏑ – – – – ⏑ – (–) no one thinks of splitting before or after the short syllable. These restraints, however, are taken to apply only to the particular units in question; outside dactylo-epitrite such cuts as – – ⏑ – | ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – . . . or ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – – | ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – – | ⏑ – ⏑ – or ⏑ – – | ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – | ⏑ – – are accepted without question so long as the bits can wear familiar labels—iambic, bacchiac, anapaest, reizianum, choriambic dimeter, etc. Two bacchiacs or two reiziana in the same period, or a cluster of reiziana or dochmiacs within the same stanza are generally felt to be one up on an analysis which strays into more categories, even though the 'dochmiacs' may run ⏑ – – ⏑ – | – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – . . . – ⏑ – ⏑ – or the 'reizianum' in one line take the form – – ⏑ ⏑ – – and in the next ⏑ – ⏑ – –. But on the whole analysis of such periods is very much an affair *ad lib.*, which nobody takes very seriously.

So far as I know, the idea has never been worked out that dactylo-epitrite, though a special stereotyped form of periodic composition, can provide a clue to the sort of metrical units Pindar used in his other poems—'aeolic' or whatever one chooses to call them—and the way he put them together to form composite periods. I am aware of the danger of allowing oneself to be mesmerized by schematic patterns of longs and shorts; the worst difficulty of Greek metric is the docility with which its simple *ὕλη* accepts such *εἴδη* and even permits them to work out an elaborate set of relations. Nevertheless the only way to test each attempt at systematization is to try its capacity to bring the phenomena into an ordered whole and occasionally to give a better explanation than hitherto of puzzling factors by setting them in a new relation to others.

One important task is to keep a sharp eye upon terminology and see that it does not lull us into a false sense of security; another is to be aware of what we are doing when transferring concepts familiar from one kind of lyric to a different kind. In what sense can an 'iambic' be followed by a 'trochaic' in *ἀναξιφόρμιγγες ὕμνοι*, or an 'anapaest' by an 'adonean' in *ὑψηλοτάτων μᾶτερ ἀέθλων*? The answer is that these names and concepts belong to a different manner of composition, in which they could never be found in this close association. If we apply to these two lines the principles deduced from dactylo-epitrite construction, we find that the sequence of two longs in the middle of each means a junction of two units ⏑ – ⏑ – | – ⏑ – – and – – ⏑ ⏑ – | – ⏑ ⏑ – –. Each ends with a final *anceps*, and the second has initial *anceps* also; the case of the first is less certain, since the first syllable may be short *anceps* or the whole unit may be a headless form of – ⏑ – ⏑ –. Examination of the whole stanza and its various responsions may give the answer, or the question may have to be left open.

It is clear that by proceeding in this fashion we shall find ourselves with some units that have ready-made names and others that have not; thus there is no particular harm in calling – ⏑ ⏑ – – 'adonean', but the partly similar – – ⏑ ⏑ – is nameless, to say nothing of ‸ ⏑ – ⏑ –. The only way to deal with this problem is either to avoid naming altogether or to invent for the sake of convenience a set of formal symbols to express these diverse units, like the Maasian D and e for dactylo-epitrite. Since lyric of the periodic style taken as a whole needs more elastic symbols than dactylo-epitrite alone, adaptable to the different forms of 'prolongation' in single- or double-short, I suggest the following:

– ⏑ – = s, – ⏑ ⏑ – = d. Prolongation is indicated by the mere addition of s or d: thus – ⏑ – ⏑ – = ss, – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – = dd, – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – = sds. *Anceps* is written in; a blunt junction of units is indicated by a short vertical line: thus *ὑψηλοτάτων μᾶτερ ἀέθλων* would be rendered – d ˈ d –. A headless initial element is shown by ‸, so that *ἀναξιφόρμιγγες ὕμνοι* might be ‸ ss ˈ s ⏓. Resolution in the form ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – = ^{r}s, – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ = s^{r}, ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ = ^{r}s^{r}. Drag is shown s̄, the *σὺν βαθυζώνοισιν ἀγγέλλων* of *Pyth.* 9. 2 becoming s – ss̄.

There is no inherent improbability in the notion that dactylo-epitrite is merely a special kind of periodic composition which works on fundamentally the same principles as all the rest. While it is true that nearly all dactylo-epitrite odes are unadulterated, Bacchylides writes his third Epinician with the strophe in 'aeolic' and the epode in dactylo-epitrite; and in *Ol.* 13 (analysed below) Pindar actually mixes the two styles to a considerable extent. Moreover, such lines as *Nem.* 11. 5 *οἵ σε γεραίροντες ὀρθὰν φυλάσσοισιν Τένεδον*, d ˈ s ˈ s – d, though technically within the limits of dactylo-epitrite variation, would be indistinguishable in isolation from any other kind of periodic metre. Even the most striking difference between dactylo-epitrite and the rest—its avoidance of mixed single- and double-short units—is occasionally overruled, as in *Nem.* 10. 79 *καμάτου μεταλαμβάνειν. ὣς ἔννεπε· Ζεὺς δ' ἀντίος ἤλυθέ οἱ* ‸ dds ⏓ s – dd, and probably also in the much vexed epode of *Ol.* 7, where I believe the true period division and analysis to be (ll. 14–15)

ὑμνέων, παῖδ' Ἀφροδίτας Ἀελίοιό τε νύμφαν,	s – s – dd –
'Ρόδον, εὐθυμάχαν ὄφρα πελώριον ἄνδρα παρ' Ἀλφεῷ στεφανωσάμενον.	‸dd ˈ ^{r}sdd ⏓ dd

The strophe of *Ol.* 13 melts into orthodox dactylo-epitrite in the middle of the sixth period:

Τρισολυμπιονίκαν	‸ dd ⏓
ἐπαινέων οἶκον ἥμερον ἀστοῖς,	⏓ s ˈ sd ⏓
ξένοισι δὲ θεράποντα, γνώσομαι	‸ ss^{r}s – s
τὰν ὀλβίαν Κόρινθον, 'Ισθμίου	– s$^{(r)}$s ⏓ s[1]
πρόθυρον Ποτειδᾶνος, ἀγλαόκουρον·	‸ ds ˈ sd ⏓
ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει, κασιγνή- *-τα τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές,*	⏓ sd – s – dd ˈ s
Δίκα καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰρήνα, ταμίαι‿ἀνδράσι πλούτου,	⏓ dd – dd ⏓
χρύσεαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος.	s ˈ s – d

The epode is in dactylo-epitrite throughout, with the licensed variants – ⏑ ⏑ – and initial ‸ ⏑ ⏑ –. It seems highly improbable that such a transition could be made if the principles of synthesis into periods were not the same for all kinds of metrical units.

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[1] (r) indicates that at least one of the responding stanzas has resolution, $^{(s)}$ that at least one has drag.

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The implications of this method will probably become clearer if a few Pindaric stanzas are now analysed in detail. *Ol.* I is as good a starting-point as any. Strophe and antistrophe contain eleven periods:

Ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ	‸ s ǀ ds ǀ sd ⏓
ἅτε διαπρέπει νυκτὶ μεγάνορος ἔξοχα πλούτου·	‸ (s̄)^{r} ǀ s ǀ ddd ⏓
εἰ δ' ἄεθλα γαρύεν	sss
ἔλδεαι, φίλον ἦτορ,	sd ⏓
μηκέθ' ἁλίου σκόπει	sss
ἄλλο θαλπνότερον ἐν ἁμέρᾳ φαεννὸν ἄστρον ἐρήμας δι' αἰθέρος,	ss^{r}s ⏑ ssd ǀ ss
μηδ' Ὀλυμπίας ἀγῶνα φέρτερον αὐδάσομεν·	sss ⏑ d ǀ s
ὅθεν ὁ πολύφατος ὕμνος ἀμφιβάλλεται	‸ s^{r}s^{r} ⏑ sss
σοφῶν μητίεσσι κελαδεῖν	‸ s$^{(r)}$ ǀ s ǀ ^{r}s
Κρόνου παῖδ' ἐς ἀφνεὰν ἱκομένους	‸ s ǀ ss ǀ ^{r}s
μάκαιραν Ἱέρωνος ἑστίαν.	⏓ s^{r} ǀ ss

Period-end in the epode is not always certain; I give the following version with eight periods:

Συρακόσιον ἱπποχάρμαν βασιλῆα, λάμπει δέ οἱ κλέος	‸ ss^{r} ǀ s ǀ ds ǀ ss
ἐν εὐάνορι Λυδοῦ Πέλοπος ἀποικίᾳ·	‸ s ǀ d ǀ s^{r}ss
τοῦ μεγασθένης ἐράσσατο Γαιάοχος	sssd ǀ s
Ποσειδάν, ἐπεί νιν καθαροῦ λέβητος ἔξελε Κλωθώ,	‸ s ǀ s ǀ d ⏑ sd –
ἐλέφαντι φαίδιμον ὦμον κεκαδμένον.	‸ d ⏑ d ǀ ss
ἦ θαυματὰ πολλά, καί πού τι καὶ βροτῶν	– ds ǀ ss
φάτις ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀλαθῆ λόγον	^{r}sd ǀ s
δεδαιδαλμένον ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.	‸ s ǀ s ǀ ds ǀ ds –

The main differences between this style of composition and dactylo-epitrite are its frequent mixture of s and d in the same unit, the great frequency of blunt junction without link *anceps*, and the strong preference for light *anceps*. The last of these makes analysis much harder, or, to put the matter differently, Pindar deliberately obscures the junction of metrical units; the audible effect is of long unbroken sequences in such lines as the sixth, seventh, and eighth of the strophe. In these circumstances analysis remains somewhat theoretical; there is no real difference between that given above for *ὅθεν ὁ πολύφατος ὕμνος ἀμφιβάλλεται* (⏑⏑⏑⏑⏑⏑:⏑:–⏑–⏑–⏑–) and ⏑⏑⏑⏑⏑⏑⏑–:⏑:–⏑–⏑– or ⏑⏑⏑⏑⏑⏑:⏑:–⏑–:⏑:–⏑–. The principle I have with some hesitation assumed is that since the maximum prolongation of **d** that Pindar uses is **ddd**, i.e. –⏑⏑–⏑⏑–⏑⏑–, so probably his maximum prolongation of pure single-short is –⏑–⏑–⏑–. It is not quite certain whether we should assume as a principle that a unit which has once moved out of double-short should not return to it: whether, that is to say, –⏑⏑–⏑–⏑⏑– (dsd) should always be reckoned –⏑⏑–:⏑:–⏑⏑–, and a possible dssd– in the fourth period above either –⏑⏑–⏑–:⏑:–⏑⏑–– or –⏑⏑–:⏑:–⏑–⏑⏑––, but this is most probable.

The question of initial ⏑– is a difficult one, extending to problems beyond the compass of this ode. The normal explanation, that ⏑––⏑⏑–⏑– (str. I) is a 'glyconic' with the freedom of base inherited from Lesbian lyric and found also in drama, that ⏑––⏑– (str. 9) is an ordinary 'dochmiac' and ⏑––⏑–⏑– (str. 10) 'bacchiac+iambic metron', etc., does not seem to me satisfactory. Apart from the inapplicability of 'metra' to units in this style of lyric (and ⏑––⏑–⏑– has in Pindar as much right to be called 'lekythion' as ⏑––⏑⏑–⏑– glyconic), I regard 'dochmiac' as a misleading notion in Pindar. In the drama there are so many instances of purely dochmiac passages in which ⏓ – – ⏑ –, ⏓ ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ –, ⏓ – – – – and many other variations occur consecutively, often paired in cola and often in free responsion to each other, that the whole movement clearly indicates a unity of concept, 'dochmiac', beneath these variations, and when some of these dochmiacs appear mixed with other metrical groups such as cretic-paeonic or iambic we can accept the notion of a compound movement, such as the 'iambo-dochmiacs' of Aeschylus.[1] But in Pindar there is no more reason for equating ⏑ – – ⏑ – with – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – or – ⏑ – ⏑ – than there is for giving a common name to – ⏑ – and – ⏑ ⏑ – or – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – and – ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ –. Thus ⏑ – – ⏑ – can be represented, on the same principles as I have applied to all other periodic units, as ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ –, and similarly we have ⏑ – ˈ ss, ⏑ – ˈ d, ⏑ – ˈ ds, or ⏑ – ˈ dd as in *Ol.* 10 epode *μέλει τέ σφισι Καλλιόπα* ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – for which no one has found a very happy colon label, or again ⏑ – ˈ sds *τέᾳ τοῦτο μειγνύμενον φρενί Pyth.* 5. 19; ⏑ – on this showing is parallel to initial ⏑ ⏑ – or ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – in dactylo-epitrite, a headless unit such as can only occur at the opening of a period. The fifth line of the epode *ἐλέφαντι φαίδιμον ὦμον κεκαδμένον* opens similarly with ‸ d.

The question of initial *anceps* is as hard to resolve as the incidence of short *anceps* later in the Pindaric period. There appear to be three different ways in which the length of a syllable can be 'ambiguous' in Greek metric. A final syllable may be *anceps* in the sense of *brevis in longo*, i.e. a naturally long element has licence to be filled by a prosodically short syllable if it comes last in a period, as when final – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – changes to – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ ◡. Or an element may be true *anceps* (i.e. either long or short), as in the iambo-trochaic series, and in all cases where it falls outside a metrical unit in a period (i.e. in initial, link, or final position); in dactylo-epitrite, where its occurrence is easiest to control, this true *anceps* is given long quantity in the great majority of cases, with occasional shortening in one or another of the responding stanzas, but here and there Pindar chooses to use the short form all through, as, in *Ol.* 7, the first link-*anceps* in the fifth period of the epode, which is short in all five repetitions of the verse. In other styles, as we have seen, he makes frequent use of short *anceps* to gloss over the junction of metrical units in all responding stanzas, so that often we have no means of knowing whether a syllable is true short or link-*anceps*. In these circumstances it seems most practical to register prolongation except where the length of single-short appears excessive or in those few instances where the surrounding units give a strong lead. Sometimes an isolated instance of lengthening enables us to correct this, as in *Nem.* 3, where the sixth period of the strophe appears in seven of the eight repetitions to be a single prolonged unit – ssd ⏓ but in l. 46 corrects itself to – s ⏓ d ⏓ *Κένταυρον ἀσθμαίνοντα κόμιζεν.* In other cases *anceps* is long throughout (as in the first syllable of the line just quoted), while in others again it is more evenly shared between long and short.

The third kind of *elementum anceps* is a short between two longs which has occasional licence to lengthen, a phenomenon which I have called 'drag'.[2] The commonest place for this to occur is the first short in a prolonged unit, less frequently the last short is lengthened, and there are a few instances of two consecutive lengthenings of the kind: so, for instance, we get ˈ – ⏓ – ⏑ – ˈ, ˈ – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ, ˈ – ⏑ – ⏓ – ˈ, ˈ ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏓ – ˈ, └ ⏓ – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ˈ, └ ⏑ ⏑ – ⏓ – ⏓ – ˈ. Whether the drag is descended from the 'aeolic base' of the Lesbians is a matter of speculation; if so, it is certainly applied quite differently by Pindar and differently again by the dramatists. There are hardly enough instances for the principles of its use to be securely formulated; I believe, however, that the apparent occurrence of 'spondee', in Pindar at least, can be best accounted for in this way, with one or two exceptions which may be due to contraction of double-short ⏑⏑. In some of Pindar's odes the drag is a conspicuous *motif*, and one or two of these are analysed below.

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[1] The dochmiac appears, at least on negative evidence, to be a creation of dramatic lyric, perhaps of Aeschylus. Whether he got the idea from choral lyric is impossible to say, but if so he moulded it into something quite new by adapting it to the technique of composition by cola.

[2] Maas suggests 'cholosis' (cf. *χωλιάμβος*) as an international technical term for 'drag'.

To return to *Ol.* 1 and initial *anceps*, such an opening short syllable as in *ὅ-θεν ὁ πολύφατος κτλ.*, *Συ-ρακόσιον κτλ.* may be accounted for in one of two ways; either it is short *anceps* and can therefore be represented ⏑ ^{r}s^{r} . . . and ⏑ s^{r} . . ., or it starts a headless unit like the instances of initial ⏑ – ˈ – already discussed. As there is no means of distinguishing between these alternatives where responsion gives no instance of initial long, their notation is a matter of indifference. It is tempting to suppose that, as I have heard Professor Gilbert Murray suggest in a different connexion, the dancers set down a foot to a silent long element before these headless initial units and thus gave point to the distinction.[1] In the last period of the strophe l. 80 gives *μναστῆρας ἀναβάλλεται γάμον*, so that here initial *anceps* is indicated.

There remains the problem of the second period, where the manuscripts at l. 89 give *ἃ τέκε λαγέτας*, – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – for ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – of the other seven verses. If we are not to follow the Byzantine scholars in emending here, this opening must of course be taken as a resolution of ⏓ - ˈ – ⏑ –, not, as one might have been tempted to read it, of – ⏑ – ⏑ –. (Cf. l. 20 *ὅτε παρ' Ἀλφεῷ* in the ninth period of the strophe, corresponding to *σοφῶν μητίεσ-σι* ⏑ ⏑⏑ – ⏑ –.) Even so, the admission of *anceps* in ‸ ⏓ – ˈ is unexpected, and is indeed very rare in Pindar, but not unparalleled; there are two instances in the strophe of *Ol.* 10, the fifth period ⏓ – – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – – ⏑ –, which might be either ⏓ – : – : ^{r}s ˈ s or ⏓ – ˈ s^{r} – s (the resolution is, as so often, ambiguous), and the seventh period ⏓ – ˈ ds. I can find no other in choral lyric. This is not the ordinary initial *anceps* before the beginning of a metrical unit, the true *anceps* of the second category mentioned above, but the third kind of *anceps* which lengthens a normally short element. It seems then to be occasionally admitted thus at the beginning of a line, probably by analogy with ordinary initial *anceps*. But in *ἃ τέκε λαγέτας* Pindar has taken this a step farther, by allowing it even when the following long is resolved. The only parallel to this in choral lyric is the doubtful one in the first period of Bacchylides' *'Ηΐθεοι* (Snell 17) where ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ˈ – ⏑ – ⏑ – opens in l. 90 with *ἵετο δ' ὠκύπομπον δόρυ*. The most likely scansion of *ἵετο* is – ⏑ ⏑, but it cannot be taken as certain that Bacchylides did not here scan it ⏑ ⏑ ⏑. I am inclined to believe that the Byzantines may have been right in emending *Ol.* 1. 89.

Pindar's earliest epinician, *Pyth.* 10, gives a fairly simple demonstration of some of the points raised in this essay:

'Ολβία Λακεδαίμων,	(s̄)d ⏓
μάκαιρα Θεσσαλία· πατρὸς δ' ἀμφοτέραις ἐξ ἑνός	‸ s ⏓ ds ˈ d ˈ s
ἀριστομάχου γένος 'Ηρακλέος βασιλεύει.	‸ sdd ⏓ d ⏓
τί κομπέω παρὰ καιρόν; ἀλλά με Πυ- *-θώ τε καὶ τὸ Πελινναῖον ἀπύει*	‸ s ˈ d ⏓ d ˈ sd ˈ ss
Ἀλεύα τε παῖδες, 'Ιπποκλέᾳ θέλοντος	‸ s ˈ ssds ⏓
ἀγαγεῖν ἐπικωμίαν ἀνδρῶν κλυτὰν ὄπα.	‸ dds ⏓ (s̄)s

'Ολυμπιονίκα δὶς ἐν πολεμαδόκοις	⏓ d ˈ (s̄)ds
Ἄρεος ὅπλοις·	d ⏓
ἔθηκε καὶ βαθυλείμων ὑπὸ Κίρρας ἀγών	⏓ sd ˈ d ˈ s
πετρᾶν κρατησίποδα Φρικίαν.	⏓ sd ˈ s
ἕποιτο μοῖρα καὶ ὑστέραισιν	⏓ sds ⏓
ἐν ἁμέραις ἀγάνορα πλοῦτον ἀνθεῖν σφίσιν.	⏓ ssds ˈ s

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[1] I have sometimes wondered whether such a supposition would account for the unidentified symbol ⅃̇ (with its superimposed dot indicating thesis) in the middle of the dochmiac cola of the *Orestes* musical fragment (see the text in Powell and Barber, *New Chapters*, ii. 148).

In this poem the distinction between the headless initial units of the strophe and initial *anceps* in the epode is notably clear. (In this first epode the openings are as it happens all short *anceps*, but all are lengthened in one or another of the corresponding stanzas.) There are three cases of drag, all in the first short of a unit. The first of these, in the opening period (25 *καὶ ζώων ἔτι νε͜αρόν* – – – ⏑ ⏑ – –), has been cordially received, since a 'pherecratean with aeolic base' is a familiar concept, but the other two have caused confusion. The first period of the epode has in l. 49 *θεῶν τελεσάντων οὐδέν ποτε φαίνεται* ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ˈ – – – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ –. The 'glyconic with aeolic base' is indeed another familiar concept, but the cut before its first syllable leaves an initial unit ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – which is not among the 'recognized'. It cannot be thrust on to 'anapaest' because of the initial *anceps*. Wilamowitz (*G.V.* 321) divides correctly by dint of calling this a free iambic metron; Schroeder and Turyn commit the solecism of leaving two adjacent *ancipitia* in the middle of a period ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – – ˈ ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – 'reizianum+telesillean', though the latter notes this *commissura thesium* as something of a curiosity, comparing *Nem.* 7. 5 where he introduces a similar division. The remaining drag is at the end of the strophe ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – : ⏓ : – ⏓ – ⏑ –. This form is found again in the epode of *Pyth.* 8 (analysed below), in *Paean* 2 (strophe, second period), and in Bacchylides' *᾿Ηῗθεοι* (strophe, eighth period, ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ – ⏓ – ⏑ – : ⏑ : – ⏑ ⏔ . . . where *θίγεν δὲ λευκᾶν παρηῗδων* responds in l. 102 to *ἰδὼν ἔδεισεν Νηρῆος ὀλ-βίου κτλ.*, and there is no need either to emend or to juggle with the natural division of the periods; a proper name is precisely the place where an isolated instance of drag might be expected). There is thus no need to shy at *θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν* in l. 30 here, and Mair's emendation at l. 60 *ἔρωτες ἔκνιξαν φρένας* gains in probability.

The penultimate period of the strophe and the last of the epode could of course be represented alternatively as ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ – : ⏑ : – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – : ⏓ and ⏓ : – ⏑ – : ⏑ : – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – : – ⏑ – respectively, but the decasyllable given as a single unit in **ssds** is of a type (containing one **d**) which does undoubtedly exist in Pindar.[1] Apart from many instances like this which *could* be decasyllabic units (for instance *Nem.* 3, strophe period 7: *ἀ͜εθλονικία δὲ μάλιστ' ἀοιδὰν φιλεῖ* – ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ –), there is the decisive evidence of the drag in *Pyth.* 8, strophe period 5 – ⏑ ⏑ – ˈ – ⏓ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ –, where the position of the *anceps* precludes any other division. The usual explanation of this as – ⏑ ⏑ – – ⏓ ˈ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ –, a sort of 'cholo-dochmius+glyconic', is inadmissible, since if – ⏑ ⏑ – – – is a single unit it can only be a dragged form of – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ –. The last element is in fact a true long, and short *anceps* in such a position would therefore be *brevis in longo*, which can in no circumstances occur in the middle of a period. Bacchylides 18 begins with a period containing a similar unit: *βασιλεῦ τᾶν ἱερᾶν Ἀθανᾶν, τῶν ἁβροβίων ἄναξ ᾿Ιώνων* ⏑ ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ – : –, here with a pendant close; since, however, this has the label 'phalaecean' to hand, it causes no trouble. Cf. also 19. 18 *᾿Ινάχου ῥοδοδάκτυλος κόρα* – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ –. It is possible that two similar decasyllables are to be found in the strophe of *Nem.* 7, second and fourth periods: – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏕ ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ – ⏑ – and ⏑ – ⏑ – ˈ – ⏑ ⏕ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – : ⏓.

The most interesting exploitation of the drag *motif* is in *Pyth.* 8, which contains units with this *anceps* in the first short, in the last short, and doubled.

8 *τὺ δ' ὁπόταν τις ἀμείλιχον*	ʳsds
καρδίᾳ κότον ἐνελάσῃ	sdʳs
τραχεῖα δυσμενέων	– sd
ὑπαντιάξαισα κράτει τιθεῖς	‸ ss ˈ ds
ὕβριν ἐν ἄντλῳ. τὰν οὐδὲ Πορφυρίων μάθεν	d ˈ (s̄)sds
παρ' αἶσαν ἐξερεθίζων. κέρδος δὲ φίλτατον,	⏓ sd ˈ (s̄)ss
ἑκόντος εἴ τις ἐκ δόμων φέροι.	⏓ s ⏓ (s̄)s

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[1] It also existed in Lesbian lyric, cf. Alc. fr. 14 D^2 and *v. infra*, Part III.

Ep. 57	*Ἄβαντος εὐρυχόρους ἀγυιάς. τοιαῦτα μέν*	‸ssd(s̄) | (s̄)s
	ἐφθέγξατ' Ἀμφιάρηος. χαίρων δὲ καὶ αὐτός	⏓ sd | (s̄)d ⏓
	Ἀλκμᾶνα στεφάνοισι βάλλω. ῥαίνω δὲ καὶ ὕμνῳ,	(s̄)ds | s̄d ⏓
	γείτων ὅτι μοι καὶ κτεάνων φύλαξ ἐμῶν	– d | dss
	ὑπάντασεν ἰόντι γᾶς ὀμφαλὸν παρ' ἀοίδιμον,	‸s | ds | sds
	μαντευμάτων τ' ἐφάψατο συγγόνοισι τέχναις.	– (s̄)(s̄)dss –

Of these drags only that in the third period of the epode – – – ⏑ ⏑ – – is carried through all the verses, and it is as a matter of fact a doubtful case, since the line may quite possibly contain two periods – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – – and – – ⏑ ⏑ – –; it shows this diaeresis throughout though with no hiatus or *anceps*. The remainder have led to a variety of inadmissible analyses. The units with dragged first short are: – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – – ep. 2, – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – (or – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – – with the alternative period-division) ep. 3, – ⏓ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – (the decasyllable above referred to) str. 5, – ⏓ – ⏑ – str. 7, – ⏓ – ⏑ – ⏑ – str. 6. Ep. 1 shows drag in the last short ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏓ –, and ep. 6 (l. 42 *υἱοὺς Θήβαις αἰνίξατο παρμένοντας αἰχμᾷ*) has the double drag – – ⏓ – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ – –. The unusual – ⏓ – ⏑ – ⏑ – of str. 6 has probably an echo in Bacchylides 18, third period (the whole dithyramb is full of drags) *Σίνιν, ὃς ἰσχύϊ φέρτατος θνατῶν ἦν, Κρονίδα Λυταίου σεισίχθονος τέκος* ⏖ ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – | – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – | – ⏓ – ⏑ – ⏑ –, though the period division is not quite certain. Bacchylides also uses tail-drag for a proper name in 16, fourth period, *ἔνθ' ἀπὸ λαΐδος εὐρυνεφεῖ Κηναίῳ* – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏓ – : –. I am inclined to believe that the same phenomenon accounts best for the complex difficulties of the first period of *Isth.* 8, where the break after *ἀλλά* l. 11 in order to emend to *ἐμὲ δεῖμα μέν* is improbable; Pindar nowhere ends a period with *ἀλλά*.[1] If *ἀλλ' ἐμοί* or Bergk's *ἀλλ' ἔμ' οὐ* is accepted, *ἐνεγκὼν κοιμᾶτο* is perfectly possible as a drag ⏑ – | – ⏑̣ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏓ – | – ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ –. The resolution in the proper name *Ἑλέναν* l. 52 ⏑ – | – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ | – ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – has a similar echo in the sixth period – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏖ | – ⏑ – ⏓. In the epode of *Ol.* 9 the principle of drag and double drag accounts satisfactorily for the repeated accumulation of longs without the assumption of strange iambics and cholanapaests and spondees. The strophe contains four instances of ordinary first-short drag, and the epode continues:

ἐγὼ δέ τοι φίλαν πόλιν μαλεραῖς ἐπιφλέγων ἀοιδαῖς,	⏑ s ⏑ sd ⏑ ss ⏓
καὶ ἀγάνορος ἵππου θᾶσσον καὶ ναὸς ὑποπτέρου παντᾷ	‸dd(s̄)s̄ | dss̄
ἀγγελίαν πέμψω ταύταν,	ds̄(s̄)
εἰ σύν τινι μοιριδίῳ παλαμᾷ	– ddd
ἐξαίρετον Χαρίτων νέμομαι κᾶπον·	⏓ sdds̄
κεῖναι γὰρ ὤπασαν τὰ τέρπν'· ἀγαθοὶ δὲ	⏓ s ⏓ sd ⏓ sds ⏓
καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες	

(I have assumed the first period to resemble the last, but it is of course impossible to be sure which syllables are short *anceps*.) Here there are two single tail-drags and two doubles. In the last stanza, however, the second period normalizes the first of the doubles: *μελέτα· σοφίαι μὲν αἰπειναί* ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – – –, and in l. 57 the third period normalizes the second of them: *ἄντλον ἑλεῖν. κείνῳ δ' ἔσαν* – ⏑ ⏑ – – – ⏑ –. The proper Pindaric form *ἔσαν* need not be emended to the dubious *ἔσσαν* or *ἦσαν*, nor need we resort to Schroeder's expedient of deleting δ' and transferring *ἔσαν* to the following line. A similar fluctuation in double drag can be seen in *Nem.* 4, strophe, sixth period. In *Ol.* 4 the lack of responding triads makes it impossible to be sure of the analysis of the string of long syllables in strophe, period 6, or of the period-division; possibly it should be s̄s̄ | sssd. Drag in dactylo-epitrite is very rare, but I have already called attention to –⏑––– in *Pyth.* 9; *Nem.* 8 begins with one in *ὥρα πότνια, κᾶρυξ Ἀφροδίτας* which responds in l. 39 to *αὔξεται δ' ἀρετά, χλωραῖς ἐέρσαις* $^{(\bar{s})}$d – s –.

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[1] For *Ol.* 9. 55 *v.* analysis *infra*, where the running of what are commonly given as periods 2 and 3 into one line gives a more intelligible explanation of the long syllables.

Of resolution and contraction there is little to say except that the former is very common and the latter extremely rare. The great majority of resolutions are carried through all responding verses, and among those that are not, proper names account for most of the divergences. Ambiguities of analysis (⏖⏑ or ⏑⏖) are inevitable in most cases where three consecutive shorts appear. Where there are four or more they are to be kept in **s** movement rather than in **d** wherever possible, e.g. *Ol.* 1, ep. 2 is ⏑–ˈ–⏑⏑–ˈ–⏑⏖⏑–⏑– rather than . . . : – : ⏖⏑⏑–⏑– or . . . ˈ–⏑⏑⏖ˈ–⏑–, since the ascertainable instances of resolution in double-short are very rare. *Nem.* 7, str. 7 –ˈ–⏑⏑–⏑–ˈ⏑⏑⏑–⏑– has in l. 70 *Εὐξένιδα πάτραθε Σώγενες, ἀπομνύω* –ˈ⏖⏑⏑–⏑–ˈ⏑⏑⏑–⏑–, and the last line of *Ol.* 10 also shows the opening ⏑–⏑⏑⏕; most striking of all is *Isth.* 3–4. 63 *ἔρνεϊ Τελεσίαδα* –⏑⏑⏖⏑⏑– in dactylo-epitrite. All these occur in proper names, but in *Pyth.* 8, str. 2 (quoted above) the sequence –⏑–⏑⏑⏖⏑– sd^{r}s in all verses is preferable to s ˈ ^{r}s^{r} – with resolution of the last long before a final *anceps*. Some poems, such as *Pyth.* 2 and *Pyth.* 5, play conspicuously on the resolution *motif*. I quote the latter, since its sequences of shorts are unusually well controlled by sporadic long syllables in one or another of the verses, and by the surrounding rhythms.

	ὁ πλοῦτος εὐρυσθενής,	‸ss ˈ s
	ὅταν τις ἀρετᾷ κεκραμένον καθαρᾷ	‸ss$^{(r)}$ ˈ ssd
	βροτήσιος ἀνὴρ πότμου παραδόντος αὐτὸν ἀνάγῃ	‸ss^{r} ˈ sds ˈ ^{r}s
	πολύφιλον ἑπέταν.	‸s^{r} ˈ ^{r}s
	ὦ θεόμορ' Ἀρκεσίλα,	s$^{(r)}$ ˈ d
	σύ τοί νιν κλυτᾶς	‸s ˈ s
	αἰῶνος ἀκρᾶν βαθμίδων ἄπο	– s ˈ ds
	σὺν εὐδοξίᾳ μετανίσεαι	‸s ˈ sds
	ἕκατι χρυσαρμάτου Κάστορος·	‸ss ˈ s ˈ s
	εὐδίαν ὃς μετὰ χειμέριον ὄμβρον τεάν	s ˈ d ˈ ^{r}s ˈ s
	καταιθύσσει μάκαιραν ἑστίαν.	‸s – $^{(r)}$sss
23	*Ἀπολλώνιον ἄθυρμα. τῶ σε μὴ λαθέτω*	‸s ˈ s^{r} ˈ ssd
	Κυράνᾳ γλυκὺν ἀμφὶ κᾶπον Ἀφροδίτας ἀειδόμενον,	‸s ˈ dsss ˈ sd
	παντὶ μὲν θεὸν αἴτιον ὑπερτιθέμεν,	sd ˈ ^{r}sd
	φιλεῖν δὲ Κάρρωτον ἔξοχ' ἑταίρων·	‸ss ˈ sd –
	ὃς οὐ τὰν 'Επιμαθέος ἄγων	‸s ˈ d ˈ ^{r}s
	ὀψινόου θυγατέρα πρόφασιν Βαττιδᾶν	d ˈ ^{r}sd ˈ s
	ἀφίκετο δόμους θεμισκρεόντων·	‸s ˈ $^{(r)}$ss$^{(r)}$s –
	ἀλλ' ἀρισθάρματον	s ˈ s
	ὕδατι Κασταλίας ξενω-	$^{(r)(\bar{s})}$ds ˈ ds$^{(r)}$s ˈ s
	θεὶς γέρας ἀμφέβαλε τεαῖσιν κόμαις.	

αἰῶνος in the seventh period of the strophe is sometimes (for instance by Schroeder and Turyn) given a period to itself. A slight modification of the received text is required in one verse or another for either rendering. But on metrical grounds I have no doubt that the single period is better. Appeal is made to *ἀθρόοι* in *Nem.* 1 (see vol. xliv, p. 146) and to *ἕν' ἀνδρῶν* in *Nem.* 6. The former is checked by preceding *brevis in longo* and following hiatus; the latter only by diaeresis; –⏑– is a whole unit; ‸⏑–ˈ– is just possible. But what is ––⏓? Turyn says 'palimbacchius', but even in 'metrizing' contexts the palimbacchiac ––⏑ is not in isolation a self-supporting metron, any more than the dactyl –⏑⏑ or the so-called 'major ionic' ––⏑⏑. A final short lengthened to final *anceps* is a fiction.

Contraction is an elusive phenomenon, since unless the double-short is left intact in responsion it is impossible to be certain that a long syllable represents a contracted double-short. It is conceivable, for instance, that the series of longs quoted above in *Ol.* 4. 6 conceal contraction rather than drag. Ascertainable contraction is extremely rare. A possible instance is in *Ol.* 14. 7, where *σεῦ ἕκατι μελαν-τειχέα* . . . corresponds to *οὐδὲ γὰρ θεοὶ σεμ-νάν* . . . – ⏑ – ⏕ –, but *μειλαντειχέα* (Maas) would give – ⏑ – ⏑ – : – : – ⏑ ⏑ . . . in both and should perhaps be adopted. The only certain case[1] is in a proper name in the fourth period of the epode of *Ol.* 10. This period is so remarkable that it needs further consideration:

15 *καὶ χάλκεος Ἄρης. τράπε δὲ Κύκνεια μάχα καὶ ὑπέρβιον*
59 *ἀκρόθινα διελὼν ἔθυε, καὶ πενταετηρίδ' ὅπως ἄρα*
103 *εὐάνορα πόλιν καταβρέχων· παῖδ' ἐρατὸν δ' Ἀρχεστράτου*

These three versions give ⏕ – ¦ ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – ¦ ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – ¦ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏔ – ⏑ ⏓, or with alternative treatment of the resolutions ⏕ – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ¦ – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ : – : – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏔ – ⏑ ⏓. The contraction in *Ἀρχεστράτου* (one verse out of five) is clearly genuine. The initial syllable is more surprising. Four verses give a long syllable, of which *ἀκρόθινα* in the fifth appears to be a resolution. Resolution of initial *anceps*, though rare, is occasionally found in other kinds of lyric, but Pindar's practice seems to be strict. The only possible parallels occur in a corrupt passage of *Nem.* 6, where the two penultimate periods run:

21 *Νεμέᾳ δὲ τρεῖς, ἔπαυσε λάθαν* ⏕ – ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ – –
44 *βοτάνα τέ νίν ποθ' ἁ λέοντος*
67 *δελφῖνί κε τάχος δι' ἅλμας*

22 *Σωκλείδα', ὃς ὑπέρτατος*
45 *νικάσαντ' ἔρεψε δασκίοις*
68 *ἶσον εἴποιμι Μελησίαν*

If the agreement of ll. 22 and 68 is taken as establishing – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – for the end of the second of these periods, Hermann's *ἤρεφε* is an easy way of bringing l. 45 into conformity. Are there two syllables or three preceding this? The only way of giving three syllables to *Σωκλεί-δα'* is to read (with Wilamowitz) *Σαοκλεί-δα'*, but this gives ⏑ – –, which might correspond to *νικάσαντ'* – – – but hardly to *ἶσον εἴ-ποιμι* – ⏑ –. *ἴσον ϝεῖ-ποιμι* ⏑ – – (*v.* Schroeder, proleg. ii. 5) is dubious; Wilamowitz has *ἴσον κ' εἴποιμι*, emending *κε* in l. 67 to *καί*. But if two of the three lines are to be emended, it seems easier to require the already corrupt l. 45 to conform to *Σωκλείδα'* and read *νικῶντ' ἤρεφε* with Hermann. If then the pattern is to be – – – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – the simplest course is to take *ἴσον εἴποιμι* as its equivalent ⏑ ⏑ – – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ –. This sends us back to the preceding line (*κεν* in l. 67 is easy). If *βοτάνα* is accepted in l. 44, then *Νεμέᾳ* is also to be read as a trisyllable. Hermann proposed *ποία* (with *Νεμέα*). But surely the case for an opening ⏕ is much strengthened by its appearance in two consecutive lines. There is no force in the special objection to *ἴσον εἴποιμι* on the ground that particular odium attaches to a glyconic of this form (remembering the *ὁρᾷς τὸν πόδα τοῦτον;* of the *Frogs*), since those sequences of syllables which in other kinds of lyric can be grouped together as 'glyconics' have no special community of habits or taboos in the periodic kind. No one, as far as I know, has attempted to emend the opening of Bacch. 18 *βασιλεῦ τᾶν ἱερᾶν Ἀθανᾶν, τῶν ἁβροβίων ἄναξ 'Ιώνων* ⏑ ⏑ – – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – – ⏓ – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ – –.

Are we then to say that in these three cases (two in *Nem.* 6 and one in *Ol.* 10) we find initial *anceps* resolved into double-short? If so, we must at least stipulate that the *anceps* must take the long form, so that no equation of ⏑ to ⏕ is licensed. But it is possible that this can be formulated better by taking the cue from *Ἀρχεστράτου* in the last metrical unit of the period in *Ol.* 10. Since that is a contraction, the initial ⏕ may also be a contraction; and it should be noted that in the first of the two periods in *Nem.* 6 *Νεμέᾳ* and *βοτάνα* set the measure first, before *δελφῖνι.* I think it quite possible that there are three kinds of initial syllable in Pindar: true short, as indicated in the headless units, true *anceps*, and true long, which is occasionally capable of appearing as two shorts, like the headless ‸ d of, for example, the *ἐλέφαντι φαίδιμον ὦμον* of *Ol.* 1. Thus an initial true long would be a contraction of a 'headless' opening. The distinction may seem academic on paper, when so often there is no means of distinguishing true *anceps* from either of the other two, but there is every reason to believe that in the actual tempo of performance each of these three was allotted a different time-quantity. If, further, a headless element really was preceded by a silent dance-step, the distinction would be perfectly clear.

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[1] Possibly also in *Paean* 6. 117 *-μεν βίου ἀμφιπόλοις* – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – ~ *πατρὶ Μναμοσύνα* – – – ⏑ ⏑ –.

I have already called attention to the prevalence in certain odes of some particular metrical feature—resolution, drag, unusually regular or irregular length of periods, and so on. Dactylo-epitrite is of course another particularity of rhythm. One ode, *Ol.* 2, is unique in being composed, except for one **sd** at the close of the strophe, entirely in single-short, the nearest parallel being, as the detailed study of Maas[1] has shown, the *'Ηΐθεοι* of Bacchylides, which admits the double-short in one period, the seventh of the strophe (dss ⏑ dd ⏑ ss). There is, however, one notable difference between the two poems; the *'Ηΐθεοι* contains many more prolonged single-short units, especially –⏑–⏑–⏑–, and even longer sequences where it is impossible to determine which syllable is *anceps*. *Ol.* 2 is much less ambiguous, and the following analysis shows the remarkable extent to which it is dominated by the movement s ˈ s ˈ s . . . .

	Ἀναξιφόρμιγγες ὕμνοι,	‸ ss ˈ s ⏓
	τίνα θεόν, τίν' ἥρωα, τίνα δ' ἄνδρα κελαδήσομεν ;	$^{(r)}$ss ˈ s^{r} ˈ s^{r} ˈ s
	ἤτοι Πίσα μὲν Διός· 'Ολυμπιάδα δ' ἔστασεν 'Ηρακλέης	– s ˈ s^{r} ˈ s$^{(r)}$ – s ˈ $^{(r)}$s
	ἀκρόθινα πολέμου·	s ˈ ^{r}s
	Θήρωνα δὲ τετραορίας ἕνεκα νικαφόρου	⏓ s^{r} ˈ s ˈ ^{r}s ˈ s
	γεγωνητέον, ὄπιν δικαίων ξένων, ἔρεισμ' Ἀκράγαντος,	‸ s ˈ s^{r} ˈ s$^{(r)}$ ˈ ss ˈ s ⏓
	εὐωνύμων τε πατέρων ἄωτον ὀρθόπολιν·	– s ˈ ^{r}s ⏑ sd
17	*λοιπῷ γένει. τῶν δὲ πεπραγμένων*	– s ˈ s$^{(r)}$ ˈ s
	ἐν δίκᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαν ἀποίητον οὐδ' ἄν	ss ˈ ^{r}ss ˈ s ⏓
	Χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατὴρ δύναιτο θέμεν ἔργων τέλος·	^{r}s ˈ ss ˈ ^{r}s ˈ s
	λάθα δὲ πότμῳ σὺν εὐδαίμονι γένοιτ' ἄν.	– s ˈ s$^{(r)}$ – ^{r}s ⏓
	ἐσλῶν γὰρ ὑπὸ χαρμάτων πῆμα θνᾴσκει	⏓ s^{r} ˈ s ˈ s –
	παλίγκοτον δαμασθέν.	‸ sss –

The separation of the last two periods is not quite certain, since it rests on unsupported diaeresis, but as there are five verses it is probably correct. The structural units are –⏑– and –⏑–⏑–, with resolutions thirteen times carried through, five times with one or two exceptions, and once with the resolution itself the exception. A proper name is only three times the excepted instance, so that emendation in any of the others simply for the sake of uniformity has a weak case. The opening of the second period is a little uncertain, since the manuscripts at l. 46 read *πέφνεν οἱ* (this should of course be *πέφνε*, since *οἱ* is regularly preceded by hiatus), and at l. 62 *ἴσαις δ' ἐν* ἁμέραις, which is unmetrical. If the Byzantine *ἴσα δ' ἐν ἁμέραις* is accepted for this, then *πέφνε οἱ* can stand, and the notation is ⏖ ⏑ – ⏑ –, $^{(r)}$ss. If Mommsen's *ἴσαις δ' ἁμέραις* is read, the Byzantine *ἔπεφνε οἱ* must be taken, giving ⏑ ⏖ | – ⏑ –, $_{\wedge}$ s$^{(r)}$ | s. It is of course quite illegitimate to leave (with some texts) ⏓⏖ – ⏑ –, which gives different elements in different verses. The third period (*ἤτοι Πίσα κτλ.*) could alternatively be analysed – s – ^{r}s | ^{r}s | s | s; in any case the line contains one link-*anceps*, as again in the fourth of the epode. The short *anceps* of the last period of the strophe is as usual uncertain; the line from *τε* to the end might be a single unit sssd. It is noteworthy that in both strophe and epode here Pindar has so marked a clausular rhythm, which departs from the movement of the rest.

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[1] *Die neuen Responsionsfreiheiten b. B. u. P.*, pt. 2. I am in entire agreement with Maas as to the necessity of assuming corruption in the anomalous responsions of unequal length (such as ⏑–⏑– to ⏑⏑⏑–), though I see no need to suspect –⏑⏕ or ⏕⏑– or –⏓–⏑– (drag in a proper name, as indicated above); possibly also –⏓–⏑–⏑– (l. 83). My analysis does not, of course, correspond altogether to his, since the principles I have suggested do not admit 'bacchiacs' or 'dochmiacs' which involve the cut – | ⏑ in the middle of a period.

(*To be concluded*)

A. M. DALE.

THE EPIGRAMS OF ANACREON ON HERMAE

If we consult the *Anthologia Lyrica*[1] of E. Diehl and the *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*[2] of Schmid–Stählin, we find that they consider as genuine the three epigrams on Hermae which the Palatine Anthology attributes to Anacreon.[3] The question of the authenticity of these epigrams has been for long a matter of dispute,[4] but we may shed further light on it if we take into account the spread of the cult of Hermes in Attica and Anacreon's visit, or possibly visits, to Athens.

Crome, in his article Ἱππάρχειοι Ἑρμαῖ,[5] has shown that every one of the early Hermae which has come down to us, whether found in Attica, Siphnos, or the Peloponnese, followed the Attic example and is of square shape.[6] At the same time he shows that although Hermes must have been an object of worship in Attica before 510 B.C., the cult of that god appears as a common subject in the paintings on Attic vases only in the fifth and fourth centuries.[7] Nor is there any literary or epigraphical support that it spread widely there at an earlier date.

We do, however, know of an important political and religious event connected with the cult of Hermes in Attica, which took place a few years earlier (between 528 and 514) and which is frequently mentioned in our sources. This is the setting up of the famous Ἱππάρχειοι Ἑρμαῖ[8] by Hipparchus, the brother of the tyrant Hippias, midway between the city of Athens and the different demes. These Hermae were not only milestones, for which Hipparchus 'with the aid of his friends' composed epigrams for educative purposes, but at the same time cult-statues, just as the altar of the Twelve Gods, later set up by Pisistratus the Younger to serve as the central milestone of Attica, was a religious monument.[9] In the same way from 510 onwards the stone τετράγωνος Ἑρμῆς spread all over Attica not only, or primarily, as a milestone, but also as a cult-statue fashioned after the new monumental version Hipparchus introduced of the rude wooden images of Hermes which must have hitherto served for the cult. Such stone Hermae were then frequently dedicated and worshipped by private individuals; they were placed at the boundaries and at the gates of fields, villas, and houses; they were set up in the city, the gymnasia, and the palaestrae; and men put crowns of flowers upon their heads, sprinkled them with salt, touched them for luck, and offered sacrifices on altars set up to them. For this sort of stone Hermae were composed all the three epigrams which we are considering.[10]

It is generally held that Anacreon visited Athens only during the tyranny and as the guest of the Pisistratids. We are told that Hipparchus even sent a fifty-oared galley to bring the great poet from Samos to Attica.[11] To this visit it is usual to attribute his friendship with Critias and other aristocratic families at Athens, and also his activity as a 'Hermes epigrammatist'.[1] When Hipparchus was murdered in 514, to quote Schmid–Stählin, 'We cannot follow the traces of his life; he must have left Attica'. Scholars have thought that he took refuge in Thessaly by making use of the hospitality of the Thessalian King Echecratidas,[2] the friend and host of Simonides, but a second visit of Anacreon to Athens has never been contemplated.[3] In that case, of course, since the cult of Hermes in Attica spread widely after the death of Hipparchus, and only then did private individuals start dedicating stone Hermae, all the Hermes epigrams attributed to Anacreon must be spurious.

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[1] Fr. 103 (104); 105 (112); 106 (111).

[2] Vol. I. i, p. 433 (and n. 6) (München, 1929); ibid., p. 437, n. 9.

[3] *Anth. Pal.* vi. 138; vi. 143; vi. 346. A fourth one is attributed by the Anthology first to Anacreon (vi. 144) and then to Simonides (vi. 213). But after its first two lines were found on the Hermes of Hagia Trias by Milchlöfer and published by Wilhelm (*Oesterreich. Jahreshefte* 2, 1899, pp. 228 f.), they became generally and rightly attributed to the latter. See Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* III. i, p. 162; Diehl, *Anthol. Lyr.*, fr. 101 (150) a; Picard, *Rev. des Ét. Anciennes*, xxxvii (1935), pp. 9 f., etc.

[4] See Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sappho u. Simonides*, p. 107, n. i and *passim*; Geffcken, *Griechische Epigramme*, No. 116; Weber, *Anacreontea*, p. 36; Boas, *De Epigr. Simonid.*, p. 152; Kaibel, *Epigr. Gr.*, No. 758, etc. See also Friedländer–Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, pp. 67 f. and n. 8; also n. 107.

[5] *Mitteilungen des Deutsch. Instit. in Athen*, lx/lxi (1935–6), pp. 300 f.

[6] That the square shape was Attic cf. Thuc. 6. 27; Paus. 4. 33. 3.

[7] Crome, op. cit., p. 305.

[8] Ps. Plat., *Hipparch.* 228 *d* f.

[9] Cf. Herod 2. 2; *I.G.* ii. 1078.

[10] For the famous Hermae of the Agora and their special democratic significance see Domaszewski, *Die Hermen der Agora*, *S.B. Heidelberg*, 1914, Ab. 10. 9.

[11] Ps. Plat., *Hipparch.* 228 *c*. The same story is told by Aelian, *V.H.* 8. 2, probably using the Ps.-Platonic dialogue as his source.

Yet we can gather more information about Anacreon and his Athenian visit which does point to the possibility of a return to democratic Athens after the fall of the tyranny and which gives good grounds for believing that he may even have stayed in Attica during the nineties of the fifth century.

In the *Charmides* of Plato (157 *e*) Socrates says to Charmides: *ἥ τε γὰρ πατρῴα ὑμῖν οἰκία, ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπὸ Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν ποιητῶν ἐγκεκωμιασμένη παραδέδοται ἡμῖν, ὡς διαφέρουσα κάλλει τε καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ αὖ ἡ πρὸς μητρὸς ὡσαύτως.*

The same, and even more, information is given us about Anacreon and Critias, the son of Dropides, by the scholiast on Aeschylus, in *P.V.* 128: *ὁ ῥυθμὸς Ἀνακρεόντειός ἐστι κεκλασμένος πρὸς τὸ θρηνητικόν. ἐπεδήμησε γὰρ* (sc. *ὁ Ἀνακρέων*) *τῇ Ἀττικῇ, Κριτίου ἐρῶν, καὶ ἠρέσθη λίαν τοῖς μέλεσι τοῦ τραγικοῦ. ἐχρῶντο δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐν παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν θρηνητικοῖς ὡς καὶ Σοφοκλῆς.*

The Critias mentioned in both these passages is the son of Dropides, the grandfather of the tyrant Critias and of Charmides, the very Critias, as Burnet has shown, of Plato's dialogues *Timaeus* and *Critias*.[4] He was eighty years younger than Critias the friend of Solon[5] and must therefore have been born at the end of the sixth century. Thus at the beginning of the fifth century he would be a youth, a *καλός*, and, if we are to believe the scholiast and Plato, it was just at this time that Anacreon *ἐπεδήμησεν* in Attica and developed a passionate affection for him.[6] And, if we are to trust the scholiast, Anacreon must have been in Athens well on in the nineties, if he really enjoyed the *μέλη* of Aeschylus. For the first tragedy of Aeschylus is thought to have been staged some time between the spring of 499 and that of 496 B.C.[7]

The only other source of information available to us today about Anacreon's visit to Athens is the pictures of him on Attic vases. And a number of figures on such vases have been identified as Anacreon; but we are on safe ground only with those that bear his name. This occurs (*a*) on a cup by Oltos, of the time of Hipparchus, 520–510 B.C., now in the British Museum,[8] where the poet is moving with two youths, (*b*) on a lekythus by the Gales painter in Syracuse belonging to the period 510–500 B.C.,[9] where he can be seen playing the lyre in similar company, and (*c*) on a fragment of a calyx-krater in Rome, a very early work of the Kleophrades painter,[1] contemporary with *b* or even a little later.[2]

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[1] This is also, and quite arbitrarily, connected with the great undertaking of Hipparchus in setting up Hermae; see Schmid–Stählin, op. cit., p. 433 and n. 6. All the information about the life of Anacreon has already been collected and examined by F. G. Welcker in *Rhein. Mus.* iii (1835), pp. 128 f. (*Kleine Schriften*, i, pp. 251 f.).

[2] See Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 305 f.

[3] See, however, the suggestion of Madame Karouzou, *B.C.H.* lxvi/lxvii (1942–3), pp. 248 f.

[4] Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, vol. i, 'Thales to Plato'; see also Taylor, *Comm. to Timaeus*, p. 23; Wade-Gery, 'Kritias and Herodes', *C.Q.* xxxix (1945), p. 27, n. 2.

[5] Plato, *Timaeus* 21 *a*.

[6] His date is generally given earlier (cf. Kirchner, *Prosop. Attica*, i. 592, etc.); in fact in *Kritias* 5, in P.-W. xi. 2, p. 1901, it is said that Plato places him too late, which is impossible because of this connexion with Anacreon, who is always held to have visited Athens only once and that during the tyranny.

[7] Schmid–Stählin, op. cit., I. 2, p. 186; 169 (see also n. 7).

[8] Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase Painters*, p. 40, No. 69. Cf. S. Birch, *Observations of the Figures of Anacreon* (London, 1845), pp. 3 f.

[9] Beazley, op. cit., p. 31, No. 2. These two (*a* and *b*) published representations are conveniently assembled in Schefold, *Die Bildnisse der antiken Dichter*, p. 51.

It is very probable that all these pictures of Anacreon were contemporary works and that he was in Athens and a figure of Athenian society at the time they were painted, for it was not the custom of vase-painters to return to subjects of ten or twenty years before. This again seems to indicate[3] that Anacreon may have visited Athens after the fall of the tyranny and stayed there perhaps as late as the nineties.[4]

On that assumption we could attribute to this period his friendship with the noble houses of Attica—always the enemies of tyrants and unlikely therefore to form close friendships with one whose days in Athens were spent as a guest of Hipparchus—and it was then, perhaps, that he became appreciated and beloved by the Athenians. Indeed, as Critias the tyrant's famous verses show,[5] his memory was evergreen in democratic Athens; a statue was even set up on the Acropolis in the days of Pericles in his honour.[6] To this period, too, we should expect the Hermes epigrams to belong, were we not obliged by other reasons to attribute them to a later date, which certainly falls after the death of Anacreon himself.

Thus the epigram *Anth. Pal.* vi. 138:

> *Πρὶμ μὲν Καλλιτέλες hιδρύσατ⌊ο· τόνδε δ' ἐκείνο⌋*
> *⌊ἔ⌋γ⌊γ⌋ονοι ἐστέσαν⌊θ', hοῖς χάριν ἀντιδίδο⌋*

informs us that the *ἔγγονοι*, the grandchildren[7] of Calliteles, set up the Hermes just as he, their grandfather, had done earlier. As dedications of stone Hermae by private individuals only started at the very end of the sixth, and increasingly at the beginning of the fifth century in Attica, this dedication by the grandchildren of the first dedicator must be twenty years later at least. This brings us roughly to the battle of Salamis, a date too late for Anacreon.

And the other two epigrams *Anth. Pal.* vi. 346 and *Anth. Pal.* vi. 143 are certainly later. As Wilamowitz[8] and Geffcken[9] point out, on stylistic grounds the first can even be attributed to the fourth century; and again the florid and at the same time commonplace style of the second, as well as the mention of full liberty for ξεῖνοι and ἀστοί to train in the same gymnasium point to a later date. And the metrical enjambment —though not impossible—is improbable in an epigram by Anacreon.

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[1] Beazley, op. cit., p. 123, No. 29.

[2] Cf. Richter, *Attic Red-figured Vases*, 1946, p. 44; and Karouzou, *B.C.H.* lxvi/lxvii, 1942–3, pp. 248 f. Madame Karouzou very convincingly identifies the figure of a *comastes* on an amphora of the Louvre (*Vases ant. du Louvre*; 3e série, G. 220, pl. 130, p. 206) with Anacreon. This should date 490–480 B.C.

[3] We must bear in mind that these vase-paintings of Anacreon are only an *indication*, but by no means a sure proof, for 'poets' are exceptions even in this, as Sappho represented on 5th-century vases shows. Cf. Schefold, op. cit., pp. 55 and 57.

[4] That friends and guests of tyrants could become friends of the succeeding democracy we know from Simonides and the famous epigram he composed in honour of the murder of his friend and host Hipparchus.

[5] Diehl, fr. 8 (i).

[6] The Anacreon of Copenhagen is supposed to be a copy of the bronze original: see P. Arndt, *Glypt. Ny Carlsberg*, p. 39; G. Lippold, *Portrætstatuen*, pp. 37 f.

[7] *Ἔγγονος* can also be instead of *ἔκγονος*, so it may possibly mean the 'descendants'. It is not the epigraphical data which speak against Anacreon's authorship, as Kirchoff (*C.I.G.* i. 381), Kaibel (*Epig. Gr.* 758) Roberts–Gardner (*Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*, p. 439), and others thought, for the shapes of the letters, and in particular of the letter A (cf. *C.I.G.* i. 834 or Roberts–Gardner, op. cit.) are exactly the same as those on the altar of Pisistratus the Younger (Kirchner, *Imagines Inscr. Atticarum* (Berlin, 1935, v) which is dated 512 B.C. (cf. Welter, *Arch. Anzeig.* liv (1934), p. 23) or 497 B.C. (cf. Meritt, *Hesperia*, viii (1939), p. 64), and which falls well within the lifetime of Anacreon. The mixing of letters of the old Attic alphabet with those of the Ionian is probably due to Ionian craftsmen working in Attica at that time (cf. Kunze–Schleif, *Jahrb. d. deutsch. Arch.* liii (1939), p. 129, or Welter, op. cit.). On these same epigraphical data Friedländer–Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, No. 107 mainly exclude Anacreon's authorship.

[8] *Sappho and Simonides*, p. 107, n. i.

[9] *Gr. Epigr.*, No. 116.

So we must, I believe, conclude that tradition[1] is wrong in attributing to Anacreon any of the epigrams composed for Hermae set up by private individuals. For in the first place only after 510 B.C. did the cult of Hermes spread widely in Attica, and secondly, even if Anacreon did visit Attica and stay there for some time after that date—a fact of which we have serious but not certain indication—internal and stylistic evidence prove that they could not have been written in his lifetime, though, as Valerius Maximus tells us, 'he outlived the common span of human life'.[2]

C. A. TRYPANIS.

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[1] We should bear in mind that these epigrams must have been included already in the Crown of Meleager as works of Anacreon: cf. *Anth. Pal.* IV. i. 35.

[2] *Fact. et dict. memorab.*, 9. 8; Ps.-Lucian, *De Longaev.* 26, mentions that he died 85 years old.

A TWELFTH-CENTURY MANUSCRIPT OF CICERO'S *DE OFFICIIS*

THE Brotherton Collection, which now forms part of the Library of the University of Leeds, contains a manuscript of Cicero's *De Officiis* which is usually assigned to the twelfth century. On page 3 of the catalogue of the Brotherton Library (printed for private circulation, Leeds, 1931) the manuscript is incorrectly said to contain 'DE OFFICIIS LIBER PRIMUS'. In fact the manuscript contains all three books with the exception of nine leaves (seven of them from Book II) which have been removed.[1] At present the manuscript consists of 41 folios on vellum measuring 11 in. × 7½ in. Ff. 39–41 are written by a later (14th-century?) hand.

The manuscript is said (op. cit.) to have belonged to the bibliophile Dr. Anthony Askew (1722–72).[2] Mr. J. A. Symington, who was formerly private librarian to Lord Brotherton, is unable now to prove this ascription, but assures me in a letter that 'it is unquestionable the MS. is from the Library of Dr. A.'. After Askew's death his collection was sold, the books and manuscripts on separate occasions. The printed sale catalogue of the manuscripts (London, 1784) contains two manuscripts of the *De Officiis*, and in the copy in the University Library, Cambridge, which has added the names of the buyers and the prices paid, item 445 reads 'Cicero de Officiis codex pulcherrim. 4to. [*sic*]' sold to Lord Lansdowne for £11. 0s. 6*d*. This volume passed on Lord Lansdowne's death to the British Museum and is entered in the catalogue of the Lansdowne Manuscripts in the British Museum as 'item 832 8vo. M. Tullii Ciceronis . . . Officiorum lib. iii, Codex membranaceus . . . nitide exaratus. Olim Antonij Askew, M.D.'. The other Cicero manuscript in the Askew catalogue reads 'item 442 Cicero de Officiis, in Margine Notae nominales variae occurrent, corio russico, Fol.' and was sold to a Mr. Lambert for 10s. 6*d*. The history of this manuscript, which is presumably the one now in the Brotherton Collection, is not known; nor can one be certain of how the manuscript came into Askew's possession. His library contained manuscripts of Richard Mead (d. 1754) and John Taylor (d. 1766). Taylor, though best known as a Greek scholar, left manuscript notes on some Latin authors including Cicero (Nichols, *Literary Anecdotes*, footnote, iv. 510), whereas Mead (ibid. vi(i). 219) left to Askew only his Greek manuscripts. However, it is equally likely that the Cicero was purchased independently by Askew himself, for according to Nichols (iii. 494) Askew was in Paris in 1749 (after studying at Leyden and visiting Constantinople and Italy), where he had 'an opportunity of purchasing several rare MSS. and of laying the foundation of an elegant and extensive library'.

Some general characteristics of the manuscript may first be noted. In word-order, especially in cases such as noun-adjective, it shows considerable independence; it is careless, and guilty of many omissions. On the other hand, it has very few examples of simple for compound verbs and vice versa, nor does it substitute synonyma for the true reading. In orthography it has throughout *nichil* and *hi*(*s*) for *ii*(*s*). It does not know *anquirunt*, for which it always substitutes *adquirunt*. There is a considerable variation in the use of compendia (such as Atzert, praef. vii, notes for B), ē and est, ſt̄ and sunt, c̄- and con-. The following are representative of the compendia used in ff. 1–38. Those used in ff. 39–41 (the later hand) require separate notice. The most common compendium is the horizontal stroke, used suprascript both as a sign of suspension and contraction, e.g. n̄ = non, ēē = esse, enī = enim, q̅m̅ = quoniam, t̅m̅ = tamen (also tam̄), aut̄ = autem, alt̄ = alter, uō = uero, ht̄ = habet, agt̄ = agunt, nc̄ = nunc, oī = omni (etc.), hōi = homini (etc.), aīō = animo (etc.), m̄ſ = mens, f̄r = frater, pat̄ = pater, h̄r = habere, d̄r = dicitur, aliq̄n̄ = aliquando, an̄ = ante, un̄ (perhaps once only) = unde, agam̄ n̄ = Agamemnon. The horizontal stroke is also used through the upright of *b* and *d* (= -ber- and -der- and final -bis: so uiđe = uidere, acciđe = accidere, liƀalitate = liberalitate, urƀ = urbis, noƀ = nobis). Other signs of abbreviation are medial ˜ (especially in the imperfect subjunctive) = -er-, final ˜ = -ur, final ꝰ = -us, ꝝ = -rum (sts. in neuter sing. nom. and acc. -rū is also used). p̄ = prae, prae-, ꝑ = per, per-, ꝓ = pro, pro-, pꝰ = post. q; = que, quae, ꝗ = qui, qui-, ꝙ = quod (also qđ), b; = -bus, S7 = sed, ł, uł = uel. In addition to signs frequent use is made of suprascript letters, mͥ tͥ nͥ gͥ igͥ mͦ uͦ qͦ gͦ (mihi, tibi, nisi, igitur, modo, uero, quo, ergo), and pͥ = pri-. ſt is frequently in ligature, ct very rarely so. In one place only I have noted rounded *r* used internally (iii. 26. 9 moꝛtē). *i* of course has no dot, but double *ii* is often distinguished by fine vertical strokes. Little need be said about the writing in general. In the lower-case letters *d* and ꝺ are both found. In capital letters A D E H M N U are found in the uncial form as well as square capitals. For punctuation a full point, usually above the line, is used for period and comma. Capital letters are used at the beginning of sentences and often, but not always, after the stop denoting the comma. Proper names begin indifferently with small or capital letters. A question mark, lying on its back, is used irregularly. At the end of lines a hyphen is used to join syllables. Rulings horizontal and vertical are by the hard point to f. 38. On 39*r*., 40*v*., and 41*r*. (hair side) rulings are by lead. Ff. 39*v*. and 40*r*. seem to be unruled. The number of lines to a page varies between 31 and 32 on ff. 1–38, and 29 to 30 on ff. 39–41.

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[1] The missing leaves contain the following portions of the text:

(*a*) i. 102. 8 abiciunt oboedientiam . . . 109. 5 dum quod velint con-

(*b*) ii. 22. 9 aut metu, ne vi parere cogantur . . . 73. 7 multa populariter, tum illud male, non

(*c*) iii. 38. 9 aeneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae . . . 45. 8 Qui cum ad diem se.

[2] According to the catalogue the following manuscripts in the Brotherton Collection also belonged to Dr. Askew: Commentary on Psalms xviii–cxxix (Greek: 2 vols. quarto); Anastasius (Greek: 1 volume quarto); Excerpts from Ptolemy (Greek, with numerous diagrams: 3 vols. 8vo). All the volumes including the Cicero bound in old russian morocco gilt.

The following are among the abbreviations used only in ff. 39–41 (the later hand): ēiꝫ = enim (and in general ꝫ = -m), -ꝫꝰ = -mus, ꞗ and ꞩ = ser-. q̃̃ꝑ = quam (also quem), ca = causa, qd' = quod, ꝺ̶ = de, ·i· = id est, h'eat = habeat, ꞩ = sed, qꝛ = quia, q̄ = quae, ɔcipet = conciperet (and elsewhere ɔ for con-), al'r = aliter, nūō = numero, nͨ = nec, ė = enim, sƀ = sub, ip̄e = ipse, hͥ = hic, q̃i = quasi, p̄rie = patriae, mō = modo, ph'i = philosophi, ſn̄tia = sententia, ul' = uel, āt = autem.

The manuscript has received a great deal of comment and correction at various times. At least three strata must be distinguished: m. 1 indicates the hand of the first scribe including alterations in the same ink and a similar hand, m. 2 is a later writer using a darker ink. His alterations are all made in or immediately above the original hand. Where, as often happens, the reddish ink of m. 1 has almost faded, m. 2 overwrites the original words, keeping as far as possible to the actual outlines of the writing of m. 1. Whole paragraphs, even whole pages, are so overwritten, and the facsimile which appears in the printed catalogue of the Brotherton Collection is actually *in toto* the work of m. 2. This hand appears to be considerably younger than m. 1 (it alters m. 1 quā (quam) to q̃̃ꝑ), but is anterior to the comments and alterations of subsequent hands (14th/15th century onwards) which are grouped together under the designation m. x (= manus recentior).

Books I and II have an inscription inserted by a later hand. At the end of Book III there is the following:

'C. Marci tullii ciceronis de officiis liber explicit D.G.A.
Tullius Arpinas ex ordine natus equestri

Set virtute sua consul in urbe fuit
Quem Catellina malus cōiuratiq. nocētes
Senserunt vigilem civibus esse suis
HC TN o pietas tres occidere tiranni
At Lamia ille pio supposuit tumulo'

Extended comment on the manuscript is unnecessary. Basically it is a member of the Z class; for example, it omits, with Zp, the whole of i. 40, and, with Z, at the end of Book II omits *quid tertium? male pascere* (though later hands have added both between the lines and in the margin *qd t̄tiū b̄n uestire*). It has, however, been subject to some contamination. The earliest manuscripts of the contaminated class (s) quoted by Atzert (Teubner 1932) are s. xii/xiii—approximately contemporary with our manuscript. But in two respects the Leeds MS. differs from the contaminated class.

1. The amount of contamination is in total slight. To borrow A. E. Housman's metaphor (Juvenal, praef. xvi–xvii), the first hand of the Leeds MS. reveals a text upon which only the first drops of interpolation have fallen.

2. The contamination is confined almost entirely to the first half of Book I (and to ff. 39–41 copied by the later hand). It is as though the *labor contaminandi* soon became too much for our scribe. The true filiation of the manuscript becomes increasingly easy to discern. A survey of the readings *not* printed in Atzert's text—i.e. proceeding by the principle of common faults—reveals that the Leeds MS. has readings found in some manuscript of the X or s class but in no manuscript of the Z class in proportion to readings found in some manuscript of the Z family but in none of class X or s in the following ratio:

i. 1–64 and ff. 39–41 . .	3:2	(actual figures about 31:20)
i. 65 to iii. 105 . . .	1:9	(,, ,, 12:110).

The most notable examples (references by page and line to Atzert's edition) where the Leeds MS. sides with X or s against Z are:

(Bk. I) 3. 8 in eoque colendo 5. 14 sit aut (an m.x) 9. 21 observabimus 10. 23 hec 18. 20 -avit (-bat sscr. m. 1 or 2?) 19. 1 factum dimissum 19. 9. statutus 26. 4 comiti (the quotation from Ennius in the original ink but a much smaller hand; two lines later the Leeds MS. has the reading *ip̄i luceat*—the only instance I have noted of this abbreviation by m. 1) 29. 18 $\overset{\text{d c}}{\text{utendo}}$ (d c sscr. m. 1) 31. 19 (?) ui (but the *i* overwritten by m. 2; possibly arm of *t* by m. 1 erased) 60. 2 uelint (*u* overwritten: may have been *n*).

(Bk. II) 115. 9 profecto 117. 22 belli

(Bk. III) 152. 21 $\overset{\text{a}}{\text{ḍẹscend-}}$ (dots of erasure and sscr. a by m. 1) 160. 15 uidentur

(Bk. III ff. 39–41) 165. 14 scite 167. 2 notiones 167. 25 ▨*p*ind (erasure of two letters—*in* or *nu*? certainly not *ſ*) 168. 3 f. iuratos ad senatum missos in castra redituros ea quorum erant peni nisi d.r.c.i. ẜ (= sed) non r. uituperandi . . . auctor scribit in primis 168. 18 et a Varrone 169. 8 sibi 171. 29 ẜ (sic sscr. very faded m. 1?) quoniam in hiis

In almost every case where the text of m. 1 is altered by a subsequent hand, the alteration is for the worse. Only at i. 5. 14, 18. 20 (both quoted above), and 44. 17 (tāquam corrected to tūquam by m. 2) have I noted improvements by a later hand.

Once the veneer of interpolation has been removed, we are left with a text of the

Z family whose closest affinity is to V. Note especially i. 28. 6 ultro et citro (VbX) . . . acceptisque et (BV): ii. 116. 7 om. et eorum . . . tenebant (sscr. m. x mark of insertion after *amiserint*): iii. 144. 3 n̄dū ẹạ qbꝫ (dots of erasure and sscr. enī aqlꝰ m. 1): 156. 5 $\overset{\text{derāt}}{\text{delectent}}$ (sscr. m. 1): 157. 12 sorte (VPc) . . . micando (BV) . . . alteri cedet alter (V).[1] As far as the small number of examples and the greater degree of contamination allows an opinion to be formed, it seems that the manuscript from which ff. 39–41 were copied was also similar to V. See 168. 9 mansisse: 169. 17 laudandam (*c* apparently inserted into the upright of *l* by m. 1; from BV?): 170. 23 detractationem fieri.

In three instances the Leeds MS. gives support for emendations: 14. 4 debebant (Gesner): 157. 4 om. si: 164. 1 affirmate$^{\text{ue}}$ (sscr. ue very faded by m. 1). However, in view of the carelessness of our scribe it would not be wise to lay any great emphasis on these cases.

If the Leeds MS. contributes nothing to the solution of the problems which the text of the *De Officiis* raises, it does illustrate an interesting stage in the transmission of the text. Of the sixty or so extant manuscripts of the *De Officiis* over three-quarters are to be found in Great Britain. However, the great majority of these are manuscripts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Among the thirty-six manuscripts which contain the complete work or substantial portions of it in the British Museum (Royal, Harley, Cotton, Burney, Lansdowne, and Additional MSS. catalogues) only two are earlier than the beginning of the thirteenth century—Harley 2682. 21 which belongs to the Z family but is 'hardly worth collation' (A. C. Clark, *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, vii. 1892) and Harley 2716. 4 which appears as L in Atzert's apparatus and is the best representative of the X family. Four others belong to the thirteenth century, Royal MSS. 15 A. VI, VIII, XX, and Harley 2567. 3. Though age is no guarantee of a manuscript's integrity, it is with these half-dozen manuscripts that our manuscript should be considered rather than with the forty and more Renaissance transcripts.

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[1] I have said that the source from which Askew got the manuscript is unknown. Is it something more than a coincidence that the manuscript is closely dependent on V, that V was associated with the family of Vossius and Leyden, and that Askew seems to have started collecting about the time of his days as a student at Leyden?

EPHOROS BOOK I AND THE KINGS OF ARGOS

EPHOROS is known to have conceived each of his books as a unit with a specific theme,[1] so that where we have any quantity of material it is worth while asking what the theme of a book was supposed to be. Clearly Ephoros 1 was about the return of the Herakleidai and the early history of the Peloponnese, but that defines the starting-point, not the scope of the book: I propose to argue that he presented here the contrast of the three Heraklid kingdoms, the degeneration and downfall of the Argive and Messenian Heraklids as opposed to the salvation of the Spartan state by Lykourgos. Secondarily, when Ephoros comes to the deposition of the last Temenid king of Argos he has crossed the frontier between legend and history, and his account of Pheidon and Meltas is of interest for its own sake, not only for the light it throws on Ephoros' mind and methods.

1. The Temenidai in Ephoros

Temenos had four sons, Kissos, Phalkes, Kerynes, and Agraios, and a daughter Hyrnetho married to the Heraklid Deiphontes. After the casting of lots for the three divisions of the Peloponnese but before the Herakleidai conquered Argos, his sons conspired against Temenos because of the preference he gave to Deiphontes, and sent hired murderers to attack him beside a river. This much is common to Diodoros 7, fr. 13. 1, where the excerptor breaks off with Temenos left wounded by the river, and to Nikolaos, *F.Gr.H.* 90 F 30, who goes a little further, bringing Temenos back to the camp where he dies and leaves to Hyrnetho and Deiphontes his kingdom and some indispensable oracles. Pausanias in book 2 gives us glimpses of the rest of the story. 2. 19. 1 states only the bare fact of the plot against Temenos, then goes straight on to later Argive history (see below), but in 2. 26. 2 we have a momentary sight of the situation after Temenos' death, the Argive army divided between his sons in Argos and Deiphontes at Epidauros. Later still, in 2. 28. 3–7, the sons attempted to abduct Hyrnetho, and in the fighting Hyrnetho herself and Kerynes were killed. The youngest son Agraios took no part in this plot, nor in the original murder of Temenos.

The character of the story and the combination of authors alike suggest Ephoros as the source, and the suggestion becomes certainty when we find that Ephoros' list of Temenid founders of cities in the north-east Peloponnese includes all the persons of the story (except Kerynes who was killed, Paus. 2. 28. 5 above) and no one from outside it. Thus Kissos the eldest son[2] is the founder of Argos in Ephoros 70 F 149 (Strabo 10. 481), a little less consistently but still quite naturally co-founder with Temenos in F 18 (Strabo 8. 389, Ps. Skymnos 532). Phalkes founds Sikyon in F 18, cf. Paus. 2. 6. 7, etc. Deiphontes takes the Akte in F 18, and in Paus. 2. 26. 2 and elsewhere is the founder of Epidauros. Agraios, consistently with his part in the story, appears in F 18 as joint founder with Deiphontes in the Akte. Thus Temenos' murder and its sequel form an integral part of Ephoros' account of the *Τημένου λῆξις*, the Argive portion of the Peloponnese.

What follows must be cited in full:

(*a*) Pausanias 2. 19. 2: *Ἀργεῖοι δέ, ἅτε ἰσηγορίαν καὶ τὸ αὐτόνομον ἀγαπῶντες ἐκ παλαιοτάτου, τὰ τῆς ἐξουσίας τῶν βασιλέων ἐς ἐλάχιστον προήγαγον, ὡς Μήδωνι τῷ Κείσου καὶ τοῖς ἀπογόνοις τὸ ὄνομα λειφθῆναι τῆς βασιλείας μόνον. Μέλταν δὲ τὸν Λακήδου δέκατον ἀπόγονον Μήδωνος τὸ παράπαν ἔπαυσεν ἀρχῆς καταγνοὺς ὁ δῆμος.*

Μήδωνι τῷ Κείσου Musgrave: *μηδενὶ τῶν κρίσου* MSS. *Λακήδου δέκατον* Dindorf: *λακηδούδεα τὸν*, *λακυδούδεα τὸν* MSS.

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[1] Diod. 5. 1. 4 (= Ephoros, *F.Gr.H.* 70 T 11), cf. 16. 1. 1.

[2] Son and successor of Temenos in the Macedonian genealogies, Diod. 7. fr. 17 (= Theopompos 115 F 393); Satyros, *F.H.G.* iii. 165, fr. 21.

(*b*) Diodoros 7, fr. 13. 2: ὅτι Ἀργεῖοι πολλὰ κακοπαθήσαντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν βασιλέως, καὶ τοῖς Ἀρκάσι τὰς πατρίδας ἀποκαταστήσαντες, ἐμέμφοντο τὸν βασιλέα διὰ τὸ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἀποδεδωκέναι τοῖς φυγάσιν, ἀλλὰ μή σφισι κατακληρουχῆσαι. συστάντος δ' ἐπ' αὐτὸν τοῦ δήμου, καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀπονενοημένως προσφέροντος, ἔφυγεν εἰς Τεγέαν κἀκεῖ διετέλεσε τιμώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν εὖ παθόντων.

The account in Pausanias 2. 19 is continuous, this section following straight on from the account of Temenos' murder (above, p. 39), and that Ephoros is still the source is probable from the genealogy. Meltas' father Lakedes, translated into Ionic, is Leokedes, Pheidon's son in Herodotos 6. 127. 3.[1] Meltas then is Pheidon's grandson, and just as Pheidon in Ephoros F 115 (Strabo 8. 358) is tenth in descent from Temenos, so here Meltas is the tenth descendant of Temenos' grandson Medon, who is the starting-point for Pausanias because he begins the series of mere figureheads. We have then Ephoros' genealogy of the Temenids, which is not everybody's: we may fairly suppose Ephoros is the source throughout.

2. THE CONTENTS OF EPHOROS, BOOK 1

Pausanias gives the whole history from Temenos to Meltas in one short summary. The *Excerpta de insidiis* give the two Diodoros extracts consecutively, the beginning and the end of the Temenid kingdom, so that Diodoros evidently told it all in one piece. It would be natural to suppose that the original Ephoros did the same, just as in F 115 he gives in a single sweep the whole history of Elis and Olympia from the foundation of Elis by Oxylos to Pheidon's intervention at Olympia. This is the κατὰ γένος method he is said to have employed.

The thesis in Pausanias is that the Temenid kings collapsed in face of the democratic spirit of the Argives, and that this was in fact Ephoros' thesis is made more likely by his parallel treatment of Messenia. Here we have a beginning in F 116 (Strabo 8. 361). Kresphontes divided Messenia up into five, gave the aboriginal Messenians equal rights with the Dorians, then in face of Dorian resentment repented of his arrangement. Nikolaos F 31 gives the same beginning, and a Dorian insurrection in which Kresphontes was murdered and his son Aipytos saved with difficulty by his maternal grandfather the Arcadian Kypselos.[2] From Nikolaos F 34 we learn that Aipytos survived some kind of further revolt, but that he and his successors continued to have trouble with the demos until the Spartan conquest. It is clear that Ephoros here too described the inability of the Heraklid kings to maintain themselves against the demos, and it seems probable enough that he gave the whole history in Book 1, from Kresphontes down to the end of his line and the subjection of Messenia to Sparta.

Sparta began on the same lines as Messenia, as we see from F 117 (Strabo 8. 364). The first kings Eurysthenes and Prokles divided Laconia into six, admitted a lot of foreigners, and gave the perioikoi equal rights with the Spartiates. Agis son of Eurysthenes reversed this, made Sparta the controlling centre, defeated and subjected the helots. In F 118 (Strabo 8. 365) this is the reason why the later kings were called Agiads and Eurypontids, not Eurysthenids and Prokleids:[1] the first pair relied on the support of the foreigners they had admitted, the second pair ruled justly—δυναστεῦσαι δικαίως, the same facts as Isokrates *Panathenaicus* 177–81 but the opposite verdict. Earlier in the same passage of Strabo we have the judgement that the conquerors of Sparta behaved sensibly to begin with (καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μὲν ἐσωφρόνουν), but that it was Lykourgos who established their full superiority over the other Greeks. The judgement is not explicitly ascribed to Ephoros and is not altogether reconcilable with his judgement on Eurysthenes and Prokles: Nikolaos F 56. 3 may be nearer Ephoros' conception, when he says that the Spartans were no better than other people till Lykourgos took them in hand.[2]

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[1] Whatever may be thought of the presence of an Argive suitor at the court of Kleisthenes of Sikyon (cf. *C.Q.* xliii, 1949, p. 74), there is no ground to doubt the genealogical point that Pheidon had a son of this name. Lakedes appears as king of Argos, without father's name, in Plutarch *de cap. ex inim. util.* 6, *mor.* 89 e, in a list of men who gained a bad reputation for some trifling bad habit or from mere accident: Λακήδην τὸν Ἀργεῖον βασιλέα κόμης τις διάθεσις καὶ βάδισμα τρυφερώτερον εἰς μαλακίαν διέβαλε. (Λακήδην is due to Wilamowitz, the MSS. have λακύδην or even καλύδην.) The argument and the other examples show that we should not conclude too hastily that Lakedes was a weak character.

[2] Not, as in Isokrates *Archidamos* 23, by the Spartans.

Sparta and Messenia began along the same lines, though they ended very differently. The Messenian and the Argive Heraklids lost their power for the same reason, that they could not control the demos. Pausanias and Diodoros give the whole history of the Temenids in one piece, and Nikolaos (to judge from F 34) gave the whole history of the Messenian kings in one piece. Ephoros' presentation of Pheidon (see below) makes it likely that Sparta's hegemony, the result of Lykourgos' reform, was already established in Book 1. Putting all this together, it is a reasonable guess that the contrast of the Heraklid kingdoms—the two that went wrong and the one that went right—was presented as a unit in Ephoros' first book. The moral he drew is not attested, but may be guessed. He evidently disapproved of the kindness shown to non-Dorians by the first kings of Sparta and Messenia, and the uncontrolled democratic spirit shown by the Messenians and Argives must be taken as a fault. Yet kindness to the conquered is not obviously wrong in itself, and I think the basis of his disapproval is the discord involved and that Sparta went right because of the harmony introduced into the state by Lykourgos.[3] Eurysthenes and Prokles relied on the help of foreigners, evidently against their own kin: Kresphontes quarrelled with the Dorians: in all three states, kings and people quarrelled. But whereas in Argos and Messenia the quarrel ended only with the downfall of the king or state, in Sparta a solution was found.

To return to Argos and the Temenids, the odd thing about Pausanias' summary is that no word is said of Pheidon, who was not a mere figurehead and was not passed over by Ephoros. If Pausanias gives the general thesis correctly, Pheidon must have been presented as an interruption to the process by which the Temenids were brought down, as a king who overstepped the normal bounds—the germ at least of Aristotle's conception of Pheidon (*Pol.* 1310^{b}), as a king who made himself tyrant παρεκβαίνων τὰ πάτρια. Conceivably Pausanias, who cuts the whole thing down to two sentences, just summarized the thesis and disregarded the interruption caused by Pheidon. But I suspect he had more excuse than this, and that Ephoros did (odd as it may seem) pass lightly over Pheidon in this section and reserve full treatment of his exploits till later.

Firstly, the order of the *excerpta de insidiis* in Nikolaos F 30–6 shows that he took the history of the Temenidai before that of the kings of Messenia, but dealt with

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[1] No reason is quoted from Ephoros why the Messenian kings were called after Aipytos and not Kresphontes, but there is the parallel that Kresphontes gave the non-Dorians equal rights and therefore had trouble with the Dorians.

[2] Cf. Diod. 7, fr. 12. 8: ὅτι οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χρησάμενοι τοῖς τοῦ Λυκούργου νόμοις ἐκ ταπεινῶν δυνατώτατοι ἐγένοντο τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

[3] Cf. Diod. 7, fr. 12. 2–4; Polybios 6. 45. 7 (Ephoros F 148). Isokrates *Panath.* 178 seems to be working the same vein for a different purpose —παρὰ σφίσι μὲν αὐτοῖς ἰσονομίαν καταστῆσαι καὶ δημοκρατίαν τοιαύτην οἵανπερ χρὴ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ὁμονοήσειν: here too the object is concord. Of Plato's view (*Laws* 3. 690 d–691 a) that Argos and Messenia gave excessive power to their kings, whereas divine providence moderated the power of Sparta's kings (691 d), there is no trace in the surviving fragments of Ephoros.

Pheidon after the fall of Messenia and before the foundation of Corinth.[1] Nikolaos thus took Pheidon after his description of the three Heraklid kingdoms: his order is not necessarily the same as Ephoros' order, but it shows that such an order was possible. Secondly, the summary of Pheidon's career in F 115 (Strabo's report of Ephoros' account of Elis) is too long for a mere cross-reference to a figure treated more fully elsewhere. It reads as if Strabo had compressed it heavily, but even in its compressed form it is more than is necessary to explain who this Pheidon was who intrudes into the history of Elis and Olympia.

I suggest then that what Strabo gives us at the end of F 115 is a summary of Ephoros' main account of Pheidon. To Ephoros, Pheidon was the man who robbed Sparta temporarily of her Peloponnesian hegemony: and his downfall (F 115, at end) led on to a new phase of history. Therefore, though in one sense his natural place is in the series of Temenid kings, Ephoros found it more convenient to treat him fully in the context of his intervention at Olympia and after he had dealt with Lykourgos and the establishment of Spartan hegemony. The κατὰ γένος method is not all plain sailing.

To sum up, Ephoros will have begun the main part of his first book with the return of the Herakleidai to the Peloponnese.[2] He followed this with the history of the three main kingdoms, taking Argos down to the deposition of the last Temenid, Messenia down to the Spartan conquest, Sparta down to the establishment of the Lykourgan system and of her hegemony.[3] The history of Oxylos and Elis forms a natural pendant to this. Pheidon, taken from his Temenid context (where he would rather have disturbed the main argument), comes in at this point to rob the Spartans of their new position. His death at Corinth leads on to the history of that city, which stood apart from the threefold division of the Peloponnese and claimed its own separate Heraklid Aletes. Megara perhaps closed the book.

Book 2 dealt with Boiotia and continental Greece, making a judgement in similar terms on the Boiotians:[4] Book 3, the account of Attica and east Greece, provides too little material for us to recover its structure. Books 4–5 were the geographical books, on Europe and Asia, and it was not till Book 6 that he returned to the Peloponnese. Jacoby suggests that the theme here was the rise of Sparta, and assigns Lykourgos and Pheidon to this book[5]—an arrangement which is obviously possible but gives a picture of Book 1 entirely different from mine: the numbered fragments will not decide between us[6], but at least F 115 with the summary of Pheidon's career is agreed to belong to Book 1. On my view, plenty is left to fill Book 6, the tyrants and the whole history of mainland Greece in the sixth century, which might form a single unit as the history of the tyrants and of their suppression by Sparta.

3. Meltas and the Second Messenian War

From the fragments assignable to Books 1 or 6, we gain no indication how Ephoros in these early Books treated the Second Messenian War. The absence of fragments is not by itself significant, but we have to take into account that in a much later Book, on the occasion of Epaminondas' restoration of Messenia, Ephoros thought it worth while to recapitulate the Messenian Wars from the start,[1] distinguishing the original war of conquest (the 'twenty years' war'), the great revolt in which Tyrtaios and Aristomenes fought, and the revolt on the occasion of the great earthquake. The elaborate digression would have little point if it merely repeated what was said in earlier books: we must suppose that it contained something new, and Jacoby suggests that the novelty was the distinction of three wars, and that it was based on Kallisthenes' recently published *Hellenika*.

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[1] F 30, Temenos' death; F 31 and 34, Messenia; F 35, Pheidon's death at Corinth; F 36, the eponymous hero Korinthos, and Sisyphos.

[2] Including some part of Herakles' own history, as F 13–14; no doubt, some description of the Peloponnese, as Nikolaos F 23 and part of Ephoros F 113; and of the Arcadians, as F 112–13, etc.

[3] This order (Argos, Messenia, Sparta) is the natural one if I am right about the main thesis of the book. The fragments of Ephoros leave the order undecided (in F 18 the order is geographical): in Diodoros, 7. 13 might as easily precede 7. 12 as follow it: in Nikolaos, F 28–9 could follow F 34.

[4] Their geographical situation marked them out for hegemony, but they failed because they rejected education and training (F 119 = Strabo 9. 400–1).

[5] Commentary on F 54–6.

[6] The three numbered fragments of Book 6 allow only the conclusion that this book dealt with the Peloponnese: F 54 and 55 concern Arcadia, F 56 the Argolid.

To summarize Jacoby's thesis[2] very briefly, the fifth-century historians recognize the original Spartan conquest, and a general tendency of the Messenians to revolt, but do not single out as a separate 'war' any outbreak earlier than the revolt of *c.* 465. Kallisthenes did give an account of the Second War, telling the story of Aristokrates' treachery (124 F 23 = Polybios 4. 33. 5: Polybios here calls the war τὸν Ἀριστομένειον πόλεμον) and also of the bringing of Tyrtaios from Athens (F 24 = Strabo 8. 362). Ephoros incorporated this into a digression to Book 23 (or thereabouts), the earliest traceable formulation of the scheme of three Messenian Wars. Thereafter the Second Messenian War is a standard constituent of early Peloponnesian history.

One ingredient in Kallisthenes' presentation will have been the evidence of Tyrtaios himself: we know that he spoke about Tyrtaios' Athenian origin, and we may compare the use he made of Kallinos in F 29 (Strabo 13. 627). He will also have found in the historians of the preceding generation material about Aristomenes, in whom Epaminondas himself was interested.[3] There may have been other material, and if we are to elucidate further the tradition of the Second Messenian War, it is the stage before Kallisthenes that most needs looking at.

My present concern is with Ephoros' early books. There is no direct evidence from the fragments about Sparta's dealings with Messenia,[4] and it is possible that in Ephoros' picture of this phase of Peloponnesian history the struggle between Sparta and Argos was more prominent than the revolt of the Messenians against Sparta. The two main documents are F 115, and the story of Meltas.

At the end of F 115 we hear that Sparta and Elis joined together against Pheidon of Argos, who had despoiled Elis of Olympia and Sparta of her Peloponnesian hegemony. Together they dealt with Pheidon, and Sparta then helped Elis to acquire Pisatis and Triphylia. Later tradition, which made a coalition war of the Second Messenian War,[5] said that Elis obtained this Spartan help in the Pisatis as a reward for Elean services against the Messenians (Apollodoros in Strabo 8. 355): that is, the alliance against Pheidon plays in Ephoros the role which the Messenian War plays in the later tradition.

Meltas the grandson of Pheidon was still engaged in the struggle with Sparta. Ephoros said (Diod. 7. 13. 2; above, p. 40) that he fought a hard war with Sparta—but not apparently a wholly unsuccessful one, since he recovered some territory in Arcadia, presumably from Sparta or from Sparta's supporters. This land he gave to certain exiles whom he thus reinstated in their Arcadian homes. The Argives thought the land should have been divided amongst themselves, not given to the exiles, and they therefore deposed Meltas, who fled to his friends at Tegea.

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[1] Diod. 15. 66, cf. Ephoros F 216.

[2] *F.Gr.H.* iii a. 112 ff., on Rhianos 265 F 38–46; cf. on Kallisthenes 124 F 23–4. For the relation between Ephoros and Kallisthenes cf. also Wade-Gery in *Athenian Studies* (Harvard Studies in Cl. Phil., Suppl. i, 1940), 125.

[3] Paus. 4. 32. 4–6, cf. Jacoby iii a, p. 175.

[4] Diod. 8. 27 shows that Diodoros gave the story of Tyrtaios in an early book, but is not enough by itself to warrant conclusions about the early books of Ephoros: Diodoros' First Messenian War is from Myron.

[5] Already in Kallisthenes F 23 the full story of Aristokrates and the Arcadians appears, and one may reasonably guess that there were other allies. Apollodoros in Strabo 8. 355 and 362 gives a comparatively sober list of allies, Pausanias in book 4 a wilder collocation.

The war with which this story begins must have been fought in the late seventh century.[1] I suspect it is in fact another aspect of the war in which Tyrtaios fought, but whereas in later versions Arcadia and Argos are the allies of Messenia in a struggle which is primarily the revolt of the Messenians against Sparta, for Ephoros the central fact is the war between Sparta and Argos, in which some Arcadians appear as Sparta's allies.

As to the source or historicity of the story, one can only say that with Pheidon's grandson we have reached a period where detailed history is not necessarily suspect.[2] Already in the person of King Pheidon Ephoros had reached a figure of real life rather than legend, and his account of Pheidon is mainly credible history, even though the sacred neutrality of Elis is a romantic improbability, the effective hegemony of Sparta is no doubt antedated for the sake of the early Lykourgos, and it may not be true that Pheidon coined silver. About Pheidon's son Lakedes less can be said: for the seventh century he is a reasonably well attested name. The summary of Meltas' wars and downfall reads soberly enough and stands some chance of being true. By contrast, Aristomenes and the traitor Aristokrates are figures of romance, and the bringing of Tyrtaios from Athens is propaganda, even though Tyrtaios' war is real enough and there may be some kernel of historical truth to Aristomenes. Ephoros' history of Pheidon and his successors and their struggle with Sparta deserves some credit, and it may well be that this struggle, involving Elis (at least in Pheidon's time) and Arcadia, is the real centre of the alliances which in later tradition centre round the struggle between Sparta and the Messenians. Kallisthenes, using the evidence of Tyrtaios and the Aristomenes legend, brought the Second Messenian War into the centre of the picture; eminently natural, but perhaps a distortion.

Lastly, a word about the chronology. Meltas can be placed only as Pheidon's grandson, for though there is an Argive sequel—according to Plutarch (*mor.* 340 c, cf. 396 c) a certain Aigon was chosen king of Argos when the Heraklid line failed; a king of Argos is at least talked of in 480 (Herod. 7. 149); and by *c.* 450 there is an annual official with the title *βασιλεύς* (Tod 33, l. 43)—it is not chronologically helpful: Meltas' successors made no mark in history, and we cannot date the stages by which the Argive king declined into an annual magistrate.[3] But if Pheidon defeated Sparta at Hysiai *c.* 669 and seized Olympia for the festival of 668,[4] then his grandson's activity in Arcadia should fall somewhere about the end of the seventh century.

How this compares with Tyrtaios' war against the Messenians it is difficult to say. For us, as for the ancients, there seems to be no criterion but Tyrtaios himself. The chronographers dated him by his allusion to the *πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρες* who fought the war of conquest with Theopompos, and by calculating downwards from their date for Theopompos reached the middle of the seventh century or a little before it. Tyrtaios' phrase allows some latitude in calculation, even if it were certain that he meant literally that the grandfathers of his contemporaries had fought with Theopompos: also, we should date Theopompos later in the eighth century than Apollodoros did, and therefore should incline to put Tyrtaios later in the seventh.

There is another later date for Tyrtaios' war, which looks to be independent of the

[1] For the chronology see below.

[2] I have sometimes been tempted to see an allusion to Meltas' downfall in Aeschylus, *Supplices* 401, where the king imagines the Argive people reproaching him with the words '*ἐπήλυδας τιμῶν ἀπώλεσας πόλιν*': and if the story were known to the Athenian audience of the early fifth century, its credit would be improved. But though the direct speech of this line draws attention to it and suggests an allusion, Aeschylus' allusions are mostly topical, and it is hard to see why the Meltas story should be topical. Nor, indeed, were the Arcadians *ἐπήλυδες*.

[3] Diod. 7. 14 is not to be used for determining the total length of Temenid rule: as the context shows, it refers not to the Temenid but to the mythical kingdom of Inachos, Lynkeus, etc.

[4] For a restatement of this view see *C.Q.* xliii, 1949, pp. 76 f.

calculation based on Tyrtaios' πατέρων πατέρες. [Plutarch] *mor.* 194 b credits Epaminondas with the statement that he had re-established Messenia 'after 230 years'. This figure (the text is confirmed by Aelian, *V.H.* 13. 42) leads back to *c.* 600, and would agree with one of Suidas' dates for Tyrtaios, σύγχρονος τοῖς ἑπτὰ κληθεῖσι σοφοῖς.[1] The basis and origin of this date are obscure, but the connexion with Epaminondas suggests that it was current before Kallisthenes and Ephoros wrote, and if this is how Ephoros' sources thought of Tyrtaios they should place his war in the time of Meltas rather than Pheidon.[2]

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[1] Jacoby, *Apollodors Chronik*, 134 n. 22, added a story from Theopompos' Θαυμάσια (115 F 71).

[2] Among much that remains unclear is the correct expansion of Strabo's brief phrase καὶ δὴ καὶ συγκαταλῦσαι τὸν Φείδωνα at the end of Ephoros F 115. Did Sparta and Elis break up Pheidon's empire almost as soon as it had been gained? Or did Ephoros conceivably think of the same struggle as continuing into Meltas' time, nearer the period when Elis might be supposed to reduce the Pisatis, the date when later chronography ended the Pisatan interlude (*c.* 580–570, cf. *C.Q.* xliii, 1949, p. 76)? Pheidon himself, according to Ephoros, met his death in Corinth: and of course the establishment of the Isthmian tyrannies in the middle of the seventh century means a considerable diminution of the area under Argive control.

I should like to express my gratitude to Professor H. T. Wade-Gery, who read through several drafts of this article and helped me especially in the formulation of the third section of it; and to Dr. F. Jacoby, who regards all reconstructions of Ephoros as speculative if they go beyond what is guaranteed by numbered fragments, but encouraged me to proceed with this speculation.

AN EARLY LACONIAN *LEX SACRA*[1]

Summary. The text of a Laconian inscription recorded by Fourmont is re-examined and found to be part of an early *lex sacra* relating to the cult of a goddess, probably Demeter.

Restoration of the text is attempted and, despite many uncertainties, the general structure and meaning are established. The first sentence deals with the weaving or dedication of certain garments by the votaries; the second excludes unmarried women from participation in the rites.

The law concerns a community called the ὠϝὰ Ἀρκάλων. The reference to this obe, which has not been identified previously, occurs in a part of the text which is fully legible without emendation and is therefore trustworthy. This discovery has an important bearing on the constitution of the Lacedaemonian State.

A new word, ϝημός, 'clothing', is identified. It is a *nomen actionis* from the same stem as ϝῆμα, Ionic εἷμα, *n.*, and ϝήμα, *f.* (Cretan ϝέμας, *g.s.*).

Note. On account of the fragmentary nature of the text and importance of its content, textual and linguistic questions are discussed at some length. The results of the discussion are collected at the end in the form of a full text, with variant readings and translation.

AMONG Fourmont's papers was found a rough copy of an inscription from the neighbourhood of Amyclae (Boeckh, *CIG* i, No. 15: Collitz-Bechtel, *SGDI* iii(2), No. 4412; *IG* v(1), No. 722). The original was written on a stone stele broken off at the base (*columna infra fracta*), which has not been seen by anyone since Fourmont. The site is given as *in vico Schiaonsio* (or *Schiaosa*), near the modern Sclavochori, which is adjacent to the ancient Amyclae. The text reads:



Fourmont's copies of inscriptions are notoriously inaccurate; on occasion, his zeal for emending and supplementing the visible remains resulted in sheer forgery. But he was capable of rendering faithfully texts which interested and puzzled him, particularly those in archaic script. In the present instance he has apparently recorded, without trying to elucidate or improve, an inscription in the Laconian alphabet. The genuineness of the document has never been doubted, although commentators with sad experience of Fourmont's ways have naturally been reluctant to attempt restoration.

A view proposed by 'a friend of Hermann' and accepted by the editors of *IG* is that the text is a funerary inscription in verse. This is based on l. 3, read as ἔθεκέ με χήραν; but the word χήρα can be used in a multitude of contexts other than epitaphs, and Greek is not so destitute of natural dactylic rhythm that the occurrence of – ◡ ◡ – – necessarily implies hexameters or elegiacs. Nor is the metrical argument much reinforced by restoring l. 5 ἀ]λλᾷ καθαίρων. Nevertheless, Wilamowitz gave it approval: ***nihili omnia, praeter quae Hermanni amicus legit.***

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[1] I am indebted to Professor D. L. Page and Mr. A. G. Woodhead, both of whom read this article in manuscript and made valuable criticisms.

The main problem confronting any editor of the text is to assess the accuracy of Fourmont's rendering of the letters and so to determine the precise form of the Laconian alphabet used by the engraver. It is plain from the shape of letters such as Ε, F, ⊕, Ν, ξ, Ψ that Fourmont tried to write what he saw. Therefore, in the case of the two letters Υ and Φ, which have an un-Laconian look, we should assume, not that the copyist arbitrarily departed from accurate representation, but that he mistook some unfamiliar or defaced letter for the forms of *υ* and *φ* which were known to him. Further, when we find, e.g. in l. 1, a series of letters which do not constitute recognizable or plausible Greek syllables, we should try to explain any suspect letters in terms of the visual errors which Fourmont was likely to make in transcribing an unfamiliar alphabet. In the following pages it will be shown that errors recur throughout the text according to a regular pattern, and that the style of the engraver can be rediscovered with certainty.

A second problem is to ascertain the extent of the missing parts of the inscription. Along the left-hand edge Fourmont marks a lacuna in ll. 1 and 2, in each case with two dots. There is a similar notation on the right-hand edge of l. 2. A cursory examination shows that if the right-hand edge is complete in other lines, e.g. ll. 3 and 5, there must be a gap of at least two letters on the left of every line. Accordingly, we should assume that Fourmont's dots do not represent the total number of letters he thought were missing but actual traces of letters which he could not read. We must also rely on the general arrangement of his drawing to indicate the *relative* length of the lacuna in each line. The *exact* length of the lacuna must be calculated on the basis of syntactical and semantic requirements. We are told that the lower edge of the stone was broken off, and the truth of this is apparent from the piteous condition of l. 7. In the absence of any similar remark concerning l. 1, we should assume that it was written along the original upper edge. But the possibility must be borne in mind that l. 1 was not the beginning of the text but a continuation, either from another stele or from another face of the same stele. The restored text of l. 1 which will be found below demonstrates that it was not in fact the exordium.

Lines 3–7

The middle part of the text offers a convenient starting-point for discussion, since it contains several recognizable sequences of words and syllables. In particular, l. 4, with fourteen consecutive letters, invites attention.

The first letter, read as D (*δ*) by the editors, has a distinct tail in Fourmont's transcription and therefore should represent P (*ρ*). Now P can easily be a mistake for Γ, *π*. Since we shall find that Fourmont is capable even of reading P for T (ll. 1, 6), we need not hesitate to admit such an alteration.

The line now reads *πεδ' ὀϝᾶς Ἀρκάλōν*, 'in the community of Arcali/-a'. For *πεδά*, cf. L. & S.[9] s.v. *μετά*, A.I. The form *πεδά* does not occur elsewhere in the fragmentary non-literary records of Laconian speech, but its authenticity is guaranteed by Alcman, fr. 1, l. 58; 49, l. 5, as well as by the Laconian personal names *Πεδε(σί)στρατον*, *Mon. Ant.* xviii. 319, 23^b5 and *Πεδάριτος*, Thuc. 8. 28. 5. Cf. Hesychius, s.v. *πέδευρα· ὕστερα, Λάκωνες*.

The obe Arcali/-a has not been identified previously and requires justification.

The word *ὠϝά* is known from literary sources and from Laconian inscriptions. All examples are of Graeco-Roman date, although Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 6. 2, quotes a pre-classical document containing the acc. plur. Fourmont's text is by far the earliest direct evidence. The phonetic variant *οὐά* is attested outside Laconia, and the cognate *οἴη* appears to have been current in many areas. In late times the several forms of the word are glossed either *κώμη* or *φυλή* without qualification;[1] and in two Laconian inscriptions the term *φυλή* is applied to communities which are regularly styled *ὠϝά*

[1] e.g. Hesychius, s.vv. *οὐαί, ὠάς, ὠγή, ὠβάτας*.

elsewhere.[1] But there was a world of difference in classical usage between *κώμη* and *φυλή*. Even if the non-Laconian *οἴη* was primarily a geographical term (*κώμη*), the Laconian *ὠϝά* had a definite political and social connotation. We may be sure that legal vocabulary in early times did not permit vagueness of reference between 'village' and 'tribe'.

Originally *ὠϝά* was a collective noun cognate with **ὀ̆ϝος* (*f. ὄαρ*, 'old woman'), Lat. *avus*, IE. **ŏ̓wos*.[2] It denotes properly a group of kinsmen and dependants ruled by an hereditary chief or patriarch, together with their dwellings and lands. Such a group may be fitted naturally into the hereditary pattern of early Greek society. The obe must be supposed on the one hand to have been part of a nation or tribe (*φῦλον*, *φυλή*) and on the other to have been composed of a number of closer family-groups (*πατριαί*, *φρατρίαι*). Under the kind of social organization which is reflected in the Homeric poems, the head of an *ὠϝά* would rank as a *βασιλεύς* and together with his peers would sit as a *γέρων* in the council of the tribe. His residence and the centre of his power would normally be a fortified citadel (*πόλις*, *Burg*), although it might be merely an unfortified manor-house. Within the enclosure (*ἕρκος*) of the chief's house, his closest relatives and dependants (*φρατρία*, *ἑταῖροι*) would have their dwellings. Other families and septs of the *ὠϝά* would live in villages and farmsteads scattered throughout the obal territory; they would resort to the *πόλις* for assemblies and religious festivals, for protection against an invading enemy, etc.

We might expect the people of Laconia, whose institutions in the classical period were for the most part remarkably 'archaic' and 'Homeric' in character, to preserve the essential nature as well as the name of the *ὠϝά*. If we except the hereditary *βασιλεύς*, who in Laconia (as elsewhere) had vanished from the tribes and from smaller political units, this is in fact the case. The well-known Rhetra of Lycurgus,[3] according to its most natural interpretation, indicates that the obes were the primary constituents of the tribes. Also, the prestige enjoyed in early times by Pitane and Amyclae,[4] which at a later date are confirmed as obes, shows that the *ὠϝά* was no mere *κώμη* but a major political unit. The Laconian obe was in fact the nearest equivalent to the Athenian deme.

The total number of obes previously identified is six: Amyclae, Pitane, Limnae, Cynosura, Mesoa, and Neopolis. The obal status of these is confirmed by inscriptions found in or near Sparta; none of the inscriptions is earlier than the second century B.C., and most (if not all) of them are substantially later.[5] All six obes are generally assumed to have been situated in the vicinity of Sparta and to have constituted 'wards' or 'parishes' of that city. Neopolis, on account of its name, is dismissed as a late creation, and the other five are held to represent the total in classical and pre-classical times. The supporters of this theory also maintain that the Lacedaemonian tribes were the so-called 'Dorian' trio, Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyli, and consequently that the obes were not constitutent parts of the tribes but a local (Spartan) system of a different order. In addition, some scholars have been inclined to think that the Ephorate and other fivefold magistracies at Sparta were based on the obes.

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[1] *IG* v (1) 564 (Limnae), 682 (Amyclae).

[2] For additional cognates of *ὠϝά*, see J. Pokorny, *Indog. Etym. Wörterb.*, 1948, s.v. '*auo·s*', *Grorsvater mütterlicherseits* (where *mütterlicherseits* is a qualification unsupported by the bulk of the evidence).

[3] Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 6. 2 . . . *φυλὰς φυλάξαντα καὶ ὠβὰς ὠβάξαντα . . . ἀπελλάζειν* . . . (The text at this point requires modification, as I shall prove in a separate article, but not in such a way as to alter the obvious implication of the participial phrase quoted.)

[4] Herodotus 3. 55, 9. 53; Hesychius, s.v. *Πιτανάτης στρατός*; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4. 5. 11; Strabo 8. 5. 4. Cf. Thucydides 1. 20. 3; 5. 18. 10; 5. 23. 5.

[5] *IG* v (1), Nos. 26, 27, etc. For the conventional view of the tribes and obes here described, see Pauly–Wissowa, *RE*, s.vv. 'Phylai', 'Obai'.

The evidence for this theory is so late and so fragmentary in respect of both obes and tribes and it postulates a social structure so much at variance with the normal pattern of the Greek State, that it cannot stand unmodified in face of early documentary proof of the existence of another obe. As will be shown in the following discussion, Fourmont's inscription is a genuine archaic document, and its most certain phrase *πεδ' ὀϝᾶς Ἀρκάλōν* constitutes such a proof. Those who regard the obes as wards of Sparta must therefore accept a sixth obe (and also the possibility of more which are as yet unidentified). Moreover, any idea of a connexion between the number of obes and the fivefold magistracies must be abandoned.

Since Fourmont's text was found quite near Sparta and since also the evidence of Pausanias quoted below suggests that Arcali/-a was in this area, some may be inclined to continue to regard the obes as being in some sense wards of the city and to accept ignorance of their number and also of their political and social nature. This is perhaps the safest attitude to adopt; I would suggest, however, that the true solution lies along the following lines.

The obes are to be regarded as subdivisions of the Lacedaemonian tribes and unconnected with the local organization of the city of Sparta. The five (or six) obes hitherto identified may have been, in effect, wards of Sparta *after* the dissolution of the Lacedaemonian League. The significance of this dissolution would then be as follows: the known obes, being situated close to Sparta in the upper Eurotas valley, survived the dissolution and sank to the level of wards, while others in the coastal districts were separated from Sparta and raised to the level of fully independent *πόλεις*. The 'Free-Laconian' cities, that is to say, were originally obes. The total number of obes would thus be about thirty. I would further suggest that the obes were constituent parts of the Lacedaemonian tribes and that the latter were not three but five.[1]

Arcali/-a does not of course occur among the names of the 'Free-Laconian' cities. To judge by its probable position, it may have remained in the rump-league along with the other five. On the other hand, since it does not occur in the late inscriptions or among the obes mentioned by Pausanias (as contemporary *φυλαί*), I think it possible that it may have become extinct by Hellenistic times both as a township and as a political and social group.

An indirect reference to Arcali/-a occurs in the text of Pausanias, who records a mythical history of Lacedaemon in the following terms.[2] Lacedaemon married Sparte, daughter of Eurotas, and founded the city that bears her name. Their son, Amyclas, founded Amyclae: he had several sons, of whom the youngest, Hyacinthus, died at an early age and was buried in that town. *ἀποθανόντος δὲ Ἀμύκλα, ἐς Ἄργαλον τὸν πρεσβύτατον τῶν Ἀμύκλα παίδων καὶ ὕστερον ἐς Κυνόρταν Ἀργάλου τελευτήσαντος ἀφίκετο ἡ ἀρχή.* Pausanias completes the genealogy with Oibalos, son of Cynortas.

This aetiological myth appears to be based mainly on geographical names. Leaving aside Lacedaemon, i.e. the 'hollow' valley of the Eurotas, and Sparta, its capital city, we come to Hyacinthus, who may also have begun his career as a geographical feature (like other *-ινθος* names) but through a successful process of heroization have lost this connexion before the classical period. Then we have Amyclae, a town and obe, whose children are Argalus and Cynortas. That Cynortas represents an obe is suggested by the name of his son *Οἴβαλος* <**ὀϝίαλος*,[1] 'little Obe'. The existence of a 'tomb' of Cynortas close to the ancient *Σκιάς* or tholos in Sparta (which I believe is to be identified with the *σκιάς* of the Council[2]) points in the same direction; for such shrines are apt to correspond to the tribes, phratries, etc., of a Greek city. Cf. Pausanias 3. 13. 1 *Κυνόρτα τοῦ Ἀμύκλα τάφος*; id. 3. 15. 8, heroon of Aegeus (the Aegeidae); 3. 14. 2, 'tomb' of Tainaros (Tainaron), etc.

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[1] My theory of the five tribes and thirty obes will be expounded in a separate paper. I believe that this state of affairs is reflected in the legendary account by Ephorus, *ap.* Strabo 8. 5. 4 and 8. 4. 11 (Amyclae being an independent obe outside the tribal division). For the 'Free-Laconian' cities see Pausanias 3. 21. 6–7: eighteen out of the original twenty-four survived in his day.

[2] Pausanias 3. 1. 3. Cf. Apollodorus 3. 10. 3, where the same story appears without mention of Argalos. Pausanias 7. 18. 5 mentions the hero again: . . . *ὁ δὲ Ἄμπυξ Πελίου τοῦ Αἰγινήτου τοῦ Δηρείτου τοῦ Ἀργάλου* (*Ἀρπάλου*, MSS.) *τοῦ Ἀμύκλα τοῦ Λακεδαίμονος.*

It is thus a simple inference that both Cynorta and Argalos were obes situated close to Amyclae and Sparta. Cynortas is probably the eponymous hero of Cynosura/Cynura.

The name Argalus is confirmed by Hesychius (who adds nothing, however, to Pausanias' story); s.v. *Ἀγιγαῖος· Ἄργαλος καλεῖται παρὰ Λάκωσιν ὁ Ἀμύκλαντος υἱός*.[3]

Since in Greek proper-names there is often fluctuation between voiced and unvoiced stop-consonants, it may be taken as certain that Argalos and Fourmont's *Ἀρκάλο̄ν* are the same. The fact that no town or village of this name is known is not a valid objection. Even the obes of Pitane, Cynosura, and Mesoa are poorly attested and cannot be pin-pointed on a map. And indeed it is possible that *Ἄρκαλοι* denoted the people of the obe and the district which they inhabited, but that the *πόλις* or *πολίχνη* which was the focus of their social organization had an entirely different name: ethnic and topographical designations frequently do not coincide. Although inscriptions have been known to move hundreds of miles in the course of centuries, the location given by Fourmont may be taken as supporting Pausanias' account of the close connexion between Argalos and Amyclae and so confirming the geographical position of Arcali/-a.

[Finally, it is just conceivable that Hesychius' *ἄρκηλα· ᾠόν* conceals *Ἄρκαλα· ὤιον*, adjectival derivative of *ὠϝά*.[4] The form *ᾠον* appears in Clearchus (*FHG* ii p. 316 fr. 41) and Schol. T, Homer, *Iliad* 16, l. 184, and is explained as equivalent to *ὑπερῷον*. This is inaccurate; the *ᾠον* is properly the 'great hall' of the Homeric palace and manor-house, where the prince and his family and dependants dine, and the *ὑπερῷον* is the story above and behind the hall. As has been explained, *ὠϝά* as a political organization in historical times is to be considered as a development of the communal life of a single *γένος*, ruled by a patriarchal chief and living within one enclosure. Further, the comic poet Epilycus, ap. Athenaeus 140 a, uses *οἰώσομαι* in the sense 'I shall attend the obal banquet' (at Amyclae), i.e. attend the *ὤιον*.]

Boeckh (loc. cit.), while recording the haphazard conjectures of his time, concluded his remarks on the text as follows: 'inscriptionem aut oraculum aut mysticam et telesticam formulam continuisse iudico, quo et reliqua et maxime illud *καθαίρων* et *ὑδροφόρον* mentio deducunt'. This suggestion is ignored by later editors, but its merit is obvious. The words *καθαιρον̣*, l. 5, and *]ρ̣ο̣φορομ̣*, l. 6, need not be restored in precisely the form which Boeckh puts forward, but they certainly point in the direction which he indicates. If to them we add the foregoing version of l. 4, *π̣εδ' ὀϝᾶς Ἀρκάλο̄ν*, it becomes apparent that we have to do with a *lex sacra* which prescribed rules of ritual purity for an official cult of the obe.

καθαιρον will then imply an act of defilement or a caveat against it. This is supported by the simple restoration *ἀ]λλὰ̣* before *καθαιρον̣*. In l. 3 a prohibition is at once revealed if we punctuate after *ἔθε̄κε* and read *μὲ χέραν τιμ[*.

Now *χήρα* need not mean a 'widow'; its reference includes all adult women who have no husband, i.e. widows, divorcees. Thus the text may refer equally well to the exclusion of such women from certain ritual duties—a common phenomenon in Greek religion—as to funeral rites for a dead husband. That this is in fact the case is suggested by *τιμ-*, which may refer to public office of a religious kind. Further, the special reference to women suggests a goddess, such as Demeter or Core, or perhaps Artemis. Discrimination against *χῆραι* may imply a rite such as the Thesmophoria or a festival restricted to *παρθένοι*.

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[1] For this treatment of voiced bilabial+y, cf. *Φοῖβος* < **φόβγος* (*φοβή*), 'having a tress, or knot of hair' (Apollo being the ideal of full-grown youth with uncut hair: *χαιτάεις*, Pindar). So also *λαιμός* (*λάμος, λάμια*); *δαιμοί*, Hesychius (*δᾶμος*), and perhaps also *Λακεδαίμων*.

[2] *IG* v (1), No. 538 *τῆς Σκιάδος τῆς γερουσίας*; see F. Robert, *Thymélè*, pp. 101 f., 113 f.

[3] *Ἀγιγαῖος* is probably corrupt and perhaps irrelevant to the gloss.

[4] Or perhaps read *ὠάν* = *ὠϝάν* for *ᾠόν*.

Between *μὲ χέραν̣* and *ἀλλὰ* one or perhaps two imperatival infinitives are needed. This raises the problem of the extent of the lacunae on the left-hand edge. Lines 3–7 offer no solution to this problem, but it will appear later that at the beginning of l. 3 there is a fair chance that about four letters are missing. If we apply a similar measure to the beginning of ll. 4 and 5, the following possibilities may be considered:

(*a*) *τιμ[ὰν* | *[infin.]* *πεδ' ὀ. Ἀ.* | *[με̄δὲ]* *·ο·ἐ̄ν̣, ἀλλὰ*
(*b*) *τιμ[ὰν* | [?] *πεδ' ὀ. Ἀ.* | [?] *·ο·ἐ̄ν̣, ἀλλὰ*
(*c*) *τιμ* | *[-ᾱχε̄̃ν* or *-ε̂σθαι]* *πεδ' ὀ. Ἀ.* | *[με̄δὲ]* *·ο·ἐ̄ν̣, ἀλλὰ*
(*d*) *τιμ* | *[-ᾱχε̄̂ν* or *-ε̂σθαι]* *πεδ' ὀ. Ἀ.* | [?] *·ο·ἐ̄ν̣, ἀλλὰ*

The advantage of (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) is that the supposition of an infinitive in l. 5 fits the group *·ο·εν̣* quite closely. The fact that this makes it necessary to restore at least five letters, instead of four, at the beginning of l. 5 may not be a grave disadvantage. In the case of (*c*) and (*d*), *-ε̂σθαι* and the variant *-ᾱοχε̄̃ν* for *-ᾱχε̄̃ν* would require five letters at the beginning of l. 4. In (*a*) it is hard to find a suitable verb of four or five letters to govern *τιμ[ὰν*. In (*b*) the first word of l. 4 ***might*** be *με̄δείαν* or *με̄δεμίαν*. In (*d*), l. 5 might be made to start with *με̄δέν*, but interpretation of the following *·ο·ἐ̄ν̣* otherwise than as an infinitive presents difficulty.

I select (*c*) as the easiest solution, reading in l. 4 the contracted *τιμ|ᾱχε̄̃ν]*, which is possible even in archaic Laconian (cf. Alcman 1. 82; 13. 5; 49. 4, etc., also *Ποhοιδᾶνι*, *Πολιάχο̄ι*, inscrs.), and in l. 5 *με̄δὲ π]ο̄[λ]ε̄̃ν*, which exceeds the assumed extent of the lacuna by one letter only.

Τιμᾱχε̄̂ν, 'hold a priesthood', can be paralleled in its application to a priesthood (Memphis) and to a woman (Thasos); see L. & S.^{9}, s.v. *τιμοῦχος*. The epithet *τιμάοχος* is used by Homer of a female goddess; H. II, *Demeter*, l. 268, H. V, *Aphrodite*, l. 31. In the latter passage—*πᾶσιν δ' ἐν νηοῖσι θεῶν τιμάοχός ἐστι*—the goddess is described in terms applicable to a priestess. It is well known that deities often bear titles proper to their worshippers; cf. Thesmophorus, Carpophorus, Daphnephorus.

Πο̄λε̄̃ν, 'act as Pôlus' in a cult. The verb is not attested elsewhere, but may reasonably be postulated.

In religious terminology, *πῶλος f.* denotes a girl of marriageable age who is initiated into mysteries connected with puberty, marriage, and childbirth and performs certain ritual functions on that occasion.[1] 'Fillies' in this sense occur in cults of Artemis, Demeter and Core, Aphrodite, and the Leucippides, in various parts of ancient Greece; they are particularly characteristic of Laconia.

A Spartan inscription of the second century A.D. refers to Aurelia Epaphro, a *πῶλος τοῖν ἁγιωτάτοιν θεοῖν*, i.e. Demeter and Core.[2] Another *πῶλος* of these goddesses attested in Messene, in the third century B.C.[1] Artemis was called *Πωλώ* in Thasos.[2] There is no direct reference to her *πῶλοι* at Sparta, but she cannot be dissociated from the cult of the Leucippides, Hilaeira and Phoebe, in that city.[3] These two goddesses were apparently themselves known as *πῶλοι*, and so were the two maidens who served as their priestesses; cf. Hesychius, s.v. *πωλία· χαλκοῦν πῆγμα τι. φέρει δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων τὰς Λευκιππίδων πώλους· δύο δὲ εἶναι παρθένους φασίν.* Aphrodite also had votaries called *πῶλοι*;[4] these seem to have been of the class whom the Greeks described as temple-prostitutes when they were noticed in Asiatic cults—and perhaps passed over in silence if they existed in their own cities; they were maidens 'deflowered by a god' in a temple. Cf. Hesychius, s.v. *πῶλος· ἑταίρα. πώλους γὰρ αὐτὰς ἔλεγον, οἷον Ἀφροδίτης. πώλους· τοὺς νέους, καὶ τὰς νέας, καὶ παρθένους.*

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[1] *Πῶλος, m.f.*, has of course also a general currency in the sense of 'young man', 'young woman'. This may be an extension of the religious connotation, or it may be no more than an obvious metaphor. I do not think, however, that the religious connotation was derived from the metaphor. In my opinion it has its origin in a very early concept of the nature of the goddesses who are associated with *πῶλοι*; but I reserve discussion of this point for a separate paper. The maiden *πῶλοι* of Artemis, etc., are clearly the counterpart of the *ἄρκτοι* of Artemis Brauronia in Attica. *Πῶλος m.* has not, so far as I am aware, any currency in religious contexts except with regard to the Dioscuri.

[2] *IG* v (1), No. 594; that Epaphro was quite young is shown by the fact that her grandmother was alive to act as sponsor for her on this occasion. Cf. S. Wide, *Lakonische Kulte* (Leipzig, 1893), p. 179.

Along with *τιμᾱχε̄͂ν*, the infinitive *πο̄λε̄͂ν* suits the context of our inscription very well. *Τιμαχε̄͂ν* refers to the senior dignitaries of the cult, *πο̄λε̄͂ν* to the junior initiates and minor dignitaries. A woman who has no husband although she is of marriageable age is excluded from *both* functions. She is not necessarily barred from participation in the rite as a spectator; but her condition is unpropitious to a form of worship directed towards fertility, so that her active participation would be a *μίασμα*.

The adoption of *πο̄λε̄͂ν* in our text reduces considerably the range of possibilities for the subject-matter of the whole document,[5] and strengthens the case for Demeter and Core or Artemis and the Leucippides. Further enquiry into this question must be reserved for the discussion of ll. 1–3 (below).

In ll. 3–4 we have seen two indubitable cases of ξ = σ (before *ἔθε̄κε* and in *ὀϝᾶς*). This is a typical early Laconian form. But there are several other varieties of σ used in Laconia; they differ in the number of strokes which they contain, in the straightness or curve of the strokes, and in the angle of inclination to the direction of writing. If we assume that the engraver of Fourmont's inscription used two forms of σ: ξ (which Fourmont transcribed accurately and perhaps also identified correctly) and ϟ (which he conceived to be a tilted M = μ and misrepresented in his transcription), many difficulties in the text are automatically removed.[6] The likelihood of two σ-forms being used indiscriminately within a single document before the final stabilization of the local alphabet is obvious; and the possibility that Fourmont would be confused in such an event need not be argued.

Further, the Laconian υ appears in the variant forms V, ᛚ, Y. There is no instance of υ in Fourmont's text.[7] The sign ϒ occurs in l. 1 (twice) and in l. 6; and Fourmont no doubt thought it represented υ; but υ does not make sense in any of the three places.

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[1] *IG* v (1), No. 1444.

[2] *Jahrb. d. deutsch. archäol. Gesellsch.* xxvii (1912), p. 8, Nos. 2, 3: *Ἀρτέμιδι Πωλοῖ.*

[3] Wide, op. cit., pp. 326–332.

[4] *Ath. Mitt.* xxix (1904), p. 297: *πῶλον Ἀφροδίτης* (? Cyzicus).

[5] From a linguistic point of view it is conceivable that *πο̄λε̄͂ν* could refer to the sale of goods in the market which accompanied many religious festivals. *Leges sacrae* occasionally refer to the vendors (*πωληταί*) on such occasions. But the regulations concerning them are normally an appendix to the main paragraphs of the law. It is scarcely conceivable that people of this class could be mentioned in the same sentence as one of the chief causes of ritual impiety.

[6] I am indebted for this explanation to Mr. A. G. Woodhead. Previously I had supposed that the engraver used ξ and M, both with the value σ, the second being the *san*-form which is well known in the Arcadian and other Peloponnesian alphabets. The assumption of M would make it easier to account for Fourmont's use of the upright letters M N ϒ where σ is required by the context. But this hypothesis breaks down not merely because M (= *san*) is unknown in Laconian inscriptions but because it would be necessary to suppose that the engraver distinguished μ from *san* by using M (with a short fourth stroke), a form which is also unknown in Laconian and is not indeed supported in this case by Fourmont's transcript (e.g., l. 3, MΕ = *μέ*, TIM = *τιμ-*).

[7] The symbol ᛚ occurs in l. 7, but no argument can be based on the meaningless jumble in that part of the text.

It is plain, however, that on a defaced surface ϟ = *σ* could be mistaken for ⅄, particularly if (as is probable enough) Fourmont expected *υ* to appear as Y. In the same way, M = *μ* could be mistaken for ϒ = *υ*.

Finally, there is a clear possibility that the sign ϟ = *σ*, if its fourth stroke were defaced, could be mistaken for N=*ν*.

Thus the following equivalences are possible:

ϟ (*σ*) = M (*μ*)
ϟ (*σ*) = N (*ν*)
ϟ (*σ*) = ϒ (*υ*); M (*μ*) = ϒ (*υ*).

Instances of these will be found to occur in ll. 1–2 (see below). In the meantime it is clear that in l. 6 the penultimate letter M can well be explained as *σ* and that ϒ in the same line may also be *σ*. Conversely, it must also be considered possible that in l. 5 *καθαιροϒ̣* represents *καθαιρο̄σ*[.[1]

A further characteristic of Fourmont's script is the distinction between P (vertical) and ρ (oblique). The latter is beyond doubt equivalent to *ρ* in *χε̄́ραν*, *Ἀρκάλο̄ν*, and -*φορ̣ο̄̆ς*. (The P of *καθαιρ̣οϒ̣*, however, is almost vertical.) In l. 1 there is an instance of vertical P which, as will be shown below, is certainly a mistake for T. We have also seen that in l. 4 Fourmont was capable of mistaking Γ for P. If we apply this observation to the group POϒι in l. 6, we obtain either ΓOM or TOM. Associated with the following word, the latter solution provides *το̄̀ς ·ρ̣·ϙ̣φ̣όρο̄ς*, acc. plur., which is a very plausible reading. It may also be doubted whether the first P of the -*φ̣όρο̄ς* word, which is also vertical, really indicates *ρ*; but since it occurs between two missing letters its interpretation is problematical (see below).

The structure of the sentence may now be considered under the following alternatives:

(*a*) (*χε̄́ραν*) *καθαίρο̄σ*[*αν*] | (infin.) *το̄̀ς* [ ]*φ̣όρο̄ς* . . .
(*b*) (*χε̄́ραν*) *καθαίρο̄σ*[*αν* | [dat. instr. *or* advb., etc.] *το̄̀ς* [ ]*φ̣όρο̄ς* [infin.]
(*c*) (*χε̄́ρα*) *καθαίρο̄σ*[*α* | [imper.] *το̄̀ς* [ ]*φ̣όρο̄ς*.

(For the feminine participle, a gen. absol. or dat. comm. construction is scarcely to be contemplated in an archaic law; the mode of expression is sure to be simple and direct.) Type (*c*) can probably be ruled out, as it involves an unnecessary change of construction. But the factor which weighs heavily against any restoration based on the feminine participle is that it makes the [ ]*φ̣όρο̄ς* the object of purification. This word may be expected to indicate a group of magistrates or other officials, who could not be cleansed by a woman who is herself *μιαρά*, and are indeed more likely to be responsible for purification-measures in such a case. It is possible, but not probable, that the [ ]*φ̣όρο̄ς* were cult-objects, e.g. water-vessels, which would have to be cleansed. But the proper object of purification is the temple or shrine at which the pollution occurs. A similar objection applies to the imperatival construction:

(*d*) *καθαιρόν*[*τω* | [nom. plur.] *το̄̀ς* [ ]*φ̣όρο̄ς*.

The missing nominative might, within the supposed limits of the lacuna, be restored as *hιαροί*, *hιαραί* or even *hιάρε̄ιαι*. In such a case we might reasonably expect *τοὶ hιαροί* etc., but there is no room for the article.

The masc./neut. participial construction need be considered only in the form of acc. plur. masc. participle agreeing with *το̄̀ς* [ ]*φ̣όρο̄ς*. Any other case-form, e.g. nom. sing. or acc. sing. masc., would govern *το̄̀ς* [ ]*φ̣όρο̄ς* and revive the problem of the identity of the [ ]φ̣όρōς and the reason for their being purified. The sentence must therefore run as follows:

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[1] The occurrences of M, N in ll. 3–4 need not be reconsidered in this light.

(*e*) καθαίρον[τας] [infin.] τṑς [ ]φ̣όρōς [acc.] . . .

(*f*) καθαίρον[τας] [dat. instr.] τṑς [ ]φ̣όρōς [acc.] [infin.] . . .

(*g*) καθαίρον[τας] [acc.] τṑς [ ]φ̣όρōς [infin.] . . .

Of these (*g*) has the advantage of simple and clear word-order, and it is the solution which I am inclined to accept. Uncertainty must remain, however, so long as the final K of l. 6 is unsolved and while the debris of l. 7 provides no satisfactory indication of the nature of the next phrase or sentence.

Following (*g*), we have at our disposal a variety of words which would be a suitable object for the participle; e.g. *hιαρόν, δôμα, στέγαν, βōμόν*. Since Fourmont does not mark a lacuna at the end of l. 5 we should assume that the participial ending -τας belongs to l. 6. We may then read τὸ δôμα; but if a longer word, e.g. στέγαν, is preferred, there will be no room for the article (especially if it is masc. or fem.). The fragmentary letters before τṑς may fit -αν or -μα equally well. I choose τὸ δôμα as being a word of archaic flavour which may well have been applied to temples in Laconia (cf. Poseidon Δωματίτης[1] at Sparta) and was certainly so used at nearby Tegea.[2] A noun with the article is slightly more plausible than one without it, in view of τṑς [ ]φ̣όρōς.

Hitherto the Φ of l. 6 has been accepted as equivalent to φ. This is scarcely possible. The Laconian φ is regularly Φ and, although the unusual M form for σ has already been established in our text, I do not think that Φ = φ can be safely assumed if there is another plausible explanation. The symbol Φ can in fact represent ϙ, *q*, and this provides a compound of —ϙόρος (-κόρος) 'attendant', which is entirely appropriate to the context. The reading φ can only be justified if it is supposed that Fourmont modernized this letter while he copied all the others in the engraver's style with fair accuracy.

It has already been pointed out that the P at the beginning of the -ϙ̣όρōς word is of dubious value. As there is a space between it and the hesitantly marked O we perhaps ought to assume that a letter is missing here, although Fourmont does not indicate its loss. Compounds of -κόρος which may be considered are ναϝοκόρος, θεοκόρος or θιοκόρος (later Laconian σιοκόρος, Hesychius s.v.), θᾱκοκόρος and πυρκόρος (Thessalian,[3] ἅπ. λεγ.). Parallel to the last-mentioned word we might postulate *πυροκόρος, i.e. an official who tends the temple-fire (cf. πυρο- in πυροφόρος,[4] Laconian). On the strength of the very late word ἱεροκόρος, perhaps *hιαροκόρος should be added to the list. Given that P may be genuine and, if not, might well be a corruption of K or F, I select πυροϙ̣όρōς, ναϝοϙ̣όρōς, θᾱκοϙ̣όρōς in that order.

The K which follows -ϙ̣όρōς is unlikely to have been the last letter of the line. To judge by the length of l. 3 there was plenty of room for more, and even in early inscriptions it is not usual to find words divided after the initial consonant. We must assume that Fourmont failed to observe traces of any further letters at this point, since he has not marked a lacuna. The K may be supplemented κ[αὶ, to be followed by another group of officials or a second participial phrase, or it may be the beginning of the infinitive phrase which is required to complete the sentence.

Line 7 is so severely damaged that it is impossible to discover even the outlines of its structure. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the officials, in addition to cleansing the shrine, would exact a fine from the offender and would then proceed to carry out the rites which had been interrupted. Conceivably the letters AEM conceal a form of the verbs *ἀφάεσθαι, ἐξάεσθαι* used in this sense; but the shape of both A and E is so uncertain that even this modest conjecture must be considered to be valueless.

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[1] Wide, op. cit., pp. 31, 45 f.

[2] *IG* v (2), No. 3, l. 21 (Athena Alea).

[3] 'Εφ. ἀρχ. 1934–5, p. 141 (inscr.); cf. πυρκόοι (Delphi), Hesychius, s.v.

[4] *IG* v (1), No. 992, etc.

Lines 1–3.

The form of the sentence beginning *μὲ χέραν̣* . . . suggests that it opens a new clause in the law. Accordingly, since in documents of the type in question we are apt to pass abruptly from one topic to another, we need not expect to find that ll. 1–3 have much in common with ll. 3–5 as regards subject-matter. Nevertheless, there is a fair chance that the two passages may be alike in form, i.e. that the entire text may be concerned with prohibitions.

Fourmont's version of l. 1, *λ̣ντ̣ουεδεροεενο* shows an impossible combination of letters at several points; but the curious letter ϒ, which occurs twice, at once attracts attention. It has already been explained that Fourmont was prone to confuse Ϟ, *σ*, with M, *μ*, N, *ν*, and ϒ, *υ*. If it be supposed that what he *ought* to have seen here was Ṃ, *μ*, then most of the difficulties of the line disappear.

The first four letters represent]*ἅν̣τ̣ō*, 3 pl. impve., recalling the syntax already postulated for ll. 3–5, and they are followed by *μ̣ēδὲ*, which reinforces this impression. Obviously the imperative is most unlikely to have been a word of six letters, as Fourmont's notation suggests; nor is it likely to have been the first word of the sentence or paragraph, since a definite subject is needed. Even if l. 1 is taken to be a continuation of a sentence begun on another face of the stele, it may well be thought to have started with a complete word. Therefore a lacuna of more than 2 letters should be assumed for the left-hand edge at this point.

The second half of the line now reads *ροεεμο*. By changing P to T and the first E to F, we obtain a possible *τō̃ ϝε̄μō̃*, i.e. a genitive noun depending on the verb in l. 2 which follows *μēδέ*. The word **ϝημός* is unknown, but in a dialect text of the classical period we ought not to shrink from accepting a new word, provided that it can be justified in form and sense. Parallel to **ϝημός* are Dor. *ϝῆμα* (Cret.; cf. Hesych. *γῆμα*), Ion. *εἷμα* and Dor. **ϝήμα f.* (Cret. g.s. *ϝέμας*). This series from **wes-* 'clothe', 'dress', corresponds exactly to *ῥυμός*, 'pole', 'line'; *ῥῦμα*, 'draw', 'bow-shot'; *ῥυμή*, 'rush', 'street', or to *οἶμος*, 'way'; *οἶμα*, 'swoop ; *οἴμη*, '(path of) song'; cf. also *στιγμός, στίγμα, στιγμή*, etc. Strictly **ϝημός* is an abstract or *nomen actionis*, but it might easily be applied to a 'garment', 'robe', or to 'clothing' in general. If the latter sense is the correct one in our text, it may be used in contrast with *ἥματος*, a *single* garment. But, whether there be one garment or more, the use of the definite article shows that the reference is specific to something used in the cult.

The mention of clothing in a religious context brings to mind such acts as the ritual dedication of garments, the wearing of plain white garments at the Thesmophoria, mumming (esp. dances by men dressed as women, and vice versa), or even the simple stripping off of garments for athletic contests and dancing. So far the cult or cults of our law are undefined; we merely have indications of a female cult (*χέραν, τιμᾱχε̂ν, πōλε̂ν*), possibly of Demeter, Artemis, or the Leucippides (*πōλε̂ν*).

Accordingly, the significance of the *ϝημός* in the law is hard to define. It is well to remember, however, that the cult is Laconian and Dorian. Laconia is the land of *γυμνοπαίδια*, races and dances by naked boys for Apollo[1] and orgiastic dances by scantily clad, if not entirely naked, girls for Artemis.[2] Further, we find at Phaestus in Crete a ritual called *'Εκδύσια*, associated with a god Leukippos and involving the undressing of brides and *incubatio* in a temple;[3] Leukippos at once recalls the puzzling cult of the Leukippides at Sparta, which involved two female participants known as *πῶλοι*, a goddess who may have been Artemis, perhaps also the dedication of a garment, and was associated with myths of marriage and rape.[1] With these facts in mind, we may proceed to consider the restoration of l. 2.

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[1] Nilsson, *Griechische Feste*, pp. 140 f.

[2] Ibid., pp. 182 ff.; and esp. p. 184, n. 4. See Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 14. 2.

[3] Nilsson, op. cit., pp. 370–1.

The verb following *με̄δὲ* can be recognized in the initial fragment ..ↄAMANOO. The first ο is ⊕, *θ*, and the ending is therefore impve. mid. The Laconian 3 p. impve. mid. form is known from Heracleia as *-ασθω*; as a by-form we might reckon with *-ανσθω*, but hardly with *-ανθω*. Therefore, either ξ, *σ*, has been omitted by Fourmont before ⊕, or the sign N is corrupt and should be read as *σ*. But the preceding M is also doubtful, for we expect either an aorist tense or the present of a verb with indic. *-άω* or *-ᾱμι*; if it is aorist impve., the chances against M, *μ*, are considerable. As has already been shown, M, *σ*, can replace both M and N. Thus we obtain the dialectally correct verb ending *-σάσθο̄*.

The missing verb-stem is presumably one which can be followed by a genitive (*το̂ ϝε̄μο̂*). The tense appears to be the aorist of an *-ᾱ-* stem. The curved fragment of the letter preceding this stem-vowel might indicate Φ, D, or P. The following restorations may be considered. (*a*) *ἐνυφ]ασάσθο̄*, 'weave in', 'embroider', with *το̂ ϝε̄μο̂* as genitive of respect or partitive genitive. This is the aorist of *ἐνυφάω*, *ἐνυφαίνω*; the middle form of this word may appear surprising but is not, I think, out of place in the present context. The reference will be either to the weaving of garments for the goddess at public expense or (less probably) to the weaving of garments by individual women privately for dedication to the goddess. Ceremonial bathing and clothing of an effigy is of course a ritual common to most, if not all, Greek goddesses, particularly those associated with childbirth and fertility. This reading if accepted would not, therefore, throw any light on the identity of the cult concerned; it is perhaps worth mentioning, however, that in the cult of the Spartan Leucippides there was an official weaving of garments, prominent enough for Pausanias to mention it—and not for the goddesses Hilaeira and Phoebe but for Apollo (who is perhaps to be regarded as the male partner of a *ἱερὸς γάμος* in this connexion).[2] (*b*) *ἀποδ]ασάσθο̄*, with *το̂ ϝε̄μο̂* as partitive genitive. This would imply the dedication by women-initiates of part of their own clothing to the goddess. *ἀποδατέομαι* is not far removed in meaning from *ἀπάρχομαι*; but unfortunately for our purpose it does not seem to have been current in religious language. (*c*) Supposing that the clothing is either that draped over the effigy of the goddess or that dedicated to the goddess by a woman after childbirth or the like, we might postulate *ἐπαφ]ᾱσάσθο̄*, 'touch'. The object of this section of the law would then be to prevent impiety or pollution.

The brevity and obscurity which surround our text make it impossible to decide between these readings. My own preference follows the order in which they are set out above.

The remaining letters of l. 2, IT/ΛϜΓο, must be combined with l. 3 *]ọς ἔθε̄κε*, to form a phrase qualifying the preceding imperative sentence. From the indicative *ἔθε̄κε*, it may fairly be inferred that this phrase does not belong to the following sentence, *με̄̀ χέ̄ραṿ*, etc.; we should in that case expect a subjunctive or optative.

The key to the phrase is to be found in the group /ΛϜ. Here MϜ, *μέ̄*, is a safe restoration.

We must then seek a relative particle in the remaining IT. This group presents some difficulty. The obvious solutions *αἰ*, conditional, and *ἐ̄*, temporal, bear no resemblance to Fourmont's letters. The relative *hóτι* is only possible if it be supposed that Fourmont accidentally omitted *ho* by haplography after the preceding ⊕O, *-θο̄*. Another possibility that occurs to me is ΓϜ, *πε̄͂*, 'where', 'in what circumstances'. This Doric form could be reconciled with the original; and since nearly every other letter in the line requires some degree of restoration, the change is perhaps not out of the question. Both adverbially and as a relative, the word is usually local in sense.

[1] Wide, op. cit., pp. 326–32.

[2] Pausanias 3. 16. 2.

In form, however, it is an instrumental; and if it is so interpreted in our text, the meaning of the phrase is quite appropriate.[1] Finally, I would propose ΤΙ, *τί*, which requires only a trifling alteration to the text. The use of the interrogative pronoun in a distributive sense in contexts other than a straightforward indirect question is rare but authenticated: cf. *IG* ix (2), No. 517, ll. 22–3, *καὶ τὰν ὀνάλαν, κίς κε γινύειτει ἐν τάνε, δόμεν*, 'and to pay whatever expenses may be incurred towards this end' (Larisa, 3rd century B.C.), and see L. & S.^{9} s.v. *τίς* B. II. b. I do not know of any example of this usage in a dialect text so early as Fourmont's inscription, but it seems to me a natural phenomenon to which there can be no objection in principle.

Accordingly I take *τὶ . . . ἔθε̄κε* to follow the imperatives in the same way as an accusative noun, and the genitive *τô ϝε̄μô* to be in partitive relationship to this phrase.

The structure of the phrase is thus *τὶ μὲ̄* (nom. sing.) *ἔθε̄κε*, or *τὶ μὲ̄* (nom. sing. and acc. neut.) *ἔθε̄κε*. In the second case the order of the missing words may be reversed. In both cases the subject is almost certainly a priest or a magistrate or similar official. In the first, with the unexpressed object equivalent to the content of the principal clause, *ἔθε̄κε* will mean 'ordained', 'sanctioned', 'approved' (L. & S.^{9} s.v. *τίθημι*, A. V, VII). In the second, the expressed object is likely to be predicative, 'approved as (proper, permissible, etc.)'.

The letter following *μὲ̄* is almost certainly 𐌐 and not Γ; in Fourmont's copy a slight downward twist is visible at the end of the horizontal stroke. The end of l. 2 *π̣ο..* can be combined with]ο̣ς l. 3 to make *π̣ο[λι|ᾱνόμ]ο̣ς* or **π̣ō[λο|νόμ]ο̣ς*. If an accusative is postulated we must read *π̣ο[λι|ᾱνόμο̣ς ....]ōς* or *πο[..|..ōς ....]ος*, the extent of the lacuna being unknown in either case.

The variant acc. plur. (or sing.)+nom. sing. may, I think, be ruled out. The only plausible word that occurs to me is *πṓ[λōς*; and this or any word of similar length is unlikely, because Fourmont marks only two letters missing in l. 2 and, since there seems to have been room for one or two more, the engraver would not divide *πό[λō|ς*. The choice between the remaining alternatives, i.e. nom. sing. or nom. sing.+acc. neut., is hard to decide. From the standpoint of both style and context, the nom. sing. alone seems rather more natural. The subject of the preceding imperatives must be definite; it cannot have been women in general or even women of a general category, such as *χέ̄ρα* below, since that would require not a 3 plur. but an imperatival infinitive. Therefore this subject was almost certainly the title of a priesthood, etc. In the case of a nom. sing.+acc. neut. construction in the *τὶ μέ̄* clause, the sentence would then be something like 'X shall not . . . unless Y has approved it as Z'.

The fact that assumption of a single nom. sing. like *πολι|ᾱνόμο̣ς* enables us to bridge the lacuna is an advantage, but does not constitute a proof of its correctness. Nevertheless we have seen that, by postulating a lacuna of the same size in each of the other lines, it is possible to construct a text which is syntactically and dialectally defensible. This accident cannot fail in return to support the conjecture on which it was based.

The word *πολιᾱνόμος* is a distinctively Dorian title and represents a magistracy which is likely enough to be active in supervising the cults of an obe. Plato, *Ep*. 13. 363 c refers to a Syracusan polianome, evidently as a person of some importance. The title occurs also at Cyrene (*Doc. ant. dell' Africa Italiana*, ii. 127). Although hitherto unattested in Laconia, the Heracleian board of *πολιᾱνόμοι* (*IG* xiv, No. 645, l. 104 *et al.*) provides a close link with that country. In relation to an obe, the polianome would probably be the chief executive officer of the citadel (*πόλις*) which was the centre of local government. The absence of the definite article *may* imply '*a* polianome', i.e. one of a board of magistrates; but it is unsafe to extract so much from the crude style of an archaic law. Although the known word is to be preferred to the unknown, I suggest **πōλονόμος* because of the possibility, already demonstrated, that our text deals with the *πῶλοι* of a goddess. This official would be parallel to the *γυναικονόμος* responsible for the dress and behaviour of women at the Andanian mysteries.[1] On the other hand, *πōλονόμος* has the considerable disadvantage of restricting the lacuna in l. 3 to three letters and so affecting the reconstruction of other lines.

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[1] Other conjectures, such as *ὄπᾱ* or *hóπᾱ*, might be offered. I omit them from my discussion both because they involve the assumption of a major corruption in the text (haplography following ⊕O, etc.) and because they do not represent any real syntactical improvement on those conjectures which are mentioned above.

ἔθε̄κε: the indicative construction signifies that the action of the official concerned is definite and statutory. He has previously appointed or sanctioned something; the persons referred to in the imperative verbs are not to interfere with it. There is no question of the official taking such action from time to time or as need arises, which would require *κα c. subj.*

The full text may now be represented as follows:

(*deficiunt aliquot versus*)

]ά̣ντ̣ō μ̣ε̄δὲ τ̣ô ϝε̄μ̣ō̃
ἐνυφ]α̣σ̣ά̣σ̣θ̣ō, τ̣ὶ̣ μ̣ε̄̀ π̣ο[λι-
-ᾱνόμ]ο̣ς ἔθε̄κε. μ̣ε̄̀ χε̄̀ρα̣ν̣ τιμ-
-ᾱχε̄̃ν] π̣εδ' ὀ̄ϝᾱ̃ς Ἀρκάλōν
μ̣ε̄δὲ π]ō[λ]ε̄̃ν̣· [ἀ]λλὰ̣ καθαίρον-
-τας τὸ δô]μ̣α̣ τ̣ṑς̣ [πυ]ρ̣ο̣ϙ̣όρōς̣ κ[αὶ
†ΛΙΓϘΑΕΜΛΛ··Ψ·Ι·ΥΟ†
(*deficiunt aliquot versus*)

V. ll. 2. ἀποδ]α̣σ̣ά̣σ̣θō, ἐπαφ]α̣σ̣ά̣σ̣θō. π̣ε̣ *pro* τ̣ὶ̣.
2–3. πō[λο|νόμ]ο̣ς
3–4. τιμ|[ᾱοχε̄̃ν], τιμ|[ε̂σθαι]
5–6. καθαίρον | [τας στέγ]α̣ν̣ *vel* | [τας hιαρ]ο̣ν̣
6. [να]ϝ̣ο̣ϙ̣όρōς, [hια]ρ̣ο̣ϙ̣όρōς, [θᾱ]κ̣ο̣ϙ̣όρōς, *vel nomen e -φ̣όρος compositum.*

Tr. 'They shall not . . . nor shall they weave into the garments anything which the Polianomus has not prescribed.—No unmarried woman shall hold the priesthood in the community of Arcali(-a), nor serve as Pôlus; if this should happen, the Pyrocori shall cleanse the temple and . . .'

The text remains something of a patchwork; but its patches are all of one kind and they fit together. The chief source of doubt is the size of the lacuna on the left-hand edge.

The date of the inscription cannot be stated in terms of decades. The alphabetic peculiarities which have been noted point to the early fifth century, or even the sixth century. This supposition is supported by the style and content.

The identity of the cult referred to in the text remains obscure. Demeter is perhaps the most likely solution. Her worship was widespread in Laconia as in other Peloponnesian states; and a number of inscriptions concerning it have been found in the Amyclae–Sclavochori area.[2] The content of the Fourmont text is not out of keeping with that of other laws of the Demeter cult found in the Peloponnese.[3] On the other hand, Artemis or the Leucippides might well have a law of this kind.

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[1] *IG* v (1), No. 1390, l. 26 *et al.*

[2] *IG* v (1), Nos. 579, 594, and other texts in the same volume which refer to *θοιναρμόστριαι* without naming Demeter (Nos. 583, 584, 589, 596, etc.).

[3] *IG* v (2), No. 514 (Lycosura); E. Schwyzer, *Dial. graec. exempla epigr. potiora* (Leipzig, 1923), No. 429 (Dyme); A. J. Beattie, *CQ.* xli (1947), pp. 66 f. (? Clitor).

PLATO'S USE OF QUOTATIONS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL

PLATO's use of illustrative material, in the widest sense, is very varied. Parts of the field have had some study—his use of metaphor and simile (still capable, no doubt, of yielding more meaning in relation to his thought) and his use of proverbs, at least as regards subject-matter and sources. The object of the present article is to consider in general what may already have been catalogued somewhere—his quotations from other writers (mainly from poets) and his references to myths and to other stories.

Plato uses quotations sometimes as integral to his argument, sometimes as a mere embellishment. The two types are not always easy to distinguish; any quotation usually occurs as in some degree appropriate or relevant to the context of discussion, and may well supply a case in point. But there is an obvious difference between, for example, the extended use and application of verses from Euripides in *Gorg.* 484 e ff. or the exceptional passage *Rep.* 379 d–391 c, where quotation and criticism of Homer is essential to the argument, and at the other extreme the brief use of, for example, the Pindaric phrase *σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω* (*Men.* 76 d, *Phaedr.* 236 d) as a mere conversational 'tag', playful in effect and without any bearing on the subject of discussion.

Under the use of quotations as part of the argument several other continuous passages may be noted—the treatment of an ode of Simonides in *Prot.* 339 a ff., and of a pair of quotations from Theognis in *Meno* 95 d ff.; the discussion on Homer in the *Ion*, and the numerous verbal instances used in the *Cratylus*. Exceptional in a different way is the speech of Agathon in *Symp.* 194 e–197 e, which seems full of reminiscences of poetry. Here it is difficult to be sure either of quotations or of sources (see Bury's notes). Some of the poetic diction is no doubt intended to be read as Agathon's own, e.g. the couplet at 197 c. The whole speech is in character. By contrast another artificial passage, the three discourses in the *Phaedrus*, shows very few quotations—none at all in the first speech, 230 c–234 c.

In enumerating Plato's quotations, of whatever type, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between direct citation and proverbial phrases derived originally from the poets. Thus, for example, the line from *Od.* xvii. 218, *ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον*, quoted verbatim at *Lys.* 214 b, is also the basis of proverbial references at *Gorg.* 510 b, *Symp.* 195 b, *Rep.* 425 c, *Laws* 716 c, 837 a. In this instance only the *Lysis* passage seems proper to be included among quotations.

On a count thus tentatively made, the incidence of direct verbal quotations among the dialogues shows some interesting variation. Measuring frequency in terms of Stephanus's pages, the *Ion* (a short dialogue and concerned with poetry) shows 1 quotation in every 2 pages; the *Symposium* (especially literary in style and interest) 1 in 3; the *Republic*, 1 in 4 (or, excluding 379 d–391 c as exceptional, 1 in 5). At the other end of the range of usage in the earlier dialogues, the *Phaedo* shows only 1 in 15 pages and the *Euthydemus* 1 in 18; both these works have much conversational relief and by-play, and the *Phaedo* has literary embellishment of other kinds. The later dialogues, except for *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, show very few quotations. There are none at all in *Parmenides*, *Timaeus*, and *Critias*; the *Politicus* has only 1 (in 54 pages), the *Philebus* 2 (in 56 pages); and the *Laws*, in which prose citations of proverbs are frequent, has but 14 quotations in 345 pages, i.e. 1 in 25.

With regard to the sources of poetic quotations, the great majority are from Homer. I find 99 instances of his actual words cited, with or without ascription, as against 67 from other poets. Thus, even if we excluded the special passage *Rep.* 379 d–391 c, which gives 27 Homeric citations (as well as references besides) in a short space, Homer would still exceed all the rest together.

For explicit or certainly identifiable quotations the numbers are: Homer 99; Hesiod 16; other hexameter sources 7; elegiac poets 6; Pindar 11; other lyric poets 9; Aeschylus 8; Sophocles 1 (*Rep.* 568 a, but ascribed by Plato to Euripides); Euripides 7; Aristophanes 2.

An even greater preponderance of Homer (about 60 to 32) is found in Plato's references to passages in the works of poets, whether by name or otherwise identifiable. In general references to myths, the subject-matter of Homer is naturally less predominant in proportion to the many allusions found to the labours of Heracles and to other mythical subjects.

It may be supposed that the excess of Homeric quotations (found both in passages cited for argument and in casual conversational phrases) reflects both Plato's own interest and the general outlook and habit of Athenian society in his time.

The majority of the quotations from Homer are from the *Iliad*. Allowing for some stock phrases found in either epic, the proportion of *Iliad* to *Odyssey* passages appears to be something over 2 to 1.

Among topics of quotation and reference from the *Iliad* the character and story of Achilles has chief place. This is specially observable in the *Republic* passage (386 c–391 c) in which Plato's criticism of Homer as used in education is made to centre on this example. Instances are given as follows:

(*a*) Attitude to death:
1. Achilles' speech in Hades, *Od.* xi. 489 ff.
2. His comment on the shade of Patroclus, *Il.* xxiii. 103 f.

(*b*) Display of grief:
1. His grief for Patroclus, *Il.* xxiv. 10 ff. and *Il.* xviii. 23 f.
2. Thetis' grief for him, *Il.* xviii. 54.
3. Zeus' grief for Hector, *Il.* xxii. 168.

(*c*) Insubordination:
Achilles' address to Agamemonon, *Il.* i. 225.

(*d*) Irreverence:
1. His complaint to Apollo, *Il.* xxii. 15 f.
2. His withholding the lock of hair from Spercheios, *Il.* xxiii. 140.

(*e*) Cruelty:
1. His treatment of Hector's corpse (reference to *Il.* xxiv. 14 ff.).
2. His slaying of prisoners on the pyre (reference to *Il.* xxiii. 175).

Achilles is again instanced, this time with praise for his dying to avenge his lover, in a passage of extended reference at *Symp.* 179 e ff. (the conclusion of Phaedrus' speech) and more briefly at 208 d. But perhaps the most striking and effective uses of his character are made in two passages of symbolic effect—(1) *Rep.* 516 d, where his words in Hades (*Od.* xi. 489 ff., *βουλοίμην κ' κτλ.*) are used again, attributed to the released prisoner unwilling to return to the darkness and *death* (a simile used again at 521 c) of the Cave; (2) *Crito* 44 b, where in Socrates' dream Achilles' reference to homecoming (*Il.* ix. 363) is adapted as the message of approaching death—*ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο*. The line is cited (with the slight change of *ἵκοιο* for *ἱκοίμην*) as needing no reference to context, and its application is clear from Socrates' preceding words. The citation from Homer aptly emphasizes his characteristic view of death as not merely an *ἀποδημία* but a removal to a better place, in fact a going home.

There are other examples of the repetition of a telling quotation. Thus *Od.* xx.

17 f., *στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κτλ.*, is cited three times: (1) *Phaedo* 94 d, as illustrating 'dialogue' between soul and passion; (2) *Rep*. 390 d, as an instance of self-restraint on a hero's part; (3) *Rep*. 441 b (with reference back to 390 d), in support of the division of *ψυχή*.

There are sixteen quotations from Hesiod, including some repeated and some proverbially used. Three extended citations occur of *Op*. 287 ff., *τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα κτλ.*—*Prot*. 340 d, *Rep*. 364 c–d, *Laws* 718 e ff.

Pindar is the source (usually acknowledged by Plato, in a few instances named by the Scholiast) of about a dozen quotations, only two of which are from extant odes of victory—*Phaedr*. 227 b, *ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα* (*Isthm*. i. 2) and *Euthyd*. 304 b, *τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐωνότατον, ἄριστον ὄν, ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος* (*Ol*. i. 1). The passage *νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς κτλ.* (fr. 152 Bow.) appears three times—*Gorg*. 484 b (an extended citation and comment), *Prot*. 337 d, *Laws* 715 a.

A few points of interest arise in Plato's identifiable quotations from the dramatists. Aeschylus supplies eight passages, all but two cited by name (the exceptions are at *Rep*. 383 b and 391 e, assigned to him by the Scholiast), and all apparently used with serious application. Plato quotes nothing as from Sophocles, attributing to Euripides a line (*Rep*. 568 a–b, *σοφοὶ τύραννοι κτλ.*) which the Scholiast says is Sophoclean. There are seven citations of Euripides by name, including two adaptations of *Hipp*. 612, *ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ', κτλ.*, evidently becoming proverbial. To the explicit quotations from Sophocles and Euripides must be added some more or less certain borrowings considered below as conversational 'tags'. Aristophanes is quoted only twice; both passages are from the *Clouds*, and both have personal application to Socrates—*Ap*. 19 e (*Nub*. 225), *Symp*. 221 b (*Nub*. 362). At *Phaedo* 91 c, *ὅπως μὴ . . . ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι*, the words of Eupolis on Pericles, perhaps becoming proverbial, are aptly quoted.

The forms in which quotations from poets are given may repay study in relation to Plato's style. Three types are to be distinguished:

(1) Passages (ranging in length from a word or two to several lines) cited correctly and verbatim—often introduced, for example, by *ὅτι*, or again with parenthetic insertion of (e.g.) *φησί* or *γάρ*.

(2) Passages in which the poet's own words (cited correctly or not) are adapted to the syntax of Plato's sentence, sometimes in violation of metre.

(3) Passages incorrectly cited, but recognizable as quotations.

On a count the numbers are as follows: verbatim 117, adapted 50, incorrect 20. (A few are both adapted and incorrect.)

While the verbatim type of quotation does not call for further discussion, some instances of the adapted and of the incorrect type may be considered.

Adaptation to the syntax of Plato's own sentence varies from slight changes without violation of metre to distortion of form and order. The slight changes may be such as Homer himself uses, for example, in reporting a message given; *Crito* 44 b, already considered, is an example, with *ἵκοιο* for the original *ἱκοίμην* (*Il*. ix. 363). A typical longer passage occurs at *Rep*. 388 a–b,

Ὁμήρου τε δεησόμεθα . . . μὴ ποιεῖν Ἀχιλλέα . . .
ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρᾶς κατακείμενον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε
ὕπτιον, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνῆ,

τότε δ' ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα
πλωΐζοντ' ἀλύοντ' ἐπὶ θῖν' ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο,

μηδὲ ἀμφοτέραισιν χερσὶν ἑλόντα κόνιν αἰθαλόεσσαν χευάμενον κὰκ κεφαλῆς, μηδὲ ἄλλα κλαίοντα κτλ. . . . μηδὲ Πρίαμον . . . λιτανεύοντά τε καὶ

κυλινδόμενον κατὰ κόπρον,
ἐξονομακλήδην ὀνομάζοντ' ἄνδρα ἕκαστον.

Here in both quotations (*Il.* xxiv. 10 ff. and xxii. 414 f.) the syntax is changed from direct statement, with nominatives and finite verbs, to participial constructions in the accusative depending on *μὴ ποιεῖν*. At some points—*ἀναστάντα, ἑλόντα, χευάμενον*—the change to participles upsets the metre, at others it does not. A line in the first passage shows also two verbal deviations from the original—*πλωΐζοντ'* substituted for *δινεύεσκ'*, and *ἀτρυγέτοιο* added to *ἁλός*, incorrect here though frequent elsewhere.

An interesting example of extended adaptation with special purpose is found at *Rep.* 393 a ff., where after quoting two lines (*Il.* i. 15 f.) Plato proceeds to turn into oratio obliqua the account of the appeal of Chryses and his prayer to Apollo, as an illustration of *διήγησις* in distinction from *μίμησις*.

The verbally incorrect quotations are all Homeric except three; these are a loose adaptation of Hes. *Theog.* 675 at *Soph.* 246 a, *ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες*, and two obvious echoes (no doubt semi-proverbial) of Eur. *Hipp.* 612—*Symp.* 199 a, *ἡ γλῶττα οὖν ὑπέσχετο, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὔ· χαιρέτω δή.* *Theaet.* 154 d, *Εὐριπίδειόν τι συμβήσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.*

The great preponderance of Homeric examples among the incorrect citations goes to illustrate again the conversational habit of familiar and maybe careless quotation from the epics; and the kinds of variation shown are in keeping with such a habit. Apart from *Rep.* 388 a (already discussed) there is only one instance of serious divergence from the traditional text: *Rep.* 379 d

ὡς δοιοὶ πίθοι
κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν.

(*Il.* xxiv. 528, *δώρων οἷα δίδωσι, κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων.*) The ensuing lines are quoted correctly, with adaptation to syntax. At *Rep.* 545 d a neat substitution is made, with playful effect and without violation of metre—*εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ὅπως δὴ στάσις ἔμπεσε κτλ.* (*Il.* xvi. 113, *πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν*). Otherwise Plato's verbal inexactitudes are slight. Some show the substitution or insertion of words not themselves unhomeric; e.g. *Rep.* 388 c, *αἲ αἲ*, for *ὤμοι* (*Il.* xvi. 433). *Symp.* 220 c, *οἷον δ' αὖ*, for *ἀλλ' οἷον* (*Od.* iv. 242). *Prot.* 315 c, *καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον*, for *καὶ μὴν T. εἰσεῖδον* (*Od.* xi. 582). *Phaedr.* 266 b, *τοῦτον δίωκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο*, cf. *Od.* v. 193, *μετ' ἴχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο.* One or two examples show substitution of Attic for Epic forms; *Symp.* 219 a, *χρύσεα χαλκείων διαμείβεσθαι νοεῖς*, for *ἄμειβε* (*Il.* vi. 235). *Laws* 906 e, *λοιβῇ τε οἴνου κνισῇ τε παρατρεπομένοις αὐτοῖς*, for *παρατρωπῶσ'* (*Il.* ix. 500). At *Symp.* 198 c a pun is imported by a change of form—*ἀτεχνῶς . . . τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου . . . Γοργίου κεφαλήν*, for *μή μοι Γοργείην κεφαλὴν . . . πέμψειεν* (*Od.* xi. 634 f.): see Bury's note.

The effect of this type of inexact quotation is to suggest casual reminiscence of a generally known original. While such an incorrectness may be due to Plato's own mistake, it seems far more probable that we should regard it as intentionally written and as meant to convey either conversational informality or (in some cases) *εἰρωνεία* on the part of Socrates, who is the speaker of nearly all these quotations. Cf. *Rep.* 400 b–c, where he pleads ignorance or imperfect memory of metrical terms.

Some special interest attaches to the class of quotations (some verbatim, some adapted or incorrect) which I have already described as conversational 'tags'—often playful, burlesque, or proverbial in effect, and used without any point of argument or criticism. Here again Homer is the chief source (acknowledged or implied), supplying more than two-thirds of the examples to be noted (I find about 45) under this head. In most of them the author or context is not given; this omission is natural and indeed to be expected. An Englishman exclaiming 'I could a tale unfold!', referring to 'bearing the ills we have', will not think it necessary to mention either Shakespeare or *Hamlet*.

These 'tags' are commonest in the dialogues of the middle period, where they suit with the general poetic exuberance of style. The *Symposium*, with nine, shows the largest number. It seems worth while to give the list in full. I have elsewhere[1] collected and discussed some of Plato's poetic expressions; merely conjectural instances are omitted below, but those are included in which either quotation is obvious or a phrase (or a word) gives a safe clue to the identification of a source. As might be expected, some of the examples already studied of adaptation or inexact citation come in again under this head. The distinction between these poetic 'tags' and accepted proverbial expressions is, as we have seen, not always easy to maintain.

Ap. 20 e, *οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον.* Cf. *Symp.* 177 a, *οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος κτλ.*—there referred to *τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην.*

Ap. 34 d, *καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων.* An explicit and accurate citation (*Od.* xix. 163) is used playfully with proverbial force. Cf. *Phaedr.* 275 b, *Rep.* 544 d.

Prot. 315 b, *τὸν δὲ μέτ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη Ὅμηρος, Ἱππίαν τὸν Ἠλεῖον.* (*Od.* xi. 601, *βίην Ἡρακληείην.*)

Prot. 315 c, *καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον*—*sc.* Prodicus. (*Od.* xi. 582.)

Euthyd. 293 c, *μετὰ Διονυσοδώρου . . . φίλης κεφαλῆς.* (*Il.* viii. 281, etc.). Cf. *Phaedr.* 264 a.

Gorg. 449 a, *εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.* (*Il.* vi. 211, etc.)

Meno 76 d, *ἐκ τούτου δὴ ξύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος.* (Pind. fr. 94 Bow.) Cf. *Phaedr.* 236 d, and Ar. *Av.* 945.

Phaedo 95 b, *ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα κτλ.* (*ἐγγὺς ἰών* in singular is frequent, e.g. *Il.* iv. 496.)

Phaedo 117 a, *φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος.* A reminiscence of Hesiod (*Op.* 369, *μεσσόθι φείδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φειδώ*) passing into a proverb.

Crat. 415 a, *μὴ . . . ἀκριβολογοῦ, μή μ' ἀπογυιώσῃς μένεος.* (*Il.* vi. 265.)

Crat. 428 d, *δεῖ . . . καὶ πειρᾶσθαι, τὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ ποιητοῦ, βλέπειν ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.* (*Il.* iii. 109.)

Symp. 174 d, *σύν τε δύ', ἔφη, ἐρχομένω πρὸ ὁ τοῦ βουλευσόμεθα.* (*Il.* x. 224.) Cf. *Prot.* 348 c (cited in argument).

Symp. 177 a, *ἡ . . . ἀρχὴ . . . κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Φαίδρου τοῦδε.* Cf. *Ap.* 20 e.

Symp. 196 e, *πᾶς γοῦν ποιητὴς γίγνεται, κἂν ἄμουσος ᾖ τὸ πρίν, οὗ ἂν Ἔρως ἅψηται.* (Eur. *Sthenob.* fr. 663 N². See Bury's note.)

Symp. 199 a, *ἡ γλῶττα οὖν ὑπέσχετο, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὔ· χαιρέτω δή.* (Eur. *Hipp.* 612.) Cf. *Theaet.* 154 d.

Symp. 214 b, *ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων.* (*Il.* xi. 514.) Cf. *Polit.* 297 e.

Symp. 219 a, *τῷ ὄντι χρύσεα χαλκείων διαμείβεσθαι νοεῖς.* (*Il.* vi. 235 f., *τεύχε' ἄμειβεν | χρύσεα χαλκείων.*)

Symp. 220 c, *οἶον δ' αὖ τόδ' ἔρεξε καὶ ἔτλη καρτερὸς ἀνήρ.* (*Od.* iv. 271, *ἀλλ' οἶον κτλ.*)

Symp. 221 c, *τοὺς προτροπάδην φεύγοντας διώκει.* (*Il.* xvi. 304, *προτροπάδην φοβέοντο.*)

Symp. 222 b, *μὴ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὥσπερ νήπιον παθόντα γνῶναι.* (*Il.* xvii. 32, *ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω.*)

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[1] *C.Q.* xl. 3–4, July–October 1946, p. 111.

Rep. 411 b, *καὶ ποιήσῃ μάλθακον αἰχμητήν.* (Cf. *Il.* xvii. 588.)

Rep. 544 d, *ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι ;* (*Od.* xix. 163.) Cf. *Ap.* 34 d, *Phaedr.* 275 b.

Rep. 545 d–e, *ἢ βούλει . . . εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν . . . ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε . . . ;* (*Il.* xvi. 112 f., *πῦρ ἔμπεσε.*)

Rep. 566 c, *δῆλον ὅτι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ οὐ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ καταβαλὼν κτλ.* (*Il.* xvi. 776, *κεῖτο κτλ.*)

Rep. 607 e, *βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται.* (Soph. *Ant.* 1105, *μόλις μέν, καρδίας δ' ἐξίσταμαι.*) Cf. *Polit.* 289 b, and Ar. *Nub.* 1363, Eur. *H.F.* 1365.

Phaedr. 227 b, *οὐκ ἂν οἴει με κατὰ Πίνδαρον καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσασθαι ;* (Pind. *Isthm.* i. 2.)

Phaedr. 236 d, *σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω.* (Pind. fr. 94 Bow.) Cf. *Meno* 76 d.

Phaedr. 264 a, *Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλή.* (*Il.* viii. 381, etc.) Cf. *Euthyd.* 293 c, *Ion* 531 d.

Phaedr. 266 b, *τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο.* (*Od.* v. 193, *μετ' ἴχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο.*)

Phaedr. 275 b, *ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ' εὐηθείας.* (*Il.* xxii. 126 seems the more likely origin here.) Cf. *Ap.* 34 d, *Rep.* 544 d.

Theaet. 154 d, *Εὐριπίδειόν τι συμβήσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.* (Eur. *Hipp.* 612, *ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.*) Cf. *Symp.* 199 a.

Theaet. 170 e, *μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος.* (*Od.* xv. 556, etc.)

Theaet. 172 e, *περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος.* (*Il.* xxii. 161, *περὶ ψυχῆς θέον Ἕκτορος.*)

Theaet. 173 e, *ἡ δὲ διάνοια . . . πέτεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τᾶς τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε . . . οὐρανοῦ θ' ὕπερ.* (Pind. fr. 302 *a* Bow.)

Theaet. 176 d, *γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη.* (*Il.* xviii. 104, *ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης.* *Od.* xx. 379, *αὔτως ἄχθος ἀρούρης.*)

Theaet. 183 e, *Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ μοι εἶναι ἅμα δεινός τε.* (*Od.* viii. 22, *δεινός τ' αἰδοῖός τε.*)

Theaet. 191 a, *τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν.* (Soph. *Aj.* 1146, *πατεῖν παρεῖχε τῷ θέλοντι ναυτίλων.*)

Soph. 216 c, *ἄνδρες οὗτοι . . . ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας.* (*Od.* xvii. 486.)

Soph. 238 a, *μήπω μέγ' εἴπῃς.* (Soph. *Aj.* 386, *μηδὲν μέγ' εἴπῃς.*)

Soph. 246 a, *ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες.* (Hes. *Theog.* 675, *πέτρας . . . στιβαρῇς ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντες.*)

Soph. 268 d, *ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος ὃς ἂν φῇ . . . εἶναι, κτλ.* (*Il.* vi. 211.) Cf. *Gorg.* 449 a.

Polit. 289 b, *τὰ δὲ εἰς ὄργανα βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἑλκόμενα συμφωνήσει.* (Soph. *Ant.* 1105.) Cf. *Rep.* 607 e.

Polit. 297 e, *τὸν γενναῖον κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἰατρόν.* (*Il.* xi. 514.) Cf. *Symp.* 214 b.

Phil. 22 a, *οὐχ ὃ μέν, ὃ δ' οὔ.* (Aesch. *Pers.* 802, *οὐ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὔ.*)

Phil. 66 a, *νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντες.* (Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 115, *νυκτὶ κοινάσαντες ὁδόν.*)

Phil. 66 c, *ἕκτῃ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς.* (A traditional Orphic verse—see Bury's note.)

Quotations from prose writers are rare. A few citations from earlier philosophers are brought in for discussion—Heraclitus at *Symp.* 187 a; Protagoras at *Theaet.* 152 a, 160 b; verses of Parmenides at *Soph.* 237 a, 244 e, 258 d. More interest for the present study is found in a few casual and semi-proverbial expressions derived, by name or otherwise clearly, from philosophers.

Rep. 498 a, *ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου ἡλίου.*

Gorg. 465 d, *τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν . . . · ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.*

Phaedo 72 c, *ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα.*

Phaedo 101 e, *ἱκανοὶ γὰρ . . . ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν.*

Laws 716 c, *ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη.*

Prot. 316 b, *πάντα τὰ χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη*, suggests a parody of pre-Socratic formulae.

A number of instances of *ἄνω κάτω* imply a common colloquialism possibly derived from the *ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω* of Heraclitus; e.g. *Theaet.* 195 c, *ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἕλκῃ τις.*

Plato's allusions to myths, apart from definite quotations from or references by name to the poets, are fairly generally distributed, with again some specially loaded passages, e.g. the speech of Phaedrus in *Symp.* 178 a–180 b, where the argument is built upon instances from legend. Many of the isolated allusions (usually in the form of simile or comparison) have the same burlesque or playful conversational effect as the quotations already considered. Some, again, are clearly proverbial in effect. Some examples may be given, under topics; the full list would be much longer.

Homer: *Iliad* and Trojan story:

Ajax—*Symp.* 219 d, *χρήμασί γε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἄτρωτος ἦν ἢ σιδήρῳ ὁ Αἴας.*

Diomedes—*Rep.* 493 d, *ἡ Διομηδεία λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ πάντα κτλ.* (Proverbial—schol. explains.)

The horse—*Theaet.* 184 d, *δεινὸν . . . εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται.*

Odyssey:

Sirens—*Phaedr.* 259 a, *παραπλέοντας σφᾶς ὥσπερ Σειρῆνας ἀκηλήτους.* (*Od.* xii. 166 ff.)

Symp. 216 a, *βίᾳ οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ Σειρήνων ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὦτα οἴχομαι φεύγων.*

Lotus-eaters—*Rep.* 560 c, *εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους ἐλθὼν φανερῶς κατοικεῖ.* (*Od.* ix. 84 ff.)

Proteus—*Euthyp.* 15 d, *οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς.* (*Od.* iv. 455 ff.)

Euthyd. 288 b–c, *τὸν Πρωτέα μιμεῖσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς.*

Ion 541 e, *ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεὺς παντόδαπος γίγνῃ στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω.* This joins on obviously to the colloquial use (no doubt from the same source) of *παντοῖος γίγνεσθαι*, e.g. Hdt. vii. 10. *γ*, ix. 109.

Penelope—*Phaedo* 84 a, *Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένης.* (*Od.* ii. 93 ff.)

Eriphyle—*Rep.* 590 a, *πολὺ ἐπὶ δεινοτέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ χρυσὸν δωροδοκεῖ ἢ Ἐριφύλη ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ τὸν ὅρμον δεξαμένη.* (*Od.* xi. 326–7.)

Heracles—a number of references, some proverbial, to the labours:

Hydra and crab—*Rep.* 426 e, *τῷ ὄντι ὥσπερ Ὕδραν τέμνουσι.*

Euthyd. 297 b ff., *φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν τῇ τε ὕδρᾳ διαμάχεσθαι . . . καὶ καρκίνῳ τινὶ κτλ.* (The aid of Iolaus described, with further banter on the story.)

Phaedo 89 c, *πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷός τε εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰολέων παρακάλει.* (Cf. the derived proverb alone, *Laws* 919 b, *πρὸς δύο μάχεσθαι . . . χαλεπόν.*)

Atlas—*Phaedo* 99 c, *ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον . . . ἐξευρεῖν.*

Geryones—*Euthyd.* 299 c, *ἦ καὶ τὸν Γηρυόνην ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸν Βριαρέων οὕτως σὺ ὁπλίσαις;*

Sow of Crommyon—*Lach.* 196 d–e, *οὐδὲ τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ὗν πιστεύεις σύ γε ἀνδρείαν γεγονέναι.*

Two neatly implied references to Heracles may be added to the explicit ones:

Ap. 22 a, *δεῖ . . . τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος.*

Crat. 411 a, *ἐπειδήπερ τὴν λεοντῆν ἐνδέδυκα, οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον.*

Theseus:

Theaet. 169 a ff., a combined reference to his encounter with Sciron and that of Heracles with Antaeus.

Euthyd. 291 b, *ὥσπερ εἰς λαβύρινθον ἐμπεσόντες.*

Laws 687 e, *ἐν παθήμασιν ἀδελφοῖς ὧν Θησεῖ πρὸς τὸν δυστυχῶς τελευτήσαντα Ἱππόλυτον.*

Medea, and *Marsyas*:

Euthyd. 285 c–d, *παραδίδωμι ἐμαυτὸν . . . ὥσπερ τῇ Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῳ. ἀπολλύτω με, . . . ἑψέτω, κτλ. . . . .. εἴ μοι ἡ δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἀσκὸν τελευτήσει, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρσύου.*

Daedalus:

Euthyp. 11 b–c, *τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου . . . ἔοικεν εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα.* Cf. 15 b.

Meno 97 d ff., *τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν· κτλ.*

Endymion:

Phaedo 72 b–c, *οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' ⟨ἂν⟩ λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο.* A typical instance of a mythical allusion used playfully and combined with colloquial phrases.

The range and variety of Plato's references to personages by way of comparison is shown in these four different prototypes of wealth:

Euthyp. 11 d–e, *ἐβουλόμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ . . . τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γίγνεσθαι.*

Men. 90 a, *τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα.*

Rep. 408 b, *οὐδ' εἰ Μίδου πλουσιώτεροι εἶεν.* Cf. *Laws* 660 e.

Lys. 211 e, *μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Δαρείου χρυσίον κτήσασθαι.*

A few illustrations are of the fable type, verging on the proverbial in effect. Such are three references to the wolf in folk-lore:

Phaedr. 272 d, *λέγεται . . . δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν.*

Rep. 336 d, *καί μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἑωράκη αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ, ἄφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι.* Here the wolf is neatly implied though not mentioned.

Rep. 565 d–e, *λέγεται . . . ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνουσπλάγ χνου . . . ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.*

At *Symp.* 217 e f. we have an extended illustration from an incident which appears proverbial. *τὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πάθος κἀμὲ ἔχει. φασὶ . . . τινὰ τοῦτο παθόντα οὐκ ἐθέλειν λέγειν οἷον ἦν πλὴν τοῖς δεδηγμένοις, κτλ.* See Bury's note for other references.

At *Theaet.* 200 e a brief reference implies the background to a proverb. *ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος . . . ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό.* (Schol. explains.)

Crat. 413 a may also refer to an actual incident giving rise to a proverb: *δοκῶ . . . μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἅλλεσθαι.* The scholiast refers to *Φάυλλός τις.*

Illustrative anecdotes are few, but those which occur are effective.

Lach. 183 c ff. Stesilaus and his *δορυδρέπανον*—the tale, excellently told, proves that the professional exponents of *τὰ ὁπλιτικά* are not as a rule successful in actual fight.

Rep. 329 b, Cephalus relates a conversation with Sophocles as an instance of old age bringing release from sexual passion.
Rep. 329 e, the anecdote of Themistocles and the Seriphian—used as an analogy.
Rep. 439 e, the incident of Leontius confronted with a gruesome sight—an instance of conflict between *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*.
Theaet. 174 a, Thales' fall into a well and the Thracian girl's ridicule—illustrating the philosopher's oblivion of material affairs. Cf. 174 c.

It becomes clear from this survey that the main part of Plato's illustrative material consists of quotations from poets, and chiefly from Homer. Apart from special instances of their use in argument, his quotations appear frequently as passing analogies; here they are to be classed, along with numerous references to the poets and to the myths, as part of that rich store of similitudes which is intrinsic to Plato's style and important in interpreting his thought. Further, the easy adaptation of quotations of varying length to the syntax of Plato's own periods, and in particular the frequent introduction of brief phrases from the poets in a playful and casual manner, point the affinity between his style and the cultured conversational usage of his day.

Dorothy Tarrant.

POLITICAL SPEECHES IN ATHENS

JEBB[1] in outlining the differences between ancient and modern oratory maintains that while modern orators try to give the impression that their speeches are extempore, the Greeks polished their speeches with fastidious care and were not ashamed to admit laboured preparation. This view, which is widely held, needs considerable qualification. The purpose of this article is:

(*a*) To emphasize the strong prejudice felt by the Greeks against written speeches.
(*b*) To show that while the forensic speech was normally written out beforehand, the genuine political speeches[2] were largely extempore, and every effort was made to give this impression.
(*c*) To consider how the technique of extempore political oratory influenced Thucydides and Isocrates in the composition of their carefully prepared 'literary' speeches.

Plato, Alcidamas, and Isocrates all reflect the common prejudice against written speeches and all three comment on it in their own way to suit their own purpose. Plato, the champion of dialectic, criticizes them because they make no contribution to this method of discovering the truth: they look as if they were alive but if asked a question, they are unable to answer.[3] Alcidamas exploits the same prejudice to advertise the advantages of his own school of extempore speaking.[4] Both refer to the composition of written *λόγοι* as an amusement (*παιδιά*) which must not be taken seriously.[5] Isocrates, although himself an exponent of the written word, is fully aware of the popular prejudice against written compositions (*τὰς δυσχερείας τὰς περὶ τοὺς σοφιστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀναγιγνωσκομένους τῶν λόγων*)[6] and the various advantages of the spoken word. It was commonly felt that care in composition meant a disregard for truth[7]; and Isocrates shows himself very conscious of this feeling and is constantly on the defensive. He complains that men regard written works merely as elegant compositions and refuse to take their content seriously.[8] Consequently some orators preface a speech with the statement that it is extempore (*ἐξ ὑπογυίου*).[9] The introduction to the *Panegyricus* is mainly an apologia for a work which has been carefully prepared with regard to style and content.

It was natural that this prejudice against written speeches should have its effect on practical oratory. In forensic speaking, however, the complexity of legal cases made deliberate and laboured preparation necessary, and there existed professional speech-writers who wrote speeches for their clients to learn off by heart before they appeared in court. Even these sometimes tried to create the illusion that the speeches were unprepared.[10] It is a much more difficult question to decide how far political speeches were prepared beforehand, and histories of rhetoric tend to be reticent on this point; e.g. Volkmann[11] neglects this subject although he discusses in detail the technical divisions, etc., of demegoric speeches. Blass[1] believes that Attic oratory started by being entirely improvised and developed until the whole speech was artistically prepared beforehand; but he does not go into the question in detail and he makes no distinction between demegoric and forensic speeches.

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[1] R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators*, 2nd ed., 1893, introd. to vol. i, p. lxxi.

[2] i.e. demegoric speeches actually delivered in the *βουλή* or *ἐκκλησία*, as opposed to the 'literary' speeches of Isocrates and others. The term 'political speeches' does not translate *πολιτικοὶ λόγοι*. The Greek term is used in a much wider sense and may include epideictic and forensic as well as demegoric speeches: *v.* Anaximenes, *Rhet. ad Alex.*, ch. i *ad init.* and G. Walberer, *Isokrates und Alkidamas*, pp. 4–12, Hamburg, 1938.

[3] Plat. *Phaedr.* 275 D.

[4] Alcid. *De Soph.* passim.

[5] Plat. *Phaedr.* 276 B–E; Alcid. *De Soph.* 35.

[6] Isocr. *Ad Phil.* 29.

[7] e.g. *v.* Alcid. *De Soph.* 12; Isocr. *Antid.* 62; Aristot. *Rhet.* 3. 1. 7.

[8] Isocr. *Ad Phil.* 4, 25; *Ep.* 1. 2–3.

[9] *Paneg.* 13. Isocr. refers here, not to political speakers, but to composers of epideictic *λόγοι*.

[10] *v.* Alcid. *De Soph.* 13.

[11] R. Volkmann, *Rhet. d. Griechen u. Römer*, 1885.

There can be little doubt that during the fifth and fourth centuries there was a sharp contrast between political and legal oratory. The writing of forensic speeches was regarded as an unfortunate necessity and the professional writers of these speeches were a despised class. When Cleon in the *Knights*[2] derides the folly of a man thinking he can speak in the Assembly because he has successfully delivered a forensic speech after studiously practising it the previous night, he reflects the real difference between the two types of oratory. They called for an entirely different technique. Plato makes Phaedrus express the same distinction more explicitly: *ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνῃ, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας.* 'It is chiefly in connexion with law-suits that one speaks and writes systematically, but one also speaks (sc. systematically) in assembly speeches'; i.e. both forensic and political oratory have their own systems (*τέχνῃ*), but whereas forensic speeches are written out beforehand, political speeches are not.[3] The extempore nature of political oratory is again suggested by Aristotle. In *Rhetoric* 3. 1. 7 he contrasts *οἱ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορες* with *οἱ γραφόμενοι λόγοι.* Ibid. 12. 5 shows that political speakers are meant by the former, as Aristotle implies that there is most *ὑπόκρισις* in *δημηγορία.*

In Plato's *Phaedrus* it is explicitly stated that politicians did not write speeches.[4] Here Phaedrus expresses the fear that Lysias may be unwilling to compose a rival speech to Socrates' grandiloquent oration; a politician had recently taunted him with being a *λογογράφος*[5] and his pride might induce him to give up writing speeches. When Socrates suggests that the politician may not have been serious, Phaedrus insists that he was, for the great politicians were ashamed of writing speeches for fear they might be called Sophists. Socrates denies this, saying that politicians delight in writing speeches, but the only written compositions he can ascribe to them are laws and enactments.[6]

There is little evidence to suggest that political speeches of the fifth and early fourth century were written. Thucydides says that Antiphon had outstanding ability in assisting speakers in the law-courts and the Assembly,[1] but it is quite inadmissible to deduce from this that he *wrote* political speeches for others.[2] More likely is the tradition reported in the pseudo-Plutarchean life that Antiphon was the first to write forensic speeches;[3] no mention is made here of political speeches. Cicero ascribes written speeches to Pericles:[4] Quintilian, however, questions this statement and adds 'ideoque minus miror esse qui nihil ab eo scriptum putent'.[5] Plutarch expressly denies that he left any written speeches:[6] and this is the implication of the passage in Plato's *Phaedrus* referred to above.[7] Suidas (for what his evidence is worth) says that Pericles was the first to deliver a written speech in the law-courts;[8] but he makes no mention of political speeches. The small fragments of Periclean speeches mentioned by Aristotle and others are mainly from an ἐπιτάφιος λόγος, i.e. an epideictic, not a demegoric, speech and so are irrelevant to the present question. In any case they are easily memorable aphorisms which could be preserved orally. A fragment of Eupolis says that Pericles in his speeches was swift, and persuasive, and left his sting in his hearers;[9] none of these qualities suggests written preparation. Plutarch says of Pericles that he took care with his speeches (περὶ τὸν λόγον εὐλαβὴς ἦν)[6] and Cicero says that he was the first to compose speeches systematically (*primus adhibuit doctrinam*).[10] This agrees with the passage from the *Phaedrus* referred to above: political speeches were not written, but there were rules for their composition (τέχνῃ λέγεται).[11] Plutarch's description of Alcibiades' oratory suggests the same conclusion. Alcibiades, he says, paid attention to form as well as content, but in his endeavour to find the right word he would often stumble and stop short in the middle of a speech.[12]

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[1] *Die att. Beredsamkeit*, i^{2}, p. 27.

[2] Aristoph. *Eq.* 347–50.

[3] Plat. *Phaedr.* 261 B. This passage has been variously translated and interpreted. The significant point is the omission of *γράφεται* in the second arm of the sentence. *τέχνῃ* must certainly be understood with the second *λέγεται* or the *δέ*-clause is pointless. *δημηγορίας* is clearly accusative plural, not genitive singular, as the meaning of the preposition shows and the parallelism of the two arms requires. The *ὕστερον πρότερον* in *λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται* is common enough, cf. Homer, *Iliad* 1. 251 *οἵ οἱ πρόσθεν ἅμα τράφεν ἠδ' ἐγένοντο.* Specialists in rhetoric from W. H. Thompson (*v.* his edition of the *Phaedrus* ad loc.) onwards have taken *λέγεται* and *γράφεται* to refer to oral and verbal instruction and take the passage to mean that lectures and rhetorical treatises relate chiefly to forensic oratory, some of the former including demegoric oratory. But *λέγω* is the usual word for delivering a speech and is unlikely to mean 'instruct' or 'lecture', particularly in a rhetorical context, while *τέχνῃ* ('according to systematic rules') refers to the composition of the actual speech, not of lectures or treatises about speaking.

[4] Plat. *Phaedr.* 257–8; cf. ibid. 277 D, 278 C.

[5] It is significant that this word, apart from its general meaning of 'prose-writer', came to be applied in a specialized sense to writers of forensic (not political) speeches.

[6] Cf. Plut. *Per.* 8. 4 (of Pericles) *ἔγγραφον μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἀπολέλοιπε πλὴν τῶν ψηφισμάτων.* Thuc. 1. 145 quotes the substance of a Periclean *ψήφισμα.* As this is in the *narrative* we may assume it is in accordance with the text, which was probably known to Thuc. The 'literary' speech, which Thuc. ascribes to Pericles (1. 140–4), is probably based in part on this *ψήφισμα.* There is also a reminiscence of it in an earlier 'literary' speech, 1. 78. 4. For the conception of laws as *λόγοι* cf. Isocr. *Antid.* 79–83, where Isocr. describes the advantages of his own 'literary' speeches over laws.

More elaborate preparation for political speaking is at first sight suggested by Cleon's strictures on his fellow orators in Thucydides.[13] But Cleon here is merely scoring a debating point by playing on the Athenian suspicion of δεινότης.[14] He is trying to create a prejudice against graduates of the rhetorical schools like Diodotus (i.e. those who spoke τέχνῃ),[15] by comparing them to composers of epideictic λόγοι. Diodotus is indignant that his speech should be assumed beforehand to be like an ἐπίδειξις (οἳ . . . προκατηγοροῦντες ἐπίδειξίν τινα)[16] and as a counter-thrust implies that Cleon's speech is like a forensic speech,[17] a form of oratory which was equally mistrusted. Neither charge implies serious criticism.

Alcidamas' work *On Composers of Written Speeches* provides further evidence to show the extempore nature of political oratory. Although primarily an attack on the

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[1] Thuc. 8. 68. 1.

[2] As, for example, S. Wilcox does in his article 'The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction', *H.S.C.Ph.* liii (1942), p. 132.

[3] Ps.-Plut. *Vit. Ant.* 4 (Thalheim, *Ant.*, p. x). The passage goes on to state that speech-writing was not customary at this time and that Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles did not write speeches, although they had the ability and every inducement to do so. Since I wrote this article my attention has been drawn to Ant's. own words in his defence—ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγουσιν οἱ κατήγοροι ὡς συνέγραφόν τε δίκας ἄλλοις κτλ. (Thalh., fr. 1, col. 2), which again suggest A. wrote only forensic speeches.

[4] Cic. *De Or.* 2. 93. According to the MS. reading in Cic. *Brut.* 46 Cicero quotes a statement of Aristotle that before Corax and Tisias *de scripto plerosque dicere*. Eberhard's emendation *discripte*, however, should probably be read. In any case the statement probably refers to forensic speeches.

[5] Quint. 3. 1. 12.

[6] Plut. *Per.* 8. 4.

[7] Plat. *Phaedr.* 257–8.

[8] Suid. s.v. Περικλῆς.

[9] Eup. *Dem.*, fr. 94 (Kock).

[10] Cic. *Brut.* 44.

[11] Plat. *Phaedr.* 261 B. τέχνῃ, as was argued above, must be repeated in the second arm of the sentence.

[12] Plut. *Alc.* 10. 3.

[13] 3. 38.

[14] Cf. Thuc. 8. 68. 1: the reason for Antiphon's unpopularity is his δόξα δεινότητος.

[15] Cleon himself was more given to ὑπόκρισις: he relied on voice and gesture to compensate for his lack of rhetorical training: *v.* Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 28. 3 and Plut. *Nic.* 8. 3.

[16] 3. 42. 3.

[17] 3. 44. 4–5.

'literary' speeches of Isocrates, it is also an advertisement for his own school of extempore speaking and consequently a general attack on all written speeches. Therefore writers of forensic speeches (*οἱ εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια τοὺς λόγους γράφοντες*) also come in for criticism.[1] The reference to *ἀντίδικοι* later on[2] again shows Alcidamas has forensic speeches in mind in comparing the merits of extempore and written speeches. Nowhere is there any reference to written political speeches—except when Alcidamas refers, as a ridiculous hypothesis, to the absurdity of a man running off to compose a written speech when summoned to speak in the Assembly.[3] If it had been customary to compose written speeches for delivery in the Assembly, as forensic speeches were written for delivery in the law-courts, Alcidamas would surely have referred to them more specifically. As this was not the custom, Alcidamas confines himself to disparaging the two kinds of written speeches prevalent in his day, i.e. the epideictic or 'literary' speech, like those of his rival Isocrates,[4] and the forensic speech.

Evidence from Isocrates points to the same conclusion. He frequently classes epideictic and forensic speeches together and expressly refers to them as written compositions.[5] In *Panegyricus* 11 and *Antidosis* 46 he describes the appropriate literary style for these two kinds of writing. He also makes frequent reference to political speakers; these are variously termed *οἱ ῥήτορες, οἱ δημαγωγοί, οἱ δημηγοροῦντες, οἱ δημηγορεῖν δυνάμενοι, οἱ ἐν τῷ πλήθει δυνάμενοι λέγειν, οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα παριόντες, οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος μαινόμενοι*, etc. Nowhere is there anything to suggest that they wrote their speeches. In *Panathenaicus* 271 he contrasts his own speeches with (*a*) *written* epideictic and forensic speeches (*τῶν πρὸς τὰς ἐπιδείξεις καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας γεγραμμένων*) and (*b*) *spoken* political speeches (*τῶν πρὸς ἡδόνην καὶ χάριν λεγομένων*).[6] In *Panathenaicus* 29, where he is passing judgement on *λόγοι* generally, he speaks *καὶ περὶ τῶν δημηγορεῖν δυναμένων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν γραφὴν τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐδοκιμούντων*. The double *καί* emphasizes the two different categories: (*a*) political speeches, (*b*) written speeches (i.e. forensic and epideictic).

But while political speeches were not written and learnt off verbatim beforehand, it is clear from passages cited above that political speaking was something more than haphazard impromptu rhetoric; it was a carefully cultivated art and one far more highly esteemed than forensic oratory. There can be no doubt that the rhetorical schools taught their pupils to speak in the Assembly and Council as well as in the law-courts.[7] The nature of this instruction is necessarily somewhat obscure, but there is evidence for believing that the method Alcidamas advocates for all branches of oratory was the one commonly employed in preparing for a political speech. He does not, he says, recommend speaking entirely without preparation. The arguments (*ἐνθυμήματα*) and their arrangement (*τάξις*) should be thought out beforehand, but their expression (*ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων δήλωσις*) should be spontaneous and unpremeditated.[8] The systems of the other rhetorical schools, as far as we know them, are in keeping with this method. Aristotle says that Gorgias made his pupils learn off by heart model speeches.[9] These speeches would be well stocked with thoughts and aphorisms which could be adapted to meet the needs of the moment. The speaker could use these to fill in the skeleton of a speech previously prepared on the lines Alcidamas recommends.[1] Cicero says that Aristotle ascribes this practice to Protagoras as well as Gorgias.[2] Our evidence, as Wilcox in the two articles already mentioned shows, suggests that Gorgias and Protagoras were far more concerned with political than with forensic speaking. Anaximenes gives more detailed precepts explicitly for political speeches on the same lines: although the more specific arguments peculiar to individual speeches can only be prompted by the business on hand at each debate, 'general ideas' (κοιναὶ ἰδέαι) can be learnt beforehand which can easily be adapted to particular questions.[3] He then proceeds to divide political speeches into seven categories, and outlines arguments which can be used under each of these headings. Elsewhere[4] Anaximenes gives hints on the structure and arrangement of political speeches, i.e. for the skeleton speech which would be thought out beforehand. It is reasonable to suppose that the methods advocated by Gorgias, Protagoras, Alcidamas, and Anaximenes are based on methods of speaking used in public life. The innovation of Alcidamas seems to have been that he wished to extend this method to all forms of speaking, i.e. to forensic and epideictic as well as demegoric speeches.

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[1] *De Soph.* 13.

[2] Ibid. 24.

[3] Ibid. 11.

[4] Strictly speaking Isocr.'s speeches do not fall into any of the usual three categories (*v. infra*), but they would have been generally regarded as *ἐπιδείξεις*; and it certainly suited Alcid. to regard them as such.

[5] e.g. *Paneg.* 188; *Antid.* 1, 46; *Panath.* 1–2, 271.

[6] This clearly refers to political speeches. Isocr. contrasts his own willingness to censure Athens for her mistakes, as he did in the *De Pace*, with the political speakers' desire to please their audience; cf. *De Pace* 9 *τῶν πρὸς ἡδόνην δημηγορούντων*.

[7] S. Wilcox makes this abundantly clear both in the article referred to above and in his article 'Criticisms of Isocrates and his *Φιλοσοφία*', *T.A.Ph.A.* lxxiv (1943).

[8] *De Soph.* 33, cf. ibid. 18.

[9] *Soph. El.* 34. $183^{b}36$.

It remains to consider how writers of 'literary' speeches like Thucydides and Isocrates were influenced by this technique of the genuine political orators. It is convenient to deal with Isocrates first. Attempts to classify his speeches according to the usual categories, in ancient and modern times, have produced widely divergent results.[5] Such attempts are fruitless because, except in his early forensic speeches, Isocrates refuses to identify himself with any one branch of oratory, although he may follow some of the conventions of one or the other of them. The *Panegyricus* and *Panathenaicus* show some of the characteristics of an epideictic speech at a Panhellenic festival, but they are really addressed to Athenian citizens.[6] The *Peace* and *Areopagiticus* have the setting of real demegoric speeches, but this is merely a literary pretence. In all such speeches Isocrates aimed at combining the literary qualities of epideictic composition with the more important subject-matter of the extempore political speech; the former had lacked substance and greatness of theme, the latter a finished style and literary embellishment. He clearly implies that he would have become a political speaker if he had had the necessary physical powers;[7] as he had not, he wrote speeches. Realizing the prejudice against written speeches, he claims that his own are justified by the importance of their subject-matter and should therefore be distinguished from the usual types of written speeches, i.e. epideictic and forensic.[8] He was not the first to attempt this type of composition. We have part of a 'literary' political speech by Thrasymachus,[9] and Lysias has another example of the same genre.[10]

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[1] Blass (op. cit. i², p. 27), treating Attic oratory in general, thinks that at an intermediate stage, before it became customary to write out the whole speech beforehand, passages on common topics were artistically written out and memorized in order that they might be introduced verbatim into an otherwise extempore speech. There is little evidence to support this, and the resulting speech would have been very uneven, as the statement from Alcidamas (*De Soph.* 14), which B. quotes to support his theory, suggests. It is far more likely that the passages to which B. refers here were those so taught by the rhetorical schools that the commonplaces, etc., could be adapted and re-phrased to suit the needs of the moment.

[2] *Brut.* 46–7.

[3] *Rhet. ad Alex.*, ch. 2 *ad init.*

[4] Ibid., chs. 29–34.

[5] See Jebb, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 76–80.

[6] I have discussed this point in *C.Q.* xliii, 1949, pp. 68–9.

[7] *Ad Phil.* 81; *Panath.* 10–11; *Ep.* 8. 7.

[8] Isocr. is at pains to point out that his speeches are not ἐπιδείξεις, particularly those in which he borrows some of the conventions of epideictic oratory; *v. Paneg.* 17; *Ad Phil.* 17, 25, 93; *Panath.* 233; *Bus.* 44. He is also anxious to disclaim any connexion with forensic oratory; e.g. *Paneg.* 11, 188; *Antid.* passim; *Panath.* 11, 271.

[9] Diels, *Vorsokr.*⁵ ii, pp. 321–4.

[10] Lys. *Orat.* 34.

Isocrates appears to have been influenced not only by the matter of political speeches but also by the manner of their composition. He told his students when composing a λόγος first to decide on the scope of the composition as a whole and of its parts, then to look for the ἰδέαι by means of which this framework would be enlarged into the complete speech.[1] Isocrates' ἰδέαι are the κοιναὶ ἰδέαι of Anaximenes, the commonplaces, stock arguments, conventional topics, etc., which the extempore political speaker found useful in filling out the framework of a speech planned beforehand. These ἰδέαι, Isocrates says, can easily be learnt from any good rhetorical teacher. The skill lies in their selection, arrangement, and expression.[2] Isocrates in fact applies the methods normally used for extempore political speaking to literary composition; but whereas the real political speech was expressed spontaneously (περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων δήλωσιν αὐτοσχεδιάζειν),[3] the 'literary' speech must be carefully composed so as to give the effect of rhythm and harmony (τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν).[2] It is not difficult to trace the framework of an Isocratean speech, and so far his work is original; one can also distinguish the ἰδέαι superimposed on this framework, the stock themes, etc., common to all speakers and writers who followed the conventions of oratory. The principles laid down by Socrates in the *Phaedrus* for the composition of λόγοι resemble those advocated by Isocrates. One must start by deciding the scope of one's speech (237 C). Every speech should be like a living creature with a body, head, and feet; it must have a beginning, a middle, and an end, fitting in with each other and the speech as a whole (264 C). It is fruitless to trace here, as many have done, the influence of Plato on Isocrates or vice versa. It is much more likely that both reflect the methods of the rhetorical schools described above.

The 'literary' speeches of Thucydides serve a very different purpose from those of Isocrates, but they also were largely based on the genuine demegoric speech and appear to have been composed on similar principles. The framework on which he built up the speech was ἡ ξυμπᾶσα γνώμη τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων,[4] the general sense of what had actually been said by his speakers. In expanding this framework into the finished speech he made extensive use of the communal ἰδέαι, as comparison with any other rhetorical writer of the period will show.[5]

It is impossible to say exactly when it became customary to make written preparation for political speaking. The change was probably gradual. Demosthenes' public orations are a treasured literary inheritance; but in his own day he appears to have suffered severely from the prejudice against written speeches of which Isocrates complains. He was thought to be hard-working rather than talented.[6] His speeches lacked the spontaneity of the extempore orator; 'they smelt of lamp-wicks'.[7] Plutarch quotes a saying of Aesion, a contemporary of Demosthenes, which implies that Demosthenes' speeches, unlike those of earlier orators, had to be *read* to be appreciated. Demosthenes defended his laboured preparation; it was, he says, a mark of respect for the people.[8] However, even Demosthenes' speeches appear to have been partly improvised,[9] as he himself is alleged to have said; οὔτε γράψας οὔτ' ἄγραφα κομιδῇ λέγειν ὡμολόγει.[8] This improvisation would doubtless have been more apparent in the speeches actually delivered than it is in our literary versions, which must have been specially revised and edited for publication.

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[1] Isocr. *Ep.* 6. 8.

[2] *Contra Soph.* 16.

[3] Alcid. *De Soph.* 33.

[4] Thuc. I. 22. I.

[5] I have discussed the composition of Thucydidean speeches more fully in *C.Q.* xlii, 1948, pp. 76–81.

[6] Plut. *Dem.* 8. 2.

[7] Ibid. 3.

[8] Ibid. 4.

[9] I agree with the general conclusions of a recent article by A. P. Dorjahn, 'On Demosthenes' Ability to Speak Extemporaneously', *T.A.Ph.A.* lxxviii (1947), pp. 69–76.

INTERPRETATIONES PROPERTIANAE. II

1. 4. 11 ff. haec sed forma mei pars est extrema furoris:
sunt maiora quibus, Basse, perire iuuat,
ingenuus color et multis decus artibus et quae
gaudia sub tacita dicere ueste libet.

11 extrema *O*, postrema *Heinsius* 13 color *O*, pudor *Ayrmann*, lepor *Waardenburgh*, calor *Jacob*, ingenium celere *Richards* 14 dicere *O*, ducere *Itali, edd. prr.*, discere *Heinsius* ueste *O*, teste *Doruillius*, mente *Markland*; sub tecta . . . ueste *Burmann*, ueste sub iniecta (*uel* superiecta) *Heinsius ad Ou. Am. 1. 4. 48* libet *O*, licet *Liuineius*

THE commentators for the most part observe a religious silence on *pars extrema*; yet there is a difficulty, as the meaning required 'the least important part', or 'the merest fringe', is hardly justified by usage.[1] The words should mean 'the last part' (cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2. 1. 36. 92 'in codicis extrema cera', 2. 2. 78. 91 'extremam partem nominis', *Caec.* 22 'fundi extremam partem', *ad Att.* 6. 1. 20 'in extrema parte epistulae', Ovid *Met.* 2. 665 'pars extrema querelae'), or 'the last stages' (Sall. *Jug.* 3. 3 'extrema dementia'): neither sense suits the passage.

As Cynthia's beauty is an external manifestation, while her character and accomplishments are inward qualities, I suggest *pars . . . externa*, a simple correction; the corruption between these words is common, especially when the compendious forms are used. *Externus* is frequently opposed to *interior* (e.g. Cic. *N.D.* 2. 10. 26, *Acad.* 2. 24). 13 then describes the *interior pars furoris*, 14 the *intima pars*.

We are required in any case to find in *ingenuus color* a reference to character, not to physical beauty. This is not so difficult as the crowd of emendations might suggest.[2]

The editors seem agreed on the rendering 'natural colour', which is not what we need. I would prefer 'ladylike blush', for the words are not far removed from Horace, *Epod.* 17. 21 'fugit iuuentas et uerecundus color'; cf. Ov. *Met.* 1. 484 'pulchra uerecundo subfuderat ora rubore' (of the gentle maiden Daphne), *Am.* 1. 14. 52 'protegit ingenuas picta rubore genas', *Her.* 19. 6 'suspicor ingenuas erubuisse genas', Catull. 61. 79 'tardet ingenuus pudor', Juv. 11. 154 and Duff ad loc., and for the general sense Ov. *Rem. Am.* 713, where *facies* is contrasted with *mores* and *artes*, Stat. *Silv.* 2. 1. 34 ff., where *forma* is contrasted with *modestia* and *pudor*. Similar are Cic. *Or.* 2. 59. 242 'praestet idem ingenuitatem et ruborem suum, uerborum turpitudine et rerum obscenitate uitanda' and Petron. *frg.* 47. 7 f. (Buecheler) 'una est nobilitas argumentumque coloris ingenui, timidas non habuisse manus'.[3]

It is high time that the intruder *ducere* (14) was ejected from the text. It is a facile, not to say stupid, Renaissance correction, against which the unanimous testimony of the manuscripts in reading *dicere* weighs powerfully. Only Lachmann, Paley, and Butler retain *dicere*, mostly for the wrong reasons—not but what Lachmann and

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[1] The difficulty is well seen in the notes of Kuinoel (who quotes as parallels the inapposite 'ecquis in extremo restat amore locus', Prop. 1. 11. 6, and 'lucernae quoque umore defectae tenue et extremum lumen spargebant', Petron. 22. 3) and Gebhart, who renders 'haec forma me ad extremum, ultimum, omnium grauissimum, furorem redegit'.

[2] Why has nobody filled up the list by suggesting *nitor*? I present the parallels to anybody who would like to have them: Ter. *Eun.* 242, Hor. *Od.* 1. 19. 5, Cic. *Cael.* 31 *fin.*, Stat. *Silv.* 3. 3. 149.

[3] Enk's note on *ingenuus color* is misleading. His citation of [Ov.] *Ep. Sapph.* 31–50 is not in point, for Sappho there apologizes for her *color*, or swarthy complexion, and claims that her other qualities compensate for this single flaw.

Paley saw some of the truth. L. says 'gaudia, quamuis oculis testibus solent expeti, tamen hic poeta uerecundiae causa tectioribus uerbis "gaudia sub tacita ueste" malit dicere', and Paley follows him in rendering 'to speak of with reserve', but without quoting any authority for such a meaning.

Butler takes *ueste* as (i) 'the coverlet that tells no tales' (but his supporting quotations all refer to the *lamp*), or (ii) 'Cynthia's garments'. His second view is rightly rejected by B.–B. and Enk, who read *ducere*. These last also, rather curiously, take *s.t.u.* as an adjectival phrase with *gaudia*.[1] There is no reason why it should not be taken with the verb, and it is in fact better so.

Better parallels for *s.t.u.* than those quoted by modern editors are Ov. *Am.* 1. 4. 48 (Passerat) 'ueste sub iniecta dulce peregit opus', *Anth. Pal.* 5. 169. 3 (Dousa f.) *ἥδιον δ' ὁπόταν κρύψῃ μία τοὺς φιλέοντας χλαῖνα* and Lucian, *Alex.* 39 (245) *καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τοῦ ὀλεθρίου ἐκείνου φιλήματά τε ἐγένετο καὶ περιπλοκαί· εἰ δὲ μὴ πολλαὶ ἦσαν αἱ δᾶδες, τάχ' ἄν τι τῶν ὑπὸ κόλπου ἐπράττετο.*

The proper meaning of the pentameter can be elicited from a curious perverseness in Enk's note: he had the truth before his eyes, but failed to see it—'sed tum rogaueris, cuinam gaudia dicere libebat, nam nemo praeter Cynthiam et poetam adest, cui poeta gaudia sub tacita stragula narrare possit'. Exactly so: Propertius does not intend to tell anybody of Cynthia's most intimate charms—certainly not Bassus. These are secrets to be imparted only in the course of loving conversation in the bed (cf. 2. 15. 3 f. 'quam multa apposita narramus uerba lucerna, quantaque sublato lumine rixa fuit'). All that is needed to obtain this sense is to realize that *s.t.u.* means *non nisi s.t.u.*, 'only beneath the discreet *lacerna*', a point easily made by the inflection of the voice.

Propertius' motives for his secretiveness are not only a form of gallantry, but also an affected modesty which he sometimes displays in speaking of such matters (cf. 1. 13. 18 'et quae deinde meus celat, amice, pudor'), and—selfishness; cf. 2. 25. 30 and Plaut. *Epid.* 651 'quod boni est, id tacitus taceas tute tecum et gaudeas'.

The line thus means 'and joys which I mention only in circumstances of the greatest intimacy with my lady—not, Sir (with an apologetic and knowing smile), to you. Those charms of hers you will never know'.

3. 7. 47 ff. non tulit haec Paetus, stridorem audire procellae
et duro teneras laedere fune manus,
sed Chio thalamo aut Oricia terebintho
effultum pluma uersicolore caput.

47 haec *N*, hunc *DVL*, hoc *F*, hic *codd. dett.* huic pectus *Scaliger*, non tulerit Paetus *Heinsius in marg. Ald. suae*, non fuit huic melius *Ast*, non fuit huic pectus *Jacobs*, non tulit huc Paetum *Henry* (huc *iam Liuineius*). *lacunam post u. 48 indicauit Vulpius* 49 Chio *O*, thyio *Santen* 50 et fultum (= effultum) *O*, effultus *Pucci*, effultum *Hertzberg*, est fultum *Palmer* uersicolore *O*, molle cubare *Ast*.

The early history of the criticism of this passage is one of counsels of despair, to which belong Vulpius' lacuna after 48, Ast's attempt to see an infinitive in *uersicolore*, and Markland's note in the margin of his Aldine 'neque sensus neque constructio his uerbis inest'. The position today is not a great deal better, as both construction and sense have caused much vexation, without much general agreement on either.

Hertzberg and Paley were content with a paraphrase, 'if Paetus had not gone to sea, he would not have had to endure such dangers and labours, but could have lived in luxury', leaving the construction to look after itself. Progress was made by Gildersleeve (*AJPh.* iv. 210), who pointed out that *non tulit* is οὐκ ἔτλη, *non is fuit qui ferret*, from which we get the contrast *sed is fuit qui mallet*, and in this he is followed by Postgate, Butler, and Butler–Barber. Tremenheere improved on this advance by taking *tulit* with both clauses, = *non erat is qui ferret* in the first place and as = *praetulit* in the second.

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[1] I cannot understand B.–B.'s citation of 2. 17. 5 'ad flumina sorte' as a parallel. Surely *ad flumina* is to be taken with *moueare*.

From Gildersleeve to Butler–Barber, the meaning has been taken to be that Paetus was the sort of man to prefer luxury, even if he could not have it; and all follow Gildersleeve in taking the passage as ideal, claiming that Paetus was poor; yet there is no evidence in the poem for Paetus' poverty: l. 7 merely means that he was a business man or merchant, and *pauper* (46) is part of the hypothetical proposition (*uiueret*) in the previous line.

The latest view is that of Henry (in *Mélanges offerts à J. Marouzeau*, Paris, 1948). Reading *huc Paetum*, he takes *audire* and *caput* as the subjects of *tulit*, and explains this to mean that it was not a desire for seafaring that took Paetus a-sailing, but the wish for the wherewithal to obtain a luxurious life. This, I feel, strains the Latin severely, while the idiom alleged, 'caput effultum huc tulit Paetum', seems hardly tolerable.[1]

It is, however, possible to extract from the passage a meaning much more powerful than the mawkish sentiment that Paetus was some delicate plant which could grow only in luxurious surroundings, and at the same time to obtain a more tolerable construction.

In 49 Propertius is almost speaking Greek; Gildersleeve (*AJPh.*, loc. cit.) saw that *thalamo* too has a Greek meaning, 'stateroom' or 'cabin', which Postgate approved (*Sel. El.*, p. 246) and illustrated from Athenaeus, 5. 207 c, who tells us that the ship which Archimedes built for Hiero θαλάμους τρεῖς εἶχε τρικλίνους and (207 e) τοὺς τοίχους εἶχε καὶ τὴν ὀροφὴν κυπαρίττου, τὰς δὲ θύρας ἐλέφαντος καὶ θύου.[2]

Subsequent commentators, strange to relate, have overlooked this part of Gildersleeve's note; he himself failed to use it as fully as he might have done. Is it not plain that ll. 47–8 describe conditions before the mast, or what we today might call 'steerage' travel, while ll. 49–50 describe the 'first-class' saloon?

Only a very slight zeugmatic use of *tulit* is needed to obtain excellent sense: in the first couplet it means *non is fuit qui ferret*, and in the second, 'he carried his head propped on cushions of peacock-feathers'. There is no contrast of preference; Propertius states, firstly, what Paetus disliked doing, secondly, what he in fact did.[1]

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[1] Henry does not, unfortunately, support his view by reference to any other passages, in Propertius or elsewhere.

[2] This, of course, was an exceptional vessel; but there were other luxury-ships of more normal size. Cf. Ath. 5. 204 d κατεσκεύασεν δ' ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ καὶ ποτάμιον πλοῖον, τὴν θαλαμηγὸν ('cabin-carrier', cf. Strabo 17. 1. 5) καλουμένην, which had κοιτῶνες (one of which had five berths), and was decorated with ivory and expensive woods. The doors were made ἀπὸ κέδρου σχιστῆς καὶ κυπαρίττου Μιλησίας, αἱ δὲ τῆς περιστάσεως θύραι . . . θυίναις κατεκόλλητο σανίσιν, ἐλεφαντίνους ἔχουσαι τοὺς κόσμους. According to Appian, *prooem.* 10, the Egyptians had, in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, luxury-warships for the use of high-ranking officials: θαλαμηγὰ χρυσόπρυμνα καὶ χρυσέμβολα ἐς πολέμου πομπήν, οἷς αὐτοὶ διαπλέοντες ἐπέβαινον οἱ βασιλῆες. See also the description of the well-appointed Egyptian merchantman *Isis* in Lucian's *Πλοῖον*. Even on smaller vessels temporary conversions could be rigged up for passengers who wished to travel in comfort: Alciphron (1. 15) tells us of coverings spread on the deck of a small vessel, with an improvised awning spread above, to suit a languid Athenian dandy, who οὐκ ἀνεχόμενος τῶν ξύλων τῆς ἁλιάδος wished to travel ἐπί τε ταπήτων τινων ξενικῶν καὶ ἐφεστρίδων κατακλιθείς· οὐ γὰρ οἷός τε ἔφασκεν εἶναι κεῖσθαι ὡς οἱ λοιποὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων. The evidence seems to show that luxury-travel was supplied in considerable part by Egyptian shipping-lines; there is nothing improbable in supposing that Paetus travelled to Alexandria on an Egyptian vessel. Nor is it unlikely that many passengers, lacking means, travelled for a nominal fare, on an undertaking to 'work their passage'. We might instance the beautiful young Adeimantus, who, after seeing the *Isis* in the Piraeus, acquired high-flown ideas, and was rebuked thus (Lucian *Nav.* 15): καίτοι πρῶτον καὶ ἐς Αἴγιναν σκαφιδίῳ πάντες ἅμα οἱ φίλοι τεττάρων ἕκαστος ὀβολῶν διεπλεύσαμεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐδυσχέραινες ἡμᾶς συμπλέοντας· νῦν δ' ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ συνεμβησόμεθά σοι, καὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν προεισελθὼν ἀφαιρεῖς.

The meaning of the passage then is that, even though Paetus travelled in luxury, he was drowned as surely as if he had been an ordinary seaman before the mast. The thought is a near relative of Lucretius 3. 1024–44, especially of 1034 f., 'Scipiadas, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror, ossa dedit terrae proinde ut famul infimus esset'.

If this be accepted, together with my view on *longas manus* (see below), all trace of sentimentality, to which editors have rightly objected, disappears from the elegy.

3. 7. 51 ff. huic fluctus uiuo radicitus abstulit ungues,
et miser inuitam traxit hiatus aquam;
hunc paruo uidit ferri nox improba ligno:
Paetus ut occideret, tot coiere mala.
flens tamen extremis dedit haec mandata querelis,
cum moribunda niger clauderet ora liquor.

As the lines stand, they assign no reason why the wave should have pulled Paetus' nails out by the roots. Postgate admits that decomposition of the nails is impossible during lifetime; Hertzberg, Butler, and Butler–Barber leave the passage severely alone; the antithesis of *tamen* is vague almost to vanishing-point, as Tremenheere noted (but his cure, a transposition of the couplet to follow 10, is almost worse than the disease), and its position obscures *tot coiere mala*. Last, but not least, the events are narrated in the wrong order.

Transpose 51–2 to follow 54, and all is clear at once. Paetus was clinging desperately to a piece of driftwood or to a life-saving raft. A wave broke his hold, and its force ripped out his fingernails—by no means an impossible consequence (cf. Hom. *Od.* 5. 424–35).[2] What would normally have happened as his corpse decomposed took place during his life.

Tamen now makes a good point: so far as his involuntary gulps of sea-water allowed, Paetus uttered his appeal to the gods of the sea.

Lastly, *tot coiere mala* comes out into the open, and shows clearly the chain of circumstances which caused Paetus' death. He travelled in a state-room, and thus had the right to expect greater safety.[3] He was washed overboard, but found a piece of wood to cling to; he might yet have reached land, but a wave cheated him of this; even so, he might have been washed ashore while breath was still in him; but he was doomed to failure even in this hope.[4]

This seems to be almost the only transposition which has not been suggested in this elegy.[5] Fortunately it can easily be explained as due to *homoearchon* (*hunc* . . . *huic*). Even if a scribe had appended the usual marginal transposition-marks, *b–a*, their loss could not be other than a matter of time.

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[1] The zeugma will disappear entirely if we take *tulit* as 'he obtained', 'he got for his money': 'what he obtained (sc. for his fare) was not steerage, but first-class accommodation'.

[2] Perhaps Paetus, being a superstitious fellow (see on *longas manus* below), let his nails grow during the voyage, as a prophylactic against shipwreck. To cut the nails or the hair during a voyage was to court disaster; cf. Petron. 105 'audio non licere cuiquam mortalium in naue neque ungues neque capillos deponere, nisi cum pelago uentus irascitur' (quoted by Scaliger, ad loc.), and 107, where this belief is called 'omen et lex nauigantium'. The storm now cuts them for him—to the quick: a grim jest.

[3] An illogical expectation, no doubt; but even today saloon passengers have a subconscious feeling that they may be safer in case of accident than the steerage, possibly because they are less crowded.

[4] For a different view see Paley ad loc.

[5] Except that Fischer has suggested the interchange of the two hexameters, but with a far different intent.

3. 7. 59 f. quo rapitis miseros primae lanuginis annos?
attulimus longas in freta uestra manus.

60 longas *O*, castas *uel* puras *Francius*, lotas *Lipsius*, sanctas *Wassenbergh*, nocuas . . . manus? *Housman*, sontes . . . manus? *Postgate*, nullas *Phillimore* manus *O*, comas *Oudendorp*, *Eldik*, *Alton*, moras *Henry*. *locum damnauit Markland.*

The fashion today is to accept *longas*, and to understand it as referring to physical beauty. The meaning is not satisfactory, nor does any emendation proposed possess the touch of inevitability needed to mark it as true. A different defence was propounded by C. M. Mulvany (*C.R.* v. 433): 'Perhaps *longas manus* are hands with long lines on the palms—a sign of longevity, acc. to Aristotle, v. Pliny *N.H.* 11. 114 [= Arist. *frg.* 286 Rose: cf. Aristoph. *de anim.* p. 37, 17] and Bonitz, *Index* s.v. *χείρ* 5. The couplet means "Why did (*sic*) you destroy me in my youth? I was destined to have a long life." '

Unfortunately *longas manus* cannot, by any stretch of imagination, mean *manus incisuras longas habentes*; but if Mulvany had looked at the preceding paragraph in Pliny, he would, I think, have found the answer. The passage is worth quoting: 'miror equidem Aristotelem non modo credidisse praescita uitae esse aliqua in corporibus ipsis, uerum etiam prodidisse. quae quamquam uana existimo nec sine cunctatione proferenda, ne in se quisque ea auguria anxie quaerat, attingam tamen quae tantus uir in doctrina non spreuit. igitur uitae breuis signa ponit raros dentes, praelongos digitos,[1] plumbeum colorem pluresque in manu incisuras nec perpetuas. contra longae esse uitae incuruos umeris et in manu unam aut duas incisuras longas habentes et plures quam xxxii dentes, auribus amplis. nec uniuersa haec, ut arbitror, sed singula obseruat, friuola ut reor et uulgo tantum narrata' (§§ 273–4).

Long hands are, presumably, hands with long fingers (Prop. 2. 2. 5), and therefore the mark of a short life. At 60, Paetus notices the *augurium* for the first time. Never has he seen his hands in this light before. After the imploring appeal of 57–9, the pentameter is a sudden cry of horror at the realization of the fate in store for him. 'No need to ask—my hands! long fingers—early death! Death *here*, and *now*!' In the next couplet his terror rises to a crescendo, ending with a reconciliation to the inevitable (63–4), as he gives instructions for the disposal of his corpse.

To make the pointing of the lines clear we should, I believe, read *at tulimus* (*at* = *at enim*), 'your answer will be —' whereby he forestalls the reply which the *di maris Aegaei* would have given—'nempe in freta nostra te rapimus: nonne uides, longas manus te huc tulisse?'

4. 8. 88. respondi et toto soluimus arma toro.

despondi *Guyet*, despondi et tuto *Pucci*, in sponda et toto *Pocchus*, respondere nouo protinus *Burmann P.*, et spondi et *Heinsius*, et spondis *Markland*, descendi *Ferrari*, et sponda *Broekhuyzen*, lis posita *Baehrens*, res pacta *Mueller*, respiro *Richmond*, escendi *Postgate*, et spondae iniecto *Hertzberg*.

Quae rerum turba! No editor has been able to see a meaning in *respondi*, with the honourable exception of Passerat, who, in his note *an respondi, satisfeci?*, pointed a way which none has followed, because of the (alleged) lack of parallels. But compare Plautus, *Mil.* 962–3 'uah, egone ut ad te ab libertina esse auderem internuntius, qui ingenuis satis responsare nequeas quae cupiunt tui?' There is a pun here; in addition to the literal use of *responsare*, we find the sense 'match the mood of' (*in mal. part.*), which suits our passage admirably. Almost without doubt, the same meaning can be found at Petronius 134 'ac me iterum in cellam sacerdotis nihil recusantem perduxit impulitque super lectum et harundinem ab ostio rapuit iterumque nihil respondentem mulcauit'—in view, that is, of the whole context, q.v.

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[1] According to Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 807^{b}9, *χεῖρες λεπταὶ καὶ μακραί* are *inter alia* the mark of the coward; but Propertius says nothing of *λεπτότης*, nor is such a meaning in point here.

Not too distantly related are Cic. *ad Fam.* 15. 21. 4 'amori amore respondere', Suet. *Caes.* 46 (quoted by Passerat) 'uillam . . . quia non tota ad animum ei responderat, totam diruisse', Sen. *Epp.* 47 *fin.*, 'quicquid non ex uoluptate respondit, iram prouocat', and Columella 3. 2. *med.* 'gemella uitis maior, nisi praepingui solo, non respondet'. For the absolute use of the word, as here, cf. Fronto, *Aqu.* 10 'dies quo primum aqua uirgo responderit', Petron. 47 'multis iam diebus uenter mihi non respondit', and Stat. *Ach.* 2. 154 'respondentia temptant tympana'.

Soluimus arma requires a note; some editors condemn it as un-Latin, e.g. Broekhuyzen; others, like Butler–Barber, allow it to tell only half its story 'we made peace'. Passerat again saw the truth, and perceived a deliberate ambiguity: 'obscoene, arma quibus pugnatur in certamine nocturno, et quae non prohibentur lege Cornelia . . ., an . . ., pugnam et rixam omnem diremimus?'. As the phrase has no parallel, he was unable to explain how the ambiguity came about. The answer is simple: that Propertius coined the phrase from analogy. It may be understood (i) as a modification of 'soluere bellum', cf. Stat. *Ach.* 2. 337 'certamina soluere', Manil. 3. 115 'iurgia soluere', Quint. 7. 1. 38 'contradictiones soluere', and Prop. 4. 4. 59 'commissas acies ego possum soluere'; 'we composed our differences'; or (ii) as formed on the lines of Ov. *Met.* 5. 380 'pharetram soluere' and Tac. *Hist.* 3. 68 'pugionem exsoluere': 'we unsheathed our weapons', *scil.* 'Veneris, Cupidinis, arma'. Propertius is clearly thinking of the *foedera concubitus*, for which see Ovid, *A.A.* 2. 459–64 'oscula da flenti, Veneris da gaudia flenti, pax erit! hoc uno soluitur ira modo. cum bene saeuierit, cum certa uidebitur hostis, tum pete concubitus foedera: mitis erit. illic depositis habitat Concordia telis, illo (crede mihi) Gratia nata locost', and Petronius 109 'in haec uerba foederibus compositis arma deponimus, et ne residua in animis etiam post iusiurandum ira remaneret, praeterita aboleri osculis placet' (this last being a parallel rather for the phraseology than the idea).

As the *certamen Veneris* and the *foedus concubitus* are the same act, it is proper that the ambiguity should lie in the verb, and Propertius must be complimented for having found a neat *color* for an old idea, *amantium irae amoris integratiost.*

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Addendum: When I had completed my note on 3. 7. 59 f., there came into my possession a copy of Paley's edition of Propertius, which had belonged to the late Josiah Gilbart Smyly, of Trinity College, Dublin. In this I found a manuscript note signed with his monogram, which shows that he had anticipated my view. I transcribe his words: 'Mulv. explains of long lines on the palm, a sign of longevity: but from Pliny 11. 114 . . . it seems more probable that Prop. means that the prophecy of the long fingers was only too true'. J. G. S.

I am glad to take this opportunity, offered to me by the merest chance, of placing this view in its proper historical setting and of referring it to its rightful discoverer. W. R. S.

NOTES ON TWO PASSAGES OF STRABO

I

11. 7. 4

THERE are some passages in Strabo where corruption of the text is not obvious at first reading, because the existing text offers no grammatical difficulty and can even be translated in such a way as to satisfy the less wary reader. One is driven to conclude that emendation is necessary only when one realizes that Strabo's argument demands something different from that which the manuscripts offer. There is an interesting example of such a passage in 11. 7. 4. Strabo is discussing Hyrcania and the Caspian Sea, which he believes to be a gulf of the Northern Ocean, and he thinks it worth while to mention some of the false notions which became current at the time of Alexander's expedition. The flatterers of Alexander (or his publicity officers, as they might now be called) wished to represent him as conquering all Asia; they could not do this unless they made him reach the left bank of the River Tanais, the accepted boundary between Europe and Asia, which flowed into the Palus Maeotis. As Alexander never reached the Tanais (Don) but turned back at the Jaxartes (Syr Daria), there remained, as Strabo puts it, a considerable area of Asia between the Tanais and the Caspian 'Gulf' which Macedonian rule never touched; and in order to keep up the fiction that he conquered all Asia, it was decided to eliminate this inconvenient area from the map by claiming that the Jaxartes *was* the Tanais. The Jaxartes flows into the Sea of Aral and there is no reason to suppose it ever flowed into any other sea;[1] but Strabo, who knows nothing of the Sea of Aral, presumes that it empties into the Caspian; the Jaxartes accordingly could be identified with the Tanais only on the assumption that the Caspian *was* the Maeotis. First of all, therefore, it had to be shown by the 'flatterers' that the Caspian was an inland sea (as Herodotus had said long ago), because if it were a gulf it would cut off the Jaxartes from the Maeotis; and the next step was to prove that the Caspian and the Maeotis were one and the same.

Up to this point Strabo's text gives no trouble:

> *προσεδοξάσθη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς θαλάττης ταύτης πολλὰ ψευδῆ διὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου φιλοτιμίαν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὡμολόγητο ἐκ πάντων ὅτι διείργει τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Εὐρώπης ὁ Τάναϊς ποταμός, τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τοῦ Τανάϊδος, πολὺ μέρος τῆς Ἀσίας ὄν, οὐχ ὑπέπιπτε τοῖς Μακεδόσι, στρατηγεῖν δ' ἔγνωστο, ὥστε τῇ φήμῃ γε κἀκείνων δόξαι τῶν μερῶν κρατεῖν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον· εἰς ἓν οὖν συνῆγον τήν τε Μαιῶτιν λίμνην τὴν δεχομένην τὸν Τάναϊν καὶ τὴν Κασπίαν θάλατταν, λίμνην καὶ ταύτην καλοῦντες καὶ συντετρῆσθαι φάσκοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἀμφοτέρας, ἑκατέραν δὲ εἶναι μέρος τῆς ἑτέρας.*

Strabo in this chapter is discussing the Caspian Sea, not the river system of Asia; hence he does not at first explain the whole 'stratagem' (that is, the identification of the Jaxartes with the Tanais) but only the first two steps in the argument: the attempts to prove that the Caspian is a lake and that it is the same as the Maeotis: 'They combined the Maeotis and the Caspian, calling the Caspian also a lake and saying that the two were somehow connected and that each was a part of the other'. One must assume that Strabo has several writers in mind (*προσεδοξάσθη . . . πολλὰ ψευδῆ*),[2] not all of whom subscribed to the entire 'stratagem'. If the Caspian is thought to be a lake 'connected with the Maeotis' (perhaps 'connected by an underground passage', as the Loeb translator renders *συντετρῆσθαι*), there are still two distinct parts (*ἑκατέραν δὲ εἶναι μέρος τῆς ἑτέρας*); and so long as the two parts, Caspian and Maeotis, are distinct and the Jaxartes is thought to flow into the Caspian part, there is no case for identifying the Jaxartes with the Tanais; the only advantage for Alexander is that he is no longer separated from the Maeotis by a gulf of the ocean. But, as Strabo's next sentence shows, Polycleitus, who identified the Tanais with the Jaxartes, positively identified the two seas, saying the Caspian was *οὐχ ἑτέρα τῆς Μαιώτιδος*:

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[1] Cf., e.g., Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, ii, p. 9: 'the Syr could never have entered our Caspian unless it ran uphill'.

[2] Cf. later in the chapter *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συγκρούειν Ἐρατοσθένης πειρᾶται.*

> *Πολύκλειτος δὲ καὶ πίστεις προσφέρεται περὶ τοῦ λίμνην εἶναι τὴν θάλατταν ταύτην*
> *(ὄφεις τε γὰρ ἐκτρέφειν καὶ ὑπόγλυκυ εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ), ὅτι δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τῆς Μαιώτιδός*
> *ἐστι, τεκμαιρόμενος ἐκ τοῦ τὸν Τάναϊν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμβάλλειν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρῶν*
> *τῶν Ἰνδικῶν, ἐξ ὧν ὅ τε Ὦχος καὶ ὁ Ὦξος καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους, φέρεται καὶ ὁ Ἰαξάρτης*
> 5 *ἐκδίδωσί τε ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις εἰς τὸ Κάσπιον πέλαγος, πάντων ἀρκτικώτατος· τοῦτον*
> *οὖν ὠνόμασαν Τάναϊν. καὶ προσέθεσαν καὶ τούτῳ πίστιν, ὡς εἴη Τάναϊς, ὃν εἴρηκεν ὁ*
> *Πολύκλειτος· τὴν γὰρ περαίαν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τούτου φέρειν ἐλάτην καὶ οἰστοῖς ἐλατίνοις*
> *χρῆσθαι τοὺς ταύτῃ Σκύθας, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τεκμήριον τοῦ τὴν χώραν τὴν πέραν τῆς*
> *Εὐρώπης εἶναι, μὴ τῆς Ἀσίας· τὴν γὰρ Ἀσίαν τὴν ἄνω καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἕω μὴ φύειν ἐλάτην.*
> 10 *Ἐρατοσθένης δέ φησι καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰνδικῇ φύεσθαι ἐλάτην καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ναυπηγήσασθαι*
> *τὸν στόλον Ἀλέξανδρον· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συγκρούειν Ἐρατοσθένης πειρᾶται,*
> *ἡμῖν δ' ἀποχρώντως εἰρήσθω περὶ αὐτῶν.*[1]

Polycleitus, one of the minor historians of Alexander's expedition,[2] is quoted by Strabo on several other occasions. In 16. 1. 13 he is ridiculed for the 'manifestly absurd' argument by which he sought to prove that the Euphrates was not subject to floods; we need not, therefore, expect a sympathetic statement of Polycleitus' theory here, but we shall expect Strabo to express himself logically. The arguments which are supposed to prove that the Caspian is a lake are reported clearly enough—'snakes are found in it and the water is not really salt';[3] then the trouble begins: 'He also offers arguments to show that the Caspian is none other than the Maeotis, drawing this inference from the fact that the Tanais flows into it.'

Grammatically this seems clear enough, though there may be room for difference of opinion about the correct punctuation;[4] but the trouble is that the text offers us the converse of what Polycleitus must have said if he subscribed to the 'stratagem'. The argument as required by the stratagem was:

(1) The Jaxartes flows into the Caspian, the Tanais into the Maeotis.
(2) I believe the Caspian is a lake and none other than the Maeotis.
(3) Therefore I infer that the Jaxartes *is* the Tanais.

The text of Strabo, on the other hand, makes him say: 'The Jaxartes *is* the Tanais; therefore I infer that the Caspian, into which the Jaxartes flows, is none other than the Maeotis.' It should be noted that Strabo uses the word *τεκμαίρεσθαι*, which we should expect him to use not in reporting an inescapable conclusion from an unfounded assumption (as here), but for an uncertain inference from observation and argument (as in the argument required by the stratagem).[5]

How, then, are these difficulties to be overcome? Is the text at fault or should we suppose that Polycleitus' argument was muddled, that it did not conform to the demands of the stratagem, and that Strabo misunderstood it? This second alternative has been adopted by Tarn in working out his theory of the 'Caspian question' (*Alexander the Great*, ii, pp. 5–15). He believes that Polycleitus had no part in 'the lies told for the honour and glory of Alexander', and that his remarks were made not about the sea which *we* call the Caspian but about the Sea of Aral which *he* called the Caspian; and he thinks that Strabo, who did not know about the Sea of Aral, has therefore misunderstood him.

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[1] This is H. L. Jones's text in the Loeb edition, except for one change in punctuation. He puts a full stop after *ἀρκτικώτατος* and a comma after *Τάναϊν* (lines 5–6). I prefer to put a colon after *ἀρκτικώτατος* and make the *οὖν* clause part of the preceding sentence: the explanation which starts with *ἐκ γάρ* in line 3 is incomplete without it.

[2] For the fragments see F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griech. Historiker*, ii B, No. 128.

[3] These arguments appear again in Diod. 17. 75. 3 and Quint. Curt. 6. 4. 18.

[4] Some editors omit the comma after *ἐστί* and take the *ὅτι* clause as governed by *τεκμαιρόμενος*. Then the *δέ* is redundant, and so Gronovius read *τεκμαίρεται* instead of the participle.

[5] Cf. his use of *τεκμήριον* later in the paragraph, when he describes the argument of writers who supported the opinion of Polycleitus: (1) They observed that fir-trees grew beyond the Jaxartes; (2) They believed that fir did not grow in the interior of Asia; (3) They therefore inferred that beyond the Jaxartes was European soil.

Greek writers both before and after Alexander's time show no knowledge of the Sea of Aral; Tarn believes, however, that Alexander had heard of it from Aristotle, who knew of its existence and called it *ἡ Κασπία θάλαττα* as opposed to *ἡ Ὑρκανία θάλαττα* which was his name for our Caspian; this is his interpretation of a puzzling passage in the *Meteorologica*.[1] He also thinks that Alexander and the Greeks with him, though they never reached the Sea of Aral, verified its existence when they interviewed Pharasmanes, king of the Chorasmians, who came to visit Alexander's headquarters at Bactra.[2] Tarn's theory cannot be discussed in its entirety here, though it may be said that there are serious weaknesses in the argument;[3] the immediate question which concerns us is whether Strabo's text should be interpreted on the assumption that Polycleitus shared this knowledge of the Sea of Aral—that, as Tarn says, he 'knew the truth' but 'with him true knowledge died' (p. 10).

According to Tarn's view the confusion or identification of the Jaxartes with the Tanais arose because Pharasmanes and his people gave the name Tanais to the lower Jaxartes and he came to Alexander 'with the information that a great river which he called Tanais flowed into the Aral' (p. 9); Polycleitus recorded this, calling the Sea of Aral 'the Caspian Sea'; and: 'Then Polycleitus ceased recording and began to reason with unhappy results. He argued that if the Caspian were a lake of nearly sweet water and a river called Tanais ran into it, it could not be other than the Maeotis (Sea of Azov) into which ran a river called Tanais (the Don). It *was* very confusing; but whether he actually meant to identify the two cannot be said.'

To this we must reply that Strabo was not the only writer who thought that Polycleitus did identify the two rivers; he tells us that others had offered arguments to show 'that the river which Polycleitus called the Tanais *was* the Tanais',[4] trying to prove that the right bank of the river was European soil. Tarn insists, however, that Polycleitus was not one of the 'flatterers' of Alexander and that Strabo distinguishes him from them by saying 'But Polycleitus . . .' (Πολύκλειτος δὲ καὶ πίστεις προσφέρεται). This argument will not hold, because the καί which follows the δέ seems to prove exactly the opposite. Strabo, who has scant respect for the authors he is quoting in this paragraph, must mean: 'But Polycleitus is not content with mere assertions; he actually (καί) tries to back up his lies with arguments.' Strabo certainly knew more about Polycleitus than we can ever hope to know; he clearly thought him dishonest; he certainly thought Polycleitus identified the two rivers with the intention of making the Jaxartes the boundary between Europe and Asia; and earlier writers had accepted the identification and offered arguments to support it.

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[1] 2. 1. 10 *ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ πλείους εἰσὶ θάλατται πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὐ συμμιγνύουσαι κατ' οὐθένα τόπον, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐρυθρὰ φαίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν κοινωνοῦσα πρὸς τὴν ἔξω στηλῶν θάλατταν, ἡ δ' Ὑρκανία καὶ Κασπία κεχωρισμέναι τε ταύτης καὶ περιοικούμεναι κύκλῳ, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν ἐλάνθανον αἱ πηγαί, εἰ κατά τινα τόπον αὐτῶν ἦσαν.* It is true that Aristotle here seems to think of the Hyrcanian and the Caspian as separate seas; but this is not yet proof that he knew about the Sea of Aral. A note in the translation of E. W. Webster (*Works of Aristotle Translated*, ed. W. D. Ross, vol. iii) suggests either (1) Aristotle has misinterpreted earlier writers, thinking they meant different seas when they spoke of 'Hyrcanian' and 'Caspian', or (2) he thought of the two as different parts of the same sea, 'in the way in which the Aegean and Adriatic might be called distinct seas by a writer who knew they were one in a sense'.

[2] Arrian, *Anab.* 4. 15. 4.

[3] As corroboration of the Aristotle passage Tarn cites what he calls 'the Gazetteer'—i.e. the passage in Diod. 18. 5 giving a summary description of the Asiatic empire, in which both Caspian and Hyrcanian Seas appear (though not in the same sentence and not distinguished one from the other as in Aristotle); but this passage cannot be used as proof because Diodorus himself regards 'Caspian' and 'Hyrcanian' as alternative names for the same sea (17. 75. 3). Nor is this use of the terms as alternates merely post-Aristotelian; it is as old as Herodotus, who uses 'Caspian' for our Caspian (1. 203, where the context shows he cannot possibly mean any other sea), while Hecataeus called the same sea 'Hyrcanian' (F. 291, Jacoby = Athen. 2. 70A *Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἐν Ἀσίας περιηγήσει . . . λέγει οὕτως· περὶ τὴν Ὑρκανίην θάλασσαν καλεομένην οὔρεα ὑψηλὰ καὶ δασέα ὕλῃσιν*). Hence Tarn's remark (p. 5) that 'the name "Caspian" originally belonged to the Aral' is completely unwarranted.

[4] *προσέθεσαν καὶ τούτῳ πίστιν ὡς εἴη Τάναϊς ὃν εἴρηκεν ὁ Πολύκλειτος.* *ὡς* is Corais' correction of *ὥστ'*. Instead of simply eliminating the *tau* I suggest reading *ὥς γ'*. Meineke felt the need for a *γε* and inserted it after *προσέθεσαν*. It serves to indicate the scorn which Strabo feels for all

It should be realized, therefore, that Tarn is making five separate conjectures: (1) that Pharasmanes gave the name Tanais to the lower Jaxartes; (2) that he told Alexander of a river called Tanais which flowed into an inland sea; (3) that Polycleitus (presumably following Alexander's instructions) gave the name Caspian to this inland sea; (4) that Polycleitus offered a somewhat confused account suggesting the identity of this sea with the Maeotis; (5) that his argument was misunderstood by Strabo and other writers. Furthermore Tarn's interpretation breaks down completely if his theory about Aristotle's knowledge of the Caspian is wrong. Even if we accept all that he asks us to believe, Strabo's words still give only just tolerable sense. He follows the punctuation given in n. 4, p. 81, above, omitting the comma after ἐστί, putting a colon after ὕδωρ, and ignoring the redundant δέ, so that the meaning will be: 'Polycleitus offers proofs that the Caspian is a lake (the existence of snakes in it and the sweetish character of its water), also inferring that it is none other than the Maeotis from the fact that the Tanais flows into it.' It has to be assumed that Polycleitus reasoned as follows: 'The sea into which the Jaxartes flows is an inland sea; the Jaxartes is called Tanais by the natives; therefore I infer that the sea is the Maeotis.'

It is certainly not easy to accept all of Tarn's conjectures; it seems reasonable, therefore, to ask whether a simpler solution of our difficulties may be found by emending Strabo's text, particularly since even with Tarn's interpretation a minor change is desirable unless a redundant δέ is to be overlooked.

If the text as it stands does not correctly describe the inference made by Polycleitus, the explanatory sentence which follows must be examined carefully and one must ask what precisely it explains. It must be noted that this sentence includes the οὖν clause: τοῦτον οὖν ὠνόμασαν Τάναϊν, and that the sentence is similar in structure to the previous long sentence: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὡμολόγητο . . . τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ οὐχ ὑπέπιπτε . . . στρατηγεῖν δ' ἔγνωστο . . . εἰς ἓν οὖν συνῆγον. In fact, the statement τοῦτον οὖν ὠνόμασαν Τάναϊν is the heart of the explanation and in an idiomatic modern translation it should come first in the sentence: 'For they identified the Tanais with the Jaxartes, which rises in the same Indian mountains as the Ochus, the Oxus, and several other rivers and, like them, flows into the Caspian Sea, farthest north of them all.'

This sentence, then, explains what Polycleitus meant by saying that 'the Tanais flowed into it'. It tells us that when he and others like him say 'Tanais' they really mean 'Jaxartes'. One of the difficulties throughout this paragraph is that Strabo does not distinguish Polycleitus from other writers as clearly as we should like; in fact his transition from singular to plural subject (τεκμαιρόμενος . . . ὠνόμασαν) is rather disconcerting. But the distinction is important. The peculiarity of Polycleitus' procedure, as Strabo sees it, seems to be that he offered arguments for the identity of the two seas, but simply conjectured that the two rivers were identical; it remained for

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this fraudulent geography and also to emphasize the limited application of the πίστις—not in support of all Polycleitus' theory, but in support of his identification of the rivers.

other writers to offer arguments in support of his identification. A correct restoration of the text, therefore, should show Polycleitus *arguing* (with πίστεις) for the identity of the two seas and *inferring* (τεκμαιρόμενος) that the two rivers were the same because they emptied into the same sea. Strabo does not take time to show why the inference was made or whether it was plausible, just as he does not attempt to refute his πίστεις and does not even say what πίστεις he offered for identification of the two seas. Eratosthenes had argued the whole question at greater length, ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποχρώντως εἰρήσθω περὶ αὐτῶν.

If therefore Polycleitus is to infer something about the rivers, not to infer something from their behaviour, the words ἐκ τοῦ must be corrupt. It would be possible to delete them altogether or to read ἐκ τού⟨του⟩, but I prefer to read τεκμαιρόμενος ἐ⟨ξ ἄρ⟩κτου τὸν Τάναϊν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμβάλλειν: 'He also offers arguments to show that the Caspian is none other than the Maeotis, inferring that the "Tanais" flows into it from the north. He says "Tanais" because, like the others, he gives the name "Tanais" to the Jaxartes, which flows from the same Indian mountains as the Ochus and the Oxus and several other rivers and, like them, enters the Caspian, farthest to the north of them all.' If the identification of seas and rivers is to be carried out convincingly, it is certainly necessary to assume that the Tanais–Jaxartes flows into the northern portion of the Maeotis–Caspian and in a direction from north to south; it must therefore go a long way to the north, before it turns in a southerly direction; and (with the exception of such rivers as might flow into the Northern Ocean) it could then be considered the most northerly river in all Asia.

This emendation is offered, therefore, as providing a simpler solution of this passage than Tarn's elaborate theory.

II 15. 3. 9

Strabo's treatment of Persis and Susiana is largely based on accounts which he found in the historians of Alexander's expedition, as he shows by his frequent references to Nearchus, Onesicritus, and Polycleitus in the third chapter of Book 15. In 15. 3. 9 he says that all the treasures in Persis were concentrated by Alexander at Susa; but that he intended to make Babylon, not Susa, his capital, and treasures were stored there also. Then comes a sentence which is printed as follows in all modern editions:

> φασὶ δέ, χωρὶς τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν παρὰ ταῦτα μὴ ληφθέντων, αὐτὰ τὰ ἐν Σούσοις καὶ τὰ ἐν Περσίδι τέτταρας μυριάδας ταλάντων ἐξετασθῆναι· τινὲς δὲ καὶ πέντε λέγουσιν.

παρά in line 1 is Corais's conjecture for the manuscript reading περί. It is a simple change, and the sentence is then supposed to mean: 'They say that, apart from the treasures in Babylon and in the camp (which were not taken into account for this reckoning), the actual treasures at Susa and in Persis were valued at forty thousand talents; others indeed say fifty thousand.' This is hardly satisfactory Greek; the translators are obliged to ignore the τῶν before παρά, and even in Strabo's Greek λαμβάνειν παρὰ ταῦτα is a strange phrase for 'to include in this total'; παρά is not the preposition that is wanted and it is not really clear what is meant by ταῦτα. Furthermore, this phrase in parenthesis adds nothing to the sentence; it is quite unnecessary after what has gone before. The emendation may therefore be criticized because, instead of making a corrupt phrase intelligible, it supplies something clumsy and superfluous.

The alternative is to keep περί and ask whether ταῦτα μή may not be a corruption of some place-name. The answer is simple: Γαυγάμηλα. Confusion of *gamma* and *tau* is easy and λα- could easily disappear before ληφθέντων. So we have: χωρὶς τῶν ἐν

Βαβυλῶνι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν περὶ Γαυγάμηλα ληφθέντων, 'apart from the treasure at Babylon and the treasure in the camp, that is to say the loot captured at Gaugamela'. With this reading the 'camp' is the Macedonian camp; but since the Persian camp at Gaugamela was overrun,[1] it is arguable that one more change should be made and that the text should read *τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῷ περὶ Γαυγάμηλα*, 'the loot captured in the Persian camp at Gaugamela'. This further change, however, is not necessary, because the 'loot taken at Gaugamela' may be considered to include other treasures besides those captured in the Persian camp—for example, the objects acquired at Arbela.[2] Strabo is evidently following the account given by one of the historians of Alexander's expedition, who tried to estimate the value of the captured Persian treasure at a time when the booty of Gaugamela had not yet been distributed or put into store, as it would be by the time the army left Susa for the farther East.

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[1] Arrian, *Anab.* 3. 15. 4.

[2] Ibid. 3. 15. 2; Quint. Curt. 5. 1. 2.

PLATO AND HISTORY

Not being an historian but a philosopher, largely concerned with political theory, Plato was not primarily interested in historical inquiry (ἱστορία) for its own sake. His references to history or prehistory, when they occur, are introduced for the purpose of illustrating some particular point of doctrine, generally ethical or political. This means that he treats history as linked up with the various aspects of philosophy, so that we can fairly ascribe to him a 'Philosophy of History', to use the phrase which has become fashionable in historiographical circles since Voltaire first invented it.

And, in fact, a Philosophy of History has been ascribed to him by at least two commentators—James Adam and A. E. Taylor—and by one historian, the author of *The Idea of Progress*. Since the former deal only with isolated points, we get a broader view of Plato's attitude from J. B. Bury's observations.

> 'The general view of Greek philosophers was that they were living in a period of inevitable degeneration and decay—inevitable because it was prescribed by the nature of the universe.... We may take Plato's tentative philosophy of history to illustrate the trend and the prejudices of Greek thought on this subject. The world was created and set going by the Deity, and, as his work, it was perfect; but it was not immortal and had in it the seeds of decay. The period of its duration is 72,000 solar years. During the first half of this period the original uniformity and order, which were impressed upon it by the Creator, are maintained under his guidance; but then it reaches a point from which it begins, as it were, to roll back; the Deity has loosened his grip of the machine, the order is disturbed, and the second 36,000 years are a period of gradual decay and degeneration. At the end of this time, the world left to itself would dissolve into chaos, but the Deity again seizes the helm and restores the original conditions, and the whole process begins anew. The first half of such a world-cycle corresponds to the Golden Age of legend, in which men lived happily and simply; we have now unfortunately reached some point in the period of decadence.
>
> 'Plato applies the theory of degradation in his study of political communities. He conceives his own utopian aristocracy as having existed somewhere towards the beginning of the period of the world's relapse, when things were not so bad, and exhibits its gradual deterioration, through the successive stages of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. He explains this deterioration as primarily caused by a degeneration of the race, due to laxity and errors in the State regulation of marriages, and the consequent birth of biologically inferior individuals.'

This summary account states fairly and clearly the main points in Plato's relevant theories as set forth in the *Politicus* Myth and in *Rep*. 8. A quotation from Adam's *Notes* on the latter book will serve to make its doctrine still more clear:

> 'The question, as Nettleship says, which Plato puts before himself is this: "The human soul being as we have described it, and having in it a certain capacity for evil as well as for good, what would it come to, and through what stages would it pass, if its capacity for evil were realized gradually but without any abatement? . . . These books therefore put before us an ideal history of evil, as the previous books put before us an ideal history of good.'

After this quotation from Nettleship, Adam proceeds to observe that, throughout, the πολιτεία is regarded as 'the Soul of the State', and that 'although Plato treats the whole question from a psychological rather than a historical standpoint, it is none the less true that the materials of his picture are taken from Greek political and social life. . . . It should be noted that Plato has given us in this part of the *Republic* the earliest attempt at a Philosophy of History, and founded the psychological interpretation of the State. Every political movement is, according to him, the expression of some particular psychological impulse or impulses, and the Constitution inevitably assumes different forms, according as one or another element or "part" of soul obtains the mastery in the individual citizen.'

As regards the statement that Plato's is 'the earliest attempt at a Philosophy of History', one may observe in passing that a similar claim had already been made for Herodotus by F. B. Jevons. The determination of the Nuptial or Secular Number, 36,000, as denoting the Age of the Cosmos not only links this passage with the 'periods' described in the *Politicus* Myth but also suggests a definite ratio between the life-periods of the Macrocosm and Man the Microcosm, since that of the latter is assumed to be—as Adam points out—100 years, which is 36,000 days. Consequently, since the State is regarded as the individual Man 'writ large', we have these three objects of study—the individual, the State, and the Universe—set before us as exhibiting similar qualities and planned on identical lines: the differences between them are those of magnitude, not of structure. We shall expect, then, that, *mutatis mutandis*, the same causes will operate in all three alike whether to produce good or to produce evil, whether to save or to destroy the organism.

Thus Plato's Philosophy may be said to comprise—apart from Dialectic—these three closely related branches of investigation and speculation—Ethics, Politics, and Cosmology; and those who would (like Collingwood) confine the term 'History' to the investigation of *res gestae*, human actions, would naturally tend to disregard the Cosmology. On the other hand, if philosophers like Hegel and Collingwood maintain that 'All history is the history of thought', a Platonist might contend that this view is akin but inferior to that of Plato for whom 'all history is the history of soul'. It is so because the material of History, whether human actions or natural events, all ultimately proceeds from the activity of Soul, which as the Self-movent is the primary Cause of all motion, all life, all change: behind all that happens whether in Man or in Nature we should postulate the driving force of Soul, the Maker of History.

Important as is the study of the Cosmos for its bearing on Ethics and Politics and the lessons that may be drawn from it, the greater part of Plato's teaching is devoted to matters of human interest. The *Republic* has brought us face to face with the problem of evil and the ways in which degeneration and deterioration are liable to occur in men and in States. Further consideration is given to this subject in Plato's latest work, the *Laws*. Passages in Book 3 are especially noteworthy as illustrating the way in which the philosopher elicits doctrine from History, and it is in one of them that A. E. Taylor discovered 'Plato's philosophy of history'. Here is a summary of it: (*Laws* 683 ff.): The case of the Dorian Federation of the three States of Argos, Messene, and Lacedaemon forms an historical example of the principle that governments are dissolved only by themselves. It was intended to form a bulwark against a barbarian invasion: it seemed at the first invincible and destined to endure for long. Nor was it ignorance of the arts of war that caused it to break down, but what we must term 'the grossest ignorance' (ἀμαθία), which consists in 'want of accord, on the part of the feelings of pleasure and pain, with the rational judgment'. We term it 'grossest', or greatest, because it belongs to the main mass of the Soul—corresponding to the mass of the populace in a State. Practical wisdom (φρόνησις) depends on the maintenance of concord (συμφωνία) and 'harmony' in the relations between these two elements, the rational and the non-rational, in the individual and the State alike. From that gross 'ignorance' Argos and Messene suffered: their rulers were autocratic and brought them to ruin. It is fatal to allow one man to wield irresponsible power. Sparta, on the other hand, survived through possessing a mixed government of two kings, a senate of elders, and ephors; thus proving the value of the balance of power, and the general principle that everywhere the mean is better than the extreme. The history of Persia compared with that of Athens affords another illustration of these truths. The autocracy of the Persian rulers Cyrus and Darius was tolerable because they were on good terms with their subjects, but the children who succeeded them, reared in luxury by their foolish mothers, had no care for their people, and proved despotic in the extreme. Contrariwise, the Athenian democracy fell away from its early spirit of reverence for law and order and plunged into excesses of licentious conduct.

It may be noted here that there is one special term, of which Plato is fond, to denote comprehensively the special vice which brings ultimate ruin to all forms of human life, namely πλεονεξία—claiming too much, aggressiveness, self-aggrandizement. It is a form of the excessive 'self-love' (φιλαυτία) which (in 5. 732 D ff.) he denounces as 'the cause of all sins', 'the greatest of all evils implanted in men's souls'. He finds it, for instance, in the Persian despots who sought only their own aggrandizement. It is the opposite of the guiding principle of moral virtue and political justice which is observance of τὸ μέτριον, the Golden Mean, the Due Measure, which has the sanction of the Deity Himself. Readers of the *Philebus* will not need to be reminded how closely, in Plato's doctrine, τὸ μέτριον is related to τἀγαθόν—Moderation to Goodness; and readers of the *Ethics* will recollect how for Aristotle ἀρετή is ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα—merely a slight divergence.

What is really the same view of the cause of political decadence is presented to us in the *Critias*, although in a somewhat different form. The Kings of Atlantis, descended from the ten sons of the sea-god Poseidon, remained for ages happily leagued together, wise and law-abiding, until at last 'the portion of divinity within them became weak and faint through being ofttimes blended with a large measure of mortality, and they became filled with lawless ambition (πλεονεξία) and power'. Hence 'Zeus, who rules by law, desired to inflict punishment upon them, to the end that when chastised they might strike a truer note' (or achieve harmony). Their subsequent defeat by the Athenian power fulfilled his intention. Here, again, the sin of πλεονεξία is the immediate occasion of the downfall of the princes, but behind it lies, as the root-cause, the gradual psychical deterioration of the originally divine harmony of soul, conceived as perfect because divine, when subjected to repeated irruptions of the discordant elements which inevitably inhere in mortal nature. It was with them as with the Universe—as related in the *Politicus* Myth—in which, after the reversal of its motion, 'by degrees the corporeal element (τὸ σωματοειδές) in its primeval nature prevailed more and more, till finally it was in danger of destruction from its disorder'. Everywhere the general law prevails which condemns all that is mundane, all that is phenomenal, however seemingly perfect, however temporarily stable, to ultimate decay and transformation if not actual destruction: Plato endorses the dictum of Heraclitus.

Since History must deal largely with human actions, and these are derived from human character, the Philosopher of History should not fail to observe that character may differ from race to race, or nation to nation: he should not assume that it is everywhere uniform. Plato avoided that error. He held (*Rep.* 435) that different races were marked by different 'ruling passions', so to say, since the three elements or 'parts' of the soul are not equally distributed either amongst individuals or amongst nations. He assigns Reason pre-eminently to the Greeks, Courage or Spirit to the Northern barbarians, and Love of Gain (*auri sacra fames*) to the Phoenicians. Here we may claim that Plato in some measure forestalls the German philosopher of history Herder (*c.* 1790), who—according to Collingwood—'was the first thinker to recognize in a systematic way that there are differences between different kinds of men—racial peculiarities'.

The unequal distribution of soul-qualities amongst individuals is also a fact which History should take into account; the more so because character is, in Plato's belief, inherited. This is implied in the passage of *Rep.* 5 (458 ff.) where the rules for human mating are prescribed: to secure the best offspring, in men as in horses and dogs, we must breed from the best parents: *fortes creantur fortibus et bonis*. Again, in the latter part of the *Politicus* (306 ff.), where the tissue of a State is compared to a woven garment, the Statesman is instructed to weave together temperaments which are naturally opposed—the fiery and spirited, as the tough warp, with the calm and peace-loving, as the yielding woof. For if the former type prevails in a State it will, by its aggressive spirit, plunge it into ruinous wars; while the 'peace at any price' policy, which would certainly be adopted by citizens of the latter type if they held the power, would ultimately lead to the enslavement of the State by some foreign force which was tempted by their weakness. Here then again marriage-rules must be enforced to secure that like temperaments do not mate with like—the gentle with the gentle, or the bold with the bold; otherwise, in the course of generations the bold will turn into madmen, the gentle into simpletons. Thus we see that however much stress Plato lays on the importance of nurture and education as a political instrument, he is equally insistent that Nature and natural law must never be disregarded, nor ever contravened.

But, it may be objected, all this, however interesting to the legislator or the reformer, and however suggestive to the student of psychology and ethics, has little to do with History and need not concern the historian. His primary concern, no doubt, is with actual occurrences, *res gestae*; but he need be no worse an historian if he tries to look beneath the surface of the facts as they present themselves and to search out the underlying causes which have given rise to the apparent facts —in other words, if he essays to interpret the history. If so, he will recognize that behind History lies Human Nature, behind the *res gestae* the *gerentes*, the actors behind the actions, so that every beam of light which is thrown on human nature helps to illumine History. Few thinkers have reflected more deeply than Plato on the various aspects of human nature and the life of the soul, which is the spring of all the actions with which the historian has to deal, and the historian who ignores his teaching loses much. Thus, for instance, with reference to the passages just cited from the *Republic* and the *Politicus* regarding the inheritance of natural characteristics and the advisability of blending opposite temperaments, the philosophical historian can deduce from Plato's doctrine both a plausible explanation of some of the reasons for the decline and fall of a nation and a helpful suggestion as to the origin of wars. Ultimately all the phenomena, all the secondary causes of History, are to be traced back to one and the same primary Cause, the Soul. That is the lesson which Plato would teach the historian: it is the core of his Philosophy of History.

Thus far we have been dealing mainly with the bearing of Plato's views on History in the limited sense of the word, as confined to human actions. We now proceed to consider how far he takes account of non-human, natural events.

As Collingwood informs us, 'Since Montesquieu wrote (*c.* 1750) geographical conditions have been recognised by all inquirers as an influential factor in the development of human societies'; and nearly two centuries earlier Bodin (*c.* 1570) had pointed out the influence of Climate. The poets, too, sensitive to natural scenery, have given expression to their belief in what we might call 'The Spirit of Place'. Wordsworth for one:

> Two Voices are there; one is of the Sea,
> One of the Mountain; each a mighty Voice:
> In both from age to age Thou didst rejoice;
> They were thy chosen Music, Liberty!

Plato, it is true, by no means shared the poet's enthusiasm for mountains and sea, if regarded as fitting environments for the establishment of a welfare State. The sea he denounced as a 'salty and bitter neighbour', and in mountainous regions he saw no hope of a soil fertile enough to provide adequate sustenance for a population of any size. He thought that there were strong political reasons for avoiding close proximity to the sea. The influx by sea of large bodies of foreign traders would tend to upset the settled traditions of the citizens; while indulgence by the citizens in any considerable export trade would lead to the gradual commercialization of their character. Moreover, the growth of a merchant service would most probably be followed by the building of a fleet to protect it and its harbours; and this, in turn, would give rise to a desire to gain command of the seas. The final result would be that the State—like the Athens of Pericles—being infected by the poison of aggressive imperialism, would speedily bring about its own downfall. Foreseeing these dangers, and warned by the fate of Athens, what Plato planned for his imaginary State was not an imperial position in the world but a safe and stable position. This summary of the argument of the first section of *Laws* 4 is sufficient to show how much stress Plato lays on geographical and climatic conditions as influencing the political and economical history of a nation. And we can supplement it by a quotation from a later passage in Book 5 (747 D f.): 'Some districts are naturally better than others for the breeding of men of a good or a bad type; this is due to variations in their climate, or their water-supply, or their soil, the products of which, both for good and evil, affect not only their bodies, but their souls as well.' Therefore the choice of a suitable site for a city demands most careful consideration.

Thus far we have been trying to present Plato's attitude to human history in its relation to Nature, so far as Nature remains quiescent and natural conditions remain relatively stable. But, unfortunately for man's comfort, Nature does not remain always quiescent; at times she gives herself a tremendous shake-up, she becomes catastrophic. The first section of *Laws* 3 tells us about this, and how it affects human history. In discussing the progress of civilization we begin by assuming that during the endless ages of the past an infinite number of changes have occurred. Thousands of States have come into existence, have changed from small to great or great to small, and ultimately have perished. The cause of this process of change may plausibly be found in the fact—vouched for by ancient legends—that 'the world of men has often been destroyed by floods, plagues, and many other things, in such a way that only a small portion—"scanty embers"—of the human race survived'. It is the story of 'the Remnant' faced over and over again with the same task of evolving into a full-grown State. With the gradual stages of that evolution as depicted by Plato we need not now concern ourselves. Similar stories of convulsions of Nature causing ruin to mankind by fire or flood or earthquake are to be found in the discourse of the Egyptian priest recorded in *Timaeus* 22 A ff., and in the Myth in the *Politicus* catastrophes of a like kind are said to follow the reversal of the Cosmic motion.

Having now considered some of the main points in Plato's view of History as based on human nature and largely swayed by influences independent of human volition, but attributable to external or Cosmic Nature, our task is nearing an end. It only remains to touch on two other points—Chance and Deity.

First, as regards Deity, Plato emphatically denies that God is the direct cause of evil: of anything less than good, θεὸς ἀναίτιος, 'the Cause does not lie in God', as the *Republic* declares; and when, in the *Timaeus*, the Divine Constructor of the Universe distributes among the 'organs of Time' (the planets) the souls of mortal creatures, he does so 'to the end that He might be blameless (ἀναίτιος) in respect of the future wickedness of any one of them'. Then, having passed over to the minor deities—the Star-gods—the task of controlling humanity aright, except so far as it might be the cause of its own evils, the Deity retired from active participation in the course of History. The last we see of Him is when, like Titania, having given His final directions to His underlings, He dismisses them with the injunction—'Then to your offices and let me rest'. And thereafter, while they get busy, He rests—'abiding in His own proper and wonted state'. Such a conception of the Deity is very different from that of the Hebrew historians who described Jehovah as ever actively and directly controlling the course of human affairs; and when Isaiah (xlv) makes the Lord say of Himself 'I make peace and create evil', the contrast with Plato's theology is especially striking. It seems safe to say that when Plato speaks of 'God' seriously he means by the term what he elsewhere calls *Nous*, Pure Intelligence, the highest element in Soul, that Supreme Cause which has made the Universe the best of all possible worlds. He seems to allow—in the *Politicus* Myth—that God may intervene at a crisis in mundane affairs, but even if he is earnest about this, such crises only occur at long intervals determined by world-periods.

But although Plato refuses to ascribe the direct control of mundane affairs to the Providence of the Supreme God, he strongly maintains (in *Laws* 10) that those affairs are watched over and superintended by a number of minor deities—gods or daemons—who have charge of the various parts of the Universe, and whose task it is to guide and control those parts so as to ensure the welfare of the whole. They act as delegates of the Supreme God in order to secure, so far as possible, the triumph of order over disorder, of Reason over Unreason, of Good over Evil, throughout the Universe; and in particular, they care for humanity as shepherds care for their flocks. Thus the idea of Providence is here reintroduced at a lower level, as it were, by the device of supplementing monotheism by polytheism—a device which still leaves God, in the highest sense, free from all contact with or responsibility for evil. Plato, in short, side-steps the problem of evil.

We may consider next whether this conception of Providence allows us to find any place for Chance in Plato's doctrine. Chance is, in truth, an elusive concept, the relation of which to History has raised no little debate. Thus, whereas Montesquieu sought to show that the vicissitudes of Societies are subject to law, Voltaire believed that events are determined by Chance where they are not consciously guided by human reason. It has been argued by J. B. Bury—following a suggestion of Cournot (1872)—that Chance means 'contingency', which may be defined as 'the collision of two independent causal chains'. For example, Napoleon's existence at a given point of time was due to a certain chain of causes which had nothing to do with the course of political events, but the colliding of these two chains of causes formed a 'contingency' which profoundly affected the course of history. Cleopatra's nose affords another striking example, since we can hardly deny the historical importance of the fascinating configuration of that feature; although it has, in fact, been contested, as, for instance, by Collingwood: 'The remark of Pascal that if Cleopatra's nose had been longer the whole history of the world would have been different is typical of a bankruptcy of historical method which in despair of genuine explanation acquiesces in the most trivial causes for the vastest effects.' 'Contingency', says the same scholar, 'means unintelligibility.' All the same it would be folly to deny that trivial causes may produce vast effects, as was clearly pointed out by Amiel: 'What we call little things are merely the causes of great things. An enormous avalanche begins by the displacement of one atom; and the conflagration of a town by the fall of a match. Accident plays a vast part in human affairs.' Even if we are forbidden to identify Chance with Contingency, we dare not try to oust Fortune, that fickle goddess, from the sphere of History, feeling sure that what is true of Nature is true also of her—*Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret.*

Turning now to Plato, let us try to define his attitude to this dubious and delicate matter. Perhaps the most pertinent passage—apart from hints deducible from the *Timaeus*—is to be found in *Laws* 4. 709 f.: 'I was on the point of saying that no man ever makes laws, but chances and accidents (τύχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραί) of all kinds, occurring in all sorts of ways, make all our laws for us. . . . It might seem proper to say that human affairs are nearly all matters of pure chance (τύχας). . . . But it may also be affirmed that God controls all that is, and that Chance (τύχη) and Occasion (καιρός) co-operate with God in the control of human affairs. And with these two we should associate a third factor—Art (τέχνη).' If a State is ruled by an exemplary king, he will be 'lucky' (εὐτυχής) 'if in his time there should arise a praiseworthy lawgiver, and if a certain piece of luck (τύχην) should bring the two together' (710 D). In this last sentence we seem to have a case of 'contingency', very similar to that which some have discovered in the history of Napoleon. These passages certainly make it quite clear that Plato did not wish to banish Chance from History. He gives it an intermediate place between the operations due to human reason and skill (τέχνη) and those due to the originating Supreme Cause, Divine Intelligence, the place in which we expect to find the workings of secondary or accessory causes (συναιτία).

The notion of Chance crops up again in *Laws* 10: 'It is stated by some that all things which have come, or are coming, or will come into existence, do so partly by Nature (φύσει), partly by Chance (τύχῃ), and partly owing to Art (διὰ τέχνην).' These people ascribe the motions and minglings of physical bodies and their qualities to Chance, working with Nature, 'not to reason (διὰ νοῦν), nor to any god, nor to art'; but while their crass materialism is abhorrent to Plato, who occupies much of this tenth Book in denouncing it, he does not withdraw his earlier statement that Chance does play some part in deciding the course of human affairs.

That Art is a factor to be reckoned with is the first thing we learn from the *Timaeus*, where God plays the part of the 'Demiurge', the World-Artist, copying a Model. And whereas in the passage quoted above from *Laws* 4 the operation of Art appeared to be distinct from that of God, in the *Timaeus* there is no such distinction, since it is no longer human but divine art that is being described. It is not so clear where that other factor, Chance, finds a place in the *Timaeus*. The most suggestive passage seems to be 46 D ff., where the distinction is drawn between two kinds of efficient Causes—'those which belong to the Intelligent Nature and are artificers of things fair and good, and those which are devoid of intelligence and produce always accidental and irregular effects (τὸ τυχὸν ἄτακτον)'. Here (in τὸ τυχόν) we get a glimpse of Chance (τύχη) as probably lurking somewhere in the class of unintelligent Causes which operate blindly rather than purposefully. In 48 A ff. we come to a passage in which, after the account of the operations of Reason, those of Necessity (ἀνάγκη) are set forth. First it is explained that 'this Cosmos in its origin was generated as a compound, from the combination of Necessity and Reason', and that the combination was satisfactory so far as Necessity yielded to the persuasions of Reason, as she did for the most part. But not invariably; for in spite of the best efforts of the Divine Reason, the Demiurge, He can never quite perfectly realize His perfect designs because of an intrinsic and incorrigible element which subsists always in the World. We may guess at the origin of that refractory residuum, as we might term it, if we recall the earlier passage 30 A: 'When God took over all the visible which was in a state of discordant and disorderly (πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως) motion, He brought it into order (εἰς τάξιν) out of disorder.' He did not create the World, He merely cosmicized it, and that only 'so far as possible' (κατὰ δύναμιν), for the original elements, or properties, of the primeval Chaos still inhered in the World after Cosmos was imposed upon it, after God had 'taken it over'. This seems to explain what Plato means by 'Necessity' or, as he also calls it, 'the Errant Cause' (πλανωμένη αἰτία). We imagine it as a force that, as it were, goes astray, loses its right road and blindly collides with some other moving force, whether rational or irrational, and thus appears on the level of History as Chance, in the sense of 'Contingency'. And inasmuch as this irrational factor, this 'Errant Cause' which is deaf to the voice of Reason, was no part of God's design but was inherent in the chaotic material which He had to 'take over', no responsibility for any of the evil it may cause can attach to God. By thus antedating the existence of potentially evil 'powers', or elements, to a time before God came on the scene, Plato stands clear of 'the problem of evil' as it faces the believers in a Deity who is a Creator in the strict sense of the term, both omnipotent and omniscient.

Having seen, then, how Nature, Providence, and Chance are all given by Plato a part to play in determining the course of History, and how behind all these lies the ultimate Cause of all change, the Self-moving, everlasting Soul, we may sum up his interpretation of History by saying once again that for Plato 'All History is the history of Soul'. Recalling, then, the famous simile in the *Phaedrus*, where the human soul is compared to a Charioteer (Reason) driving a pair of horses (Passion and Desire), we may say, in fine, that the History of Humanity is the story of that eventful drive.

R. G. BURY.

CAMBRIDGE.

AESCHYLUS, *AGAM*. 231 ff., ILLUSTRATED

. . . *φράσεν δ' ἀόζοις πατὴρ μετ' εὐχαν*[1] | *δίκαν χιμαίρας ὕπερθε βωμοῦ* | *πέπλοισι περιπετῆ*[2] *παντὶ θυμῷ προνωπῆ*[3] | *λαβεῖν ἀέρδην* . . . *κρόκου βαφὰς δ'* (cf. 1121 ff.) *ἐς πέδον χέουσα* | *ἔβαλλ' ἕκαστον θυτήρων* . . . *βέλει φιλοίκτῳ* | *πρέπουσα τὼς ἐν γραφαῖς*[4] . . ..



Sacrifice of Polyxena on Attic amphora, c. 550 B.C.[5]
c. $\frac{2}{5}$ of nat. size

OXFORD

P. MAAS

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[1] *εὐχὰν* or *εὐχᾶν?*

[2] Wrapped in her own garments in such a way that she cannot move arms or legs; cf. drawing.

[3] = *πρηνῆ*, opp. *ὑπτίαν*, cf. drawing.

[4] '*'Ο Αἰσχύλος ἴσως εἶχε πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔργον τοῦ Πολυγνώτου ἀπεικονίζον τὴν θυσίαν τῆς Πολυξένης. Ἔπιθι* [H.] Brunn, *Geschichte der griech. Künstler* [2nd ed., 1889] 2. 18': N. Wecklein in the translation of his commentary on Aeschylus by E. I. Zomarides, iii (1910), 66. Brunn refers to Pausan. 1. 22. 6 and Pollianus, *Anth. Pal.* xvi. 150, neither of whom agrees with either Aeschylus or the amphora.

[5] Acquired by the British Museum *c.* 1895. Now on exhibition in King Edward VII galleries. Cf. H. B. Walters, *J.H.S.* xviii (1898), 282–8 with Plate XV; hence the smaller reproductions in J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1903), 62, fig. 9; Roscher, *Myth. Lex.* s.v. 'Polyxena' (*c.* 1907), fig. 12; T. Tosi, *Atene e Roma* xvii (1914), 27; E. Galli, *Monumenti . . . dei Lincei*, xxiv (1916), 66; C. Fontenoy, *Antiquité classique*, xix (1950), Pl. I. I found nowhere a reference to Aeschylus.—For a photograph of the whole amphora see also H. B. Walters, *Hist. anc. pottery* (1905), pl. xxiii.

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